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INTRODUCTION
The endless cycle of idea and action
Endless invention, endless experiment,
Brings knowledge of motion, but not of stillness;
Knowledge of speech, but not of silence;
Knowledge of words, and ignorance of.the Word.
-T.S. Eliot'

Perhaps the most important of all important fundamental questions about
law is whether it is obligatory. Yet curiously enough, when one surveys the
reams of scholarship generated by those with an interest in law and legal
systems, the paucity of attention to this question is evident.2 One cannot help
but get the impression that discussion of certain matters is considered taboo;
indeed, that unless one is prepared to face the collapse of the entire legal
system, examination of the foundational premises upon which that system
rests is off-limits. Examination of such premises is to be ascetically avoided
by centering discussion on the range of technical subsidiary matters that.

* Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law. J.S.D., 1987, and Cutting Fellow, 198081, Columbia University.
1. T.S. ELIOT, Choruses from "The Rock", in THE COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS 96 (1971).
2. But see, e.g., RONALD M. DwORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 190-224 (1986); JOHN FINNIs, NATURAL
LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 314-43 (1980); PHILIP SOPER, A THEORY OF LAW 57-100 (1984).
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surround and, through consequent preoccupation, deflect attention from the
truly essential.3
There is no doubt that there is genuine value in concentrating on subsidiary
matters that envelop those aspects regarding the nature of law itself. Such
treatment enhances the meaning of specific legal rules, their relationship to
whole areas of law, and the workings of the legal system. But unless the very
thing that has precipitated such an outpouring of analytical and creative talent
has the force to bind those to whom it is directed, then far too much cerebral
energy has been spent on describing a will-o-the-wisp. Admittedly, the law
may be backed by the bite of official social sanction. And commentators,
evincing a natural preference for the organizing and ordering attributes of law,
may even write and speak about it as though it were obligatory. Still, in
passing over whether law binds and focusing instead on its interpretation,
explication, application, and creation, the law is given an importance with
regards to the resolution of social problems that is perhaps undeserved.4 In
light of the possibility of practical advantages incident to alternative
conceptions of law, it may also be deprived of the chance to become all that
it can be as a device for organizing and ordering the affairs of humankind.5
The importance of the question of the law's ability to bind is illustrated by
looking at three specific areas, the first of which is contemporary theoretical
scholarship. For some time now commentators have offered their considered
opinions on the courts' authority to exercise judicial review to invalidate
statutes not inconsistent with any plain constitutional text,' uphold statutes

3. This is not a phenomenon confined to law, but appears in other disciplines as well. Organized
religions seldom entertain inquiry concerning the omnipotence or equitableness of God. But see
generally HAROLD S. KUSHNER, WHEN BAD THINGS HAPPEN TO GOOD PEOPLE (1981). Similarly,
political ideologies scarcely ever examine the assumptions upon which their social constructs rest. But
see generally ROBERTO UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975). The scientific community itself
operates in a milieu that always takes current scientific laws for granted until enough incompatibilities
appear and necessitate some form of reanalysis and reworking. See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
4. Law is generally viewed as an instrument for addressing social problems. When it is conceived
of as binding, there is a heightened expectation that it will be able to address such problems with some
apparent degree of success. As a result, it is not at all strange to witness members of a social community
attempting to deal with the community's difficulties, in large part, through legal pronouncements. To
the extent that efforts on other fronts are essential, they may receive less attention. See infra text
accompanying notes 167-77.
5. A very rigid conception of law can produce a certain sterility or paralysis that impedes the use
of law to advance social progress. Cf.MORTON J. HORWrIz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW
253-66 (1977) (discussing the displacement of traditional legal doctrines that worked against commercial
development with modem doctrines that promoted such). It should be observed that every learned firstyear law student is aware of how the rejection of the ancient doctrine of the free flow of air and light
allowed for the promotion of urban development. See Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182 (Wis. 1982).
6. A classic opinion taking such an approach is Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(holding a law forbidding contraception unconstitutional despite absence of constitutional language of
prohibition). For commentary on such an approach to statutory invalidation, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE LJ. 943 (1987); Robert H. Bork, Neutral
Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Paul Brest, The Fundamental
Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictionsof Normative ConstitutionalScholarship, 90 YALE
L.J. 1063 (1981); Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REv. 165 (1985).
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inconsistent with a plain text,7 nullify other statutes because they happen to
be antiquated,' or make "federal common law." 9 Commentators have also

written much about the determinacy of law, questioning whether its application produces a single right answer or several opposed, possible answers.'0
In addition, they have dissected legal reasoning itself, focusing not so much
on the appropriateness of the premises upon which the reasoning rests as on
the way in which it explains the intellectual process by which a decision is
arrived at on its own merits or from precedent." And finally, under the

appellation of "interpretivism," there has been a retreat from the traditional
subject/object, idealism/nominalism, realism/antirealism debate and a move in
the direction of emphasis on the preeminent place occupied by the act of
interpretation, without regard to assessing the correctness of either the result
of the interpretation or the reasoning by which it is achieved."

7. See Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 865 (1960); Richard A. Epstein,
Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 703 (1984); Steven D. Smith, Why
Should Courts Obey the Law?, 77 GEo. L.J. 113, 145 n.131 (1988); Harry H. Wellington, On Freedom
ofExpression, 88 YALE L.J 1105 (1979). For cases in the area, see East New York Say. Bank v. Hahn,
326 U.S. 230 (1945) (upholding state mortgage moratorium laws despite the constitutional prohibition
on laws impairing contract), and Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444 (1934). On
the contract clause, see also Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light, 459 U.S. 400 (1983) and
Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1980) (upholding state statutes impacting contracts). With
regard to the First Amendment, see generally Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (upholding
§ 3 of Espionage Act of 1917 from a First Amendment challenge associated with a conviction for
circulation of a written document); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (upholding an Espionage
Act conviction for a public address); FRANCIS WHARTON, STATE TRIALS OF THE UNrrED STATES
DURING THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF WASHINGTON AND ADAMs (1849) (discussing cases upholding the

Sedition Act of 1798 notwithstanding the First Amendment protection of speech and press).
8.See GUIDO CALABRESi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); Allen C.

Hutchinson & Derek Morgan, CalabresianSunset: Statutes in the Shade, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1752
(1982) (book review).
9. See Martha A. Field, Sources ofLaw: The Scope of FederalCommon Law, 99 HARV. L. REV.
881 (1986); Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine and The Constitution, 53 Nw. U. L. REV. 427 (1958);
Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of FederalCourts, 52 U. CH. L. REV. 1 (1985); Paul
J.Mishkin, The Variousnessof "FederalLaw": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National
and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV.797 (1957); Martin H. Redish, Continuingthe Erie
Debate: A Response to Westen & Lehman, 78 MICH. L. REv. 959 (1980); Peter Westen & Jeffrey S.
Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311 (1980); Note,
Federal Common Law and Article III. A JurisdictionalApproach to Erie, 74 YALE L.J. 325 (1964). For
basic cases, compare Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (urging an active role
with regard to the formulation of federal common law), with Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, 451
U.S. 630 (1981) (taking a restrictive view of power to formulate federal common law).
10. See Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997
(1985); Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology ofBureaucracyin American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276 (1984);
Allan C. Hutchinson, Democracy and Determinacy. An Essay on Legal Interpretation,43 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 541 (1989); Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984); Ken Kress, Legal
Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L. REv. 283 (1989).
1I.
See Vincent A. Wellman, PracticalReasoningand JudicialJustification:Toward an Adequate
Theory, 57 U. COLO. L. REv. 45 (1985); Richard Warner, Comment, Three Theories of Legal
Reasoning, 62 S.CAL. L. REV. 1523 (1989).
12. See generally Robert M. Cover, Forward:Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1983)
(arguing that the context in which law is made is part and parcel of its meaning); Stanley Fish, Dennis
Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773 (1987); Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L.
REv. 1325 (1984); Stanley Fish, Interpretationand the Pluralist Vision, 60 TEx. L. REv. 495 (1982);
Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982); James B. White, Law as
Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 TEx. L. REv. 415 (1982). See also RICHARD
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In each instance, theoretical scholarship has tended to proceed without
considering whether law is obligatory. No matter what position a particular
commentator takes, the unspoken assumption is that law does indeed bind
those to whom it is directed. Obligation goes without saying. Yet in the event
this unstated premise is faulty, if the force of law is something which has
been incorrectly taken for granted, the significance of judicial review, legal
determinacy, case law reasoning, and interpretivism would appear to be
substantially undercut in all but the most formalistic of senses.
The second area illustrating the importance of this same matter has to do
with existing judicialprecedent involving real-life legal issues. As we all
know, the courts frequently hold forth on sensitive and complex disputes
concerning whether the straightforward words of a contractual commitment
between private parties,1 3 the character of an unequivocal rule of the
common law,' 4 the plain terminology of a legislatively decreed statutory
6
mandate,"5 or the absolutistic expression of a constitutional provision
establish standards from which departure is disfavored. And just as with the
commentary on contemporary theoretical issues, the judicial opinions tackling
these disputes of obvious importance to the litigants are penned from the
perspective that since it is universally accepted that law is binding, there need
not be a single word said in defense of that proposition. Attention is focused
almost exclusively on whether any of the sundry number of stratagems
available for avoiding an adverse determination can be employed.'" The
power of law to obligate is simply viewed as a given. On the offhand chance
no logical reason exists for accepting such a proposition, it seems that much
that is onanistic could therefore be found in a substantial amount of judicial
decisions.
A third area in which the question of law's ability to bind is important
involves those individuals outside the formal machinery of the legal decisionmaking process as well as those within it who have a direct personal stake in

RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979). For a critical review of interpretivism see

Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse?, 41 STA. L. REV.
871 (1989) (attempting to demonstrate the need to return to the realist/antirealist debate).
13. See Clarkin v. Duggan, 198 N.E. 170 (Mass. 1935) (finding private express easement for "teams
only").
14. Consider the traditional common law doctrine of privity of contract, established in Winterbottom
v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842) (requiring a contractual relation between
a plaintiff and the one sued for personal injury resulting from an item of tangible property).
15. See State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971) (disregarding a statute subjecting to a fine "any
person who trespasses on any lands... after being forbidden so to trespass by the owner"); see also
K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988) (approving U.S. Customs Service regulations
allowing certain imports when the controlling statute says importation "shall be unlawful"). On K-Mart,
see Thomas 0. Depperschmidt, The Supreme Court Decision on Gray Markets in K-Mart v. Cartier,
Inc.: When is 'PlainLanguage' Not Plain?, 15 S. ILL. U. L.J. 67 (1990).
16. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (interpreting U.S. CONST. amend. I); Moon
v. Freeman, 379 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1967) (interpreting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5).
17. Those strategems first resorted to would include attempting to identify determinative factual
distinctions between the case at hand and the earlier precedent-setting case; closely examining the
language of the contractual, statutory, or constitutional provision in dispute to ascertain whether it is
susceptible to interpretation; and seeking the purpose or objective of the rule being applied so as to
avoid arriving at a decision consistent with its strict language but inconsistent with its goal.
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understanding how to act when facing a problem that can be answered by
some rule of law. Whether private citizen, governmental official, lawyer, or
judge, the practical concerns attendant to membership in a social community
require reference to rules of law. When the rules indicate they expect actions
at variance with those that happen to be contemplated, the matter of law's
ability to obligate is directly implicated. This is certainly true whenever an
individual contemplates civil disobedience, 8 a public official considers
contravening a legislative mandate, 9 a lawyer advises a client of the
morality (versus the immorality) of conduct currently deemed unlawful, 0 a
judge considers departing from well settled rules of law,2 or a jury reflects
on ignoring the law so it can arrive at a decision it finds more appropriate.2 2
Most who encounter situations that pit what they would like to do against
what the law dictates, follow the law. However, even those who decide to
pursue actions inconsistent with what the law declares most likely do so
because they think it expedient, not because they have concluded law is
incapable of fixing obligation. But is it not true that if law lacks the force to
bind, many have already been, and many more in the future may be,
compelled to endure anguish over their actions for the wrong reason? If law
is not obligatory, it seems people facing the pinch of legal rules may be
dealing with the dilemma without reflection on all the variables that should
affect their decisions.
In the pages that follow, I offer some thoughts on whether law is obligatory.
My most ambitious expectation is that the attempt will facilitate a better
comprehension of the significance of the theoretical, precedential, and
practical matters to which I have alluded. Candidly, however, the effort would
prove more than satisfying if it did nothing but contribute to an increase in
the number of those interested in reflecting on the deeper mysteries of law.

18. On following the law in this context see generally HENRY D. THOREAU, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
(1849), reprinted in THOREAU: WALDEN AND OTHER WRITINGS 85 (Joseph W. Krutch ed., 1962).
19. The Iran-Contra Affair provides a recent example of this at the highest levels of government.
See, e.g., SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE SALE OF ARMS
TO IRAN AND POSSIBLE DIVERSION OF FUNDS TO THE NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE, S. REP. No. 7, 100th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1987). For an earlier instance of executive disregard of a legislative enactment see
Louis HENmI, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 106 n.42 (1972) (revealing that President
Roosevelt placed reliance on an executive agreement overcoming earlier Congressional enactment).
20. With regard to an attorney's professional responsibility concerning an unlawful act contemplated
by a client, once the fact of the act's unlawfulness has been communicated, the Code of Professional
Responsibility does not clearly obligate the attorney to refrain from informing the client that the act is
nonetheless moral. See A.B.A. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-8 (1969), reprintedin
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY LII (rev. 4th ed. 1968) ("Advice of a lawyer... need not be confined to
purely legal considerations."). It is conceivable, however, that the Code may be directed toward allowing
reference to morality and other factors only when such a reference supports urgings to follow the law
and not when it cuts the other way.
21. See generally Steven D. Smith, Why Should Courts Obey the Law?, 77 GEo. L.J. 113 (1988)
(arguing for decisions based on a rule of reasonableness).
22. See generally Joseph L. Sax, Conscience and Anarchy: The Prosecution of War Resisters, 57
YALE REv. 483 (1968); Alan W. Schefflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REV.
168 (1972) (examining the authority of a jury to refrain from convicting one because of the view that
the settled law is unjust). For a very recent case reaffirming the power of the jury to acquit a defendant
on the basis of its notions of justice see Reale v. United States, 573 A.2d 13, 15 (D.C. 1990).
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Part I proceeds by categorizing and critiquing the various arguments that
support the notion that law binds.2 3 Immediately following in Part II are a
series of preliminary thoughts regarding my own views on the force of law
and its role in social organization.24 In the Conclusion I argue that movement
away from law-orientedness is intended neither to discount totally the value
of law, nor to substitute deleterious personal subjectivity incapable of
assisting in the solving of day-to-day legal problems.
As will be apparent from the critique in Part I of the theories of obligation,
none of the propositions in support of the binding force of law seem able to
withstand sedulous examination. Nonetheless, Part II argues that chaos and
disorder need not result if the preponderance of social energy is devoted to
nurturing a heightened sense of personal responsibility and individual
accountability. 5 The essential meaning of this is that-even with law being
conceived of as non-obligatory-through cultivating in each member of
society a sense of the importance of always acting so as to evidence
recognition that we are answerable for what we have done or failed to do,
harmony and stability can be secured. Law can be spoken of as binding when
the contrary is known to be true, and, assuming fidelity to the task of
nurturing conscientiousness, considerateness, and commitment borne of
tolerance and skepticism, the virtues of responsibility and accountability can
gradually be conditioned to take on the job of providing guidance for social
organization. The conclusion of this article defends against possible claims
that these virtues cannot prove as effective as law in ordering the affairs of
society. By their very nature they create both internal personal and external
societal constraints on pure subjectivity. The conclusion finishes by returning
to the theoretical, precedential, and practical matters referenced in the opening
pages of this paper and argues that, in moving away from faith in law, the
social fabric can be preserved while allowing for new and creative perspectives on the resolution of difficult legal problems.
I. POSSIBLE BASES OF LEGAL OBLIGATION
No man stood on truth. They were merely branded together, as usual one
leaning on another, and all together on nothing; as the Hindus made the
world rest on an elephant, the elephant on a tortoise, and the tortoise on a
serpent, and had nothing to put under the serpent.
-Henry David Thoreau26
Quite obviously there are numerous ways to examine the entire range of
bases potentially capable of imbuing law with the obligational force to bind.
For instance, one might classify each basis under time-honored jurisprudential

23. See infra part I.
24. See infra part II.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 168-77.
26. HENRY DAVID THOREAU, LIFE WITHOUT PRINCIPLE (1863), reprintedin THOREAU, supra note
18, at 353, 365-66 (Joseph W. Krutch ed., 1962).
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like

positivism"

and

naturalism,28

adding

something

like

27. Positivism is frequently seen as emphasizing promise or consent as the basis of obligation. See
JAMES L. BRIERLY, THE BASIS OF OBLIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (1958). It matters not
whether the consent is evidenced through a social contract establishing a political sovereign, see
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN Pt. II, ch. XVIII (Everyman ed. 1914), or some more direct and
participative method. On discussion of consent as the basis of obligation, see infra notes 56-58 and
accompanying text. Positivism as a school of legal theory gained in strength between the latter years
of the 18th century and the early years of the 20th century. This paralleled the ascendancy of the
modem nation-state, see GEORGE C. CHRISTIE, JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND READINGS ON THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 292-93 (1973), and the advance of physical science, see ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A
CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 223-24 (1947). At the risk of oversimplification,
positivism's distinguishing characteristics include the notions that law proceeds from the dictates of a
sovereign, and that the legal order and the moral order are analytically distinct. See CHRISTIE, supra,
at 292. Positivism is often associated with the view that law is infused with what is necessary to make
it binding because the sovereign has surveyed the range of available standards and then manifested its
consent to one by settling upon and formally prescribing, through the issuance of a statute, decree, or
some instrument, a rule to be observed by those who are subject to the rule's embrace. See PHILIP
SOPER, A THEORY OF LAW 17-18 (1984); James Boyle, Ideals and Things: InternationalLegal
Scholarship and the Prison-house of Language, 26 HARV. INT'L LJ. 327, 334 (1985).
The historical antecedents of positivism extend at least to the 17th century theorist John Locke, who
maintained that consent created a majoritarian community that succeeded to the earlier state of nature
and gave rise to the notion of legal obligation. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL
GOVERNMENT Ch. VIII §§ 95-99, reprinted in JOHN LOCKE, ON POLITICS AND EDUCATION 75, 123-25
(Classics Club ed. 1947). A similar position on the force of consent in the international realm was
expressed by Locke's contemporary countryman, Richard Zouche. See NUSSBAUM, supra, at 118-22
(citing Zouche for the proposition that the principles of international law are rles "accepted by custom
conforming to reason among most nations or which [have] been agreed upon by single nations."
RICHARD ZOUCHE, JURIs ET JUDICIi FECIALIS, SIVE JURIS INTER GENTES (1650), quoted in NUSSBAUM,
supra,at 121 (emphasis added)). Locke's and Zouche's views on the import of consent were reiterated
in the 18th century by David Hume, who maintained that government is established by consent and that
the duty to obey government derives from that consent. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN
NATURE, 470-76, 539-49 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed. 1888). By far the most influential early positivist was
John Austin, founder of the English analytical jurisprudence movement of the 19th century. Unlike
Locke, Zouche, and Hume, however, Austin did not view consent as vital to legal obligation, since the
existence of obligation hinged on nothing other than the presence of positive, or man-made law. See
JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832), reprinted in CHRISTIE, supra,
at 471, 581-92. Positive law was "properly so-called," and consisted of a command from a sovereign
political subordinate backed up by sanction, see AUSTIN, supra, at 472-75, 499, 527.
28. Naturalism, natural law, or the law of nature as a basis of obligation emphasizes that all humanmade law is to be looked at and understood against a backdrop of principles discovered through use of
human faculties, whether sensory or cerebral. The principles discovered bind because they reflect God's
will, right reason, or some similar force. See CHRISTIE, supra note 27, at 84, for the observation that
the important questions natural law adherents have struggled with include the effect of natural law upon
human law, how one identifies the content of natural law, and whether natural law is binding. On natural
law generally see A.P. D'ENTRkVEs, NATURAL LAW: AN HISTORICAL SURVEY (1951).
The natural law tradition seems to have had its roots in Greek Stoicism. Stoicism developed in the
third century B.C., perhaps as a reflection of the disillusionment, following the decline of the Greek citystate in the preceding century, with man's ability to govern man. See ROBERT ADAMSON, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY 79-83,257-94 (1908). The essence of the thought of early Greek
Stoics was expressed by Chrysippus and included the following: that divine providence animates the
world; that animation is expressed through nature; nature is rational; man is unique in that man has
reason; the good life consists in living in accordance with nature and thereby resigning one's self to the
purposes of the divine being. See generallyJOSIAH B. GOULD, THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHRYSIPPUS (1970).
Stoicism, as introduced to the Romans by Panaetius in the middle of the second century, B.C., perceived
obligation to rest on natural law. Roman Stoics appeared to have accepted this in large part. See
MARCUS CICERO, ON THE LAWS, bk. I (n.d.), reprinted in CICERO: SELECTED WORKS 218, 228-33
(Classics Club 1948); CHRISTIE, supra note 27, at 81 (Cicero held that the law of nature evidences what
is just, and justice is to be practiced). For similar views by Roman Stoics, see MARCUS AURELIUS,
MEDITATIONS ch. VII, § 55, ch. XI, §§ 9-10 (n.d.), reprintedin MARCUS AURELIUS AND HIS TIMES 75-
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scientism to round out the spectrum. Then again, one could simply address
each basis of obligation individually, as though every one were an explanation
discrete and separate from all the others. The approach selected here,
however, arranges the various possible bases into four major categories. The
names given to each of the categories try to capture a characteristic shared by
the sj~ecific bases of obligation analyzed thereunder. In this way, the
commonalities of certain explanations of why law obligates can be identified,
discussed, and subjected to full consideration, without leaving the impression
that every foundational argument stands on its own, or that one time-honored
jurisprudential school suggests bases with characteristics endemic only to
itself. With these comments firmly in mind, let us consider each of the
categories of potential bases of obligation.

A. Observable Facts
The first category to be considered might be labeled "observable facts."
Each individual basis within this category manifests the feature of being
something that can be perceived, ascertained, or determined. Through
observation and empirical study, the characteristic which claims to make each
of the individual bases within the broader category unique from each of the

76, 117 (Classics Club 1945), and EPicTETUs, THE DISCOURSES, bk. 2, ch. VIII (n.d.), reprinted in
EpicTETUs, DISCOURSES AND ENCHIRIDION 103-06 (Thomas W. Higginson trans., Classics Club 1944).
For theorists of natural law doctrine in post-Roman period see THOMAS AQUINAS, THE SUMMA
THEOLOGICA (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 1915); FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, DE
POTESTATE CIVIL] (1528), translated in JAMES B. SCoTT, THE SPANISH ORIGIN OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, pt. I, Francisco de Vitoria and His Law of Nations (Gwladys L. Williams trans., 1934); HUGO
GROTIUS, DE JuRE BELLI AC PACIS (1625) (Classics of International Law No. 3) (Francis W. Kelsey
trans., 1964); FRANCISCO SUAREZ S.J., DE LEGIBUS, AC DEo LEGISLATORE (1612) (Classics of
International Law No. 19) (Gwladys L. Williams et al. trans. & James Brown Scott ed., 1964); and
SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, DE JuRE NATURAL ET GENTUM LIBRI Ocro (1672) (Classics of International
Law No. 17) (C.H. Oldfather et al. trans., 1934). Modern writings on natural law include FINNIS, supra
note 2, and LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE (1987).
29. Scientism is not a commonly spoken of basis of obligation, but it might be said to involve the
identification of biological, physical, or socio-behavioral principles which function in the universe, and
the articulation of how these principles can be used to explain why law should be viewed as binding.
The principles identified would be ones that emerge from or can be confirmed by empirical analysis.
Since these principles operate in the same milieu as man, and on all objects of the observable universe,
the fact that human-made law is a formulation by one to whom these principles apply suggests that the
idea the principles may serve as a theoretical backstop is sufficiently colorable to merit consideration.
To the extent there has been anything like a "tradition" of scientism in law, it would seem to date from
the period of rapid scientific progress following the Industrial Revolution. For discussion of some of the
arguments that might be arranged under the heading of scientism, see generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN,
THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW (1975); ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, PSYCHOANALYTIC
JURISPRUDENCE (1971); JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (6th ed. 1948); ALAN HUNT,
THE SOCIOLOGICAL MOVEMENT IN LAW (1978); HANS KELSEN, WHAT IS JUSTICE? 303, 324 (1957);
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS]; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981) [hereinafter POSNER, JUSTICE];
ADAM POGDOREcKi, LAW AND SOCIETY (1974); LEPOLD J. POSPl9IL, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW: A
COMPARATIVE THEORY (1971); WILLIAM A. ROBSON, CIVILISATION AND THE GROWTH OF LAW 277-344
(1935); GEORGES SCELLE, LA THtORIE JURIDIQUE DE LA RtVISION DES TRArrts (1936) (linking law
and biological principles); N.S. TiMASHEFF, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (1939); and
Joan C. Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the New
Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429 (1987).
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others in the category can be confirmed or validated. That is to say, the

presence of the distinguishing attribute of each separate individual basis can
be verified by simple examination, perception, or measurement. Each basis
possesses an ascertainable attribute, hence the label "observable facts."
Though the ascertainable attribute possessed by each basis is observable, thus
making each basis within the broader category like all the others therein, the
ascertainable attribute of each of the bases is different, thereby distinguishing

one from another.
The observable attributes themselves permit the bases to submit to grouping
into separate phyla, but no effort of that sort is undertaken here.3" Moreover,
it is clear that even if such an effort were undertaken, the attributes of each

separate basis are of such a nature that any delineation between phyla would
not be precise. One phylum could include those bases which have attributes
that seem most apparent in the context of individual persons, that is, they
manifest themselves through the individual, while the other phylum could

include those which evince themselves most often in the larger communal or
societal setting, that is, through fraternal association between many individuals. Clearly, though, since the community is simply a conglomeration of

individual persons, the potential for overlap and cross-participation of phyla
must be acknowledged. Bases that might be referred to as individual in one
setting might seem to appear in the community in another, and vice versa. The
demarcation between phyla would be far from exact.
Putting aside these preliminaries and getting down to particulars, one of the

bases of obligation falling under the label of "observable facts" is the social
instinct: the inherent desire of people to associate with one another and pursue
a common purpose. This natural urge to cooperate with others, whether
deriving from an intuitively felt common bond or a recognized intellectual
drive for affiliation that satiates curiosity, could supply the explanation for

why law is to be observed. 3' The instinctual compulsion to create a social
30. Were the effort to be undertaken, the bases denominated herein as social instinct, rationality as
a fact, and sense of right, see infra text accompanying notes 31-35, would be grouped together, with
that denominated law as evolution. See infra text accompanying notes 36-39. The bases discussed under
the idea that law is what is done and the physical law of causality, infra text accompanying notes 39-44,
would have to be grouped separately.
31. See GROTiuS, supra note 28, at 12-13; see also Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition
in InternationalLaw, 23 BRIr. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 24 (1946). Hugo Grotius, often referred to as the father
of international law, was an early 17th century Dutch proponent of natural law. See supra note 28 for
discussion of the historical development of the natural law tradition. Grotius taught that all law is
divided into natural law or volitional law. GROTIUS, supra note 28, at 38. Natural law is seen as selfevident, id. at 23, and not made by God, id. at xxxii, 40. Volitional law is established law, id. at 38, that
is to say, it is either God-made or human-made, id. at 44-45, with the latter being further divided into
the internal law of countries (municipal law) and the law of nations (fus gentium), id. at 44. The law
of nations is said to spring from custom or consent, id. at xxxi, 45. It constitutes the established portion
of international law, while principles of natural law applicable to international relations constitute the
obvious, apparent, or evident portion. Thus, the law of nature and the law of nations together make up
all of international law. But whether one is concerned with international or municipal law, it is the social
instinct that in Grotius' estimation gives it the force to bind.
For two other theorists agreeing with Grotius' position that legal obligation derives from man's social
instinct, see PUFENDORF, supra note 28, bk. II, ch. III, §§ 4-5, reprintedin CHRISTIE, supra note 27, at
161, 169-71. See also LON DUGUIT, LE DRorr SOCIAL, LE DRorr INDIVIDUEL, ET LA TRANSFORMATION
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life with others is a basic, primordial desire furthered by rules maintaining
social order. 32 From the order produced by rules comes greater success at
efforts to nurture social fraternity. Human beings are by nature social
creatures, creatures naturally desirous of collaborating with each other to
attain the mutual end of ongoing community. To the extent that legal rules are
geared toward the maintenance of social order, they are binding because they
are designed to reach an end natural to all persons. Stated differently, the
social instinct gives force to law because law brings order and order promotes
the association between people that allows them to fulfill that which is in their
very nature. Law is the progenitor of harmony, and harmony gives fruitful
effect to the social instinct.
Related to the social instinct concept is the idea that the basis of obligation
derives from the fact of human rationality, the capacity of each of us to
respond to life's predicaments in a reasoned and thoughtful way. The essence
of this approach is that since humans are distinguished from all other
creatures in possessing the power of coherent reflection, that which is rational
or reasonable is therefore binding3 3 in that it gives full play to our native
abilities and represents the product of a fact natural to humankind. Rationality
is the matrix that provides shape to the law, the bond that unifies all of law's
disparate strands. It is also the force which gives the law its power to
obligate. By virtue of being the product of rational and temperate consideration, the kind of consideration common to all of humanity, law acquires the
ability to command observance. Were this not so, in being able to ignore the
dictates of law, individuals would be free to act in a manner violative of their
own essence. If law is a social manifestation of human rationality, then
actions contravening law cut against the very nature of those who created it.
Being vested with an attribute which distinguishes us from other creatures
fixes on us the requirement of adhering to that which rationality produces.
Otherwise, our behavior may suggest we deny the significance of rationality
and thereby imply that that which is palpable to all-that homo sapiens are
different-is nothing more than an artificial and meaningless distinction.
The sense of right felt by man toward obedience to law, that is, the sense
that it is only appropriate and proper to obey the law, is another of the bases
falling under the category of observable facts.34 It differs from the social

DE L'ETAT (2d ed. 1911); Lon Duguit, Objective Law, 20 COLUM. L. REv. 817 (1920); 1 ROSCOE
POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 184-91 (1959) (classifying Duguit as a natural law revivalist). A somewhat
similar idea regarding law and obligation is found in DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 195-216 (1986) (stating
thatobligation arises from social associations).
32. See GROTIUS, supra note 28, at 12-13, 15-18.
33. Cf JEAN DABIN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAWS, pt. III, ch. I, §§ 201, 203 (1944), reprinted in
CHRISTIE, supra note 27, at 238, 250-52. Dabin, another of the natural law proponents, maintains that
such law is a rule of conduct man is to follow and that it proceeds from the "basic inclinations of
[man's] nature under the controlof reason." Id. at 251 (emphasis added). Though it is not clear that he
views law as receiving its force to obligate from reason alone, that may well be what he thinks. See also
CHARLES G. HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS 289 (1965) (discussing Francois
Geny's position that natural law has force from facts of human nature).
34. See Hugo Krabbe, L'Idde moderne de l'Etat, 13 RECUEIL DES CouRs 513, 570-71 (1926); see
also HUGO KRABBE, THE MODERN IDEA OF THE STATE (George H. Sabine & Walter J. Shepard trans.,
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instinct and rationality in that it emphasizes the emotional response evoked
by those interpersonal rules adopted through procedures sufficient to permit
them to be denominated rules of law. The thrust of the sense of right idea is
that individuals have certain intuitive, psychological feelings regarding the
kinds of normative matters addressed by law. To the extent that certain rules
of law are applicable to the state, it too experiences the same feelings, since
in reality it is nothing more than a collection of individuals who serve to
govern it. Thus the presence of the feeling that law is to be honored, whether
apparent in each of the citizens comprising a larger community or in the
official governmental organs of that community itself, is the source of law's
obligatory force. Law binds because there exists the sense that it is right that
it bind those it addresses.35 Were there to exist no such emotional or
psychological response to what we denominate as law, the standard prescriptions contained in the corpus juris could be freely ignored.
Beyond these three bases, there is the notion that the biological principle of
evolution provides the foundation for legal obligation. The central thrust of
that principle is that every aspect of the development of life involves the
process of adaptation or eventual elimination. To the extent that a particular
feature or attribute of life is incompatible with ambient conditions, that is to
say, to the extent something about a life form happens to make the conditions
in which that life form exists deleterious, elements possessing chaiacteristics
able to sustain existence will eventually replace those that had previously
dominated. In this way, the process of natural selection assures that things
best suited to control rise to the top and exert determinative influence, while
those ill-fitted for that purpose settle to the bottom and are removed. Nature
operates to foster the ascendance of those attributes most compatible with
itself.
There are two senses in which evolution might be called upon in the context
of law and the legal system. The first involves a historical perspective that
views the entire landscape of law and concludes that law is not static, but
constantly evolving in an effort to settle upon and incorporate the best and
most effective methods for addressing societal problems. In short, it sees the
natural evolutionary process at work in the history of law-as legal concepts
destined to displace those destined to fail.36 In this first sense, however, the
reference to evolution says nothing about why law obligates. It confines itself

1922).
35. It must be observed that "sense of righe' is an idea advanced by those positivists who view as
deficient the classic idea that law binds because it has been consented to. See supra note 27 for the
classic position of positivism. If one is inclined to think in terms of the traditional philosophical schools
of thought, one might be amused by the fact that, even though raised by positivists, the "sense of right"
idea is also available to naturalists. After all, given the fact that the feeling that it is right to follow the
law is a natural one, it would be quite easy to tie the idea of "sense of right" to natural law theories of

obligation.
36. For Justice Holmes' position, see OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., Law in Science and Science in Law,
in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 210, 212 (1920) ("proper to regard [law] ...as a great anthropological
document"), id. at 217 ("we have evolution in this sphere of conscious thought and action no less than
in lower organic stages"), and id. at 220 ("struggle for life among competing ideas").
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to noting simply that a natural process is at work in the legal system. Thus,
evolution in this sense is not put forward as a basis supporting the binding
force of law.
The second sense in which evolution might be invoked does, on the other
hand, clearly maintain that the legal rules of a particular society are to be
observed or respected because of the principle of evolution itself." The
argument might go: evolution is an inescapable biological principle; man is
a biological organism and is therefore subject to that principle in everything
he does; law as the product of that organism's creative industry reflects the
positions and opinions of the most powerful and driving members of the
community;3" being thus imbued with the essence of evolution, law partakes
of the same force possessed by the evolutionary principle itself. This is the
sense in which evolution is referred to as a possible basis of obligation under
the category here styled observable facts. It contends that law binds because
law flows from a species subject to the binding principle of evolution. Being
of such heritage, law acquires the same compelling force as possessed by that
to which its creators are subjected.
The physical principle of causality might be suggested as a closely related
basis of obligation.39 As a principle of physics, it would affect humankind
and its social institutions since both are part of the realm to which it
applies."0 Simply put, the principle indicates that every consequence is the
result of a string of connected generative events. Hypothesizing or positing
a given stimulus in a controlled environment, causality suggests the ability to
predict the eventual effect of any known events of that sort.
Causality can also be thought of in the context of law and the legal system
in precisely the same two ways raised with regard to evolution. That is,
causality can be referenced with regard to how laws or particular rules come
about, or how laws come to acquire the force to command observance. Again,
the point made earlier concerning this first form of reference applies here with
equal force. To say that the content and character of law or current legal rules
result from precipitative, antecedent conditions simply depicts the process by
which existing laws have developed. No claim is made to law having the
power to bind because of the principle of cause and effect. In this sense,
causality is not advanced as a basis of legal obligation. Yet in exactly that
second sense that evolution was called upon above, causality is called upon
here. In looking to a principle of physics as a possible basis of obligation, one
must refer to the view that the social legislation which homo sapiens produce

37. See GEORGES SCELLE, PRtCIS DE DRorr DES GENS (1932); SCELLE, supra note 29. Scelle's
ideas are alluded to in L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 16 n.l (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955).
38. See generallyPOUND, supra note 31, at 304-12.
39. Though I am not aware of any scholar who has suggested the principle of causality as the basis
of legal obligation, it would seem as plausible a basis as evolution, which has at least received some
reference in the literature. See supra notes 36-38. On the general topic of the relationship between law
and science, see ROBSON, supra note 29, at 277-344. For an interesting essay using scientific theories
in the context of examining "critical legal studies," see Williams, supra note 29.
40. See KELSEN, supra note 29, at 324 (positing that the physical and the social worlds are not
separate).

1993]

WHETHER LAW BINDS

partakes of the same obligatory force as the principle itself. While causality
alone cannot account for the existence of governmental rules which apply to
social interaction, since causality touches each component of the physical

world it is no less drawn upon when the civil institutions of human-kind make
law. Just as the results of causality which the scientific investigator is
privileged to witness are spoken of as inescapable, so too may one speak of
the prescriptive consequence of man's legislative activity. Being an object of

the physical world that is acted on by causality, that which human beings
produce therefore takes on the force of the principle itself.
The final basis that could be subsumed under the category here called
"observable facts" would be one which views obligation as deriving from
actual practice, conduct displayed with a degree of regularity. This sociobehavioral approach to the problem of law's ability to bind emphasizes the

connection between what the various actors in the social environment actually

do and the existence of law that requires observance. 4' Essentially, the idea
is that if one is intent on discovering the law of a community, all that need

be done is to identify the patterns of conduct in which the members of that
community engage on a regular and recurring basis. 42 Law is synonymous
with what specific actors do and how they respond to the complexities of
life's daily travails. The members of a community do what they do or respond

as they do because they view what has always been done as something that
41. For this approach applied to international law see Louis HENKIu,How NATIONS BEHAVE
(1979); MYERS S. McDOUGAL ET AL., STUDIES INWORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1960). Henkin's approach
is analyzed in David Kennedy, Book Review, 21 HARV. INT'L L.L 301 (1981).
42. Socio-behavioral sciences as applied to law have seldom been used to claim that they identify
the basis of legal obligation. If they were to be so applied, the argument may well be something as
straightforward as that made here. Sociology has been used, however, to understand how particular
influences lead to certain laws, whether and to what extent legal standards can be effective in securing
behavior, and the mechanisms which function to translate law into specific sorts of individual conduct.
For this view of the use of sociology with respect to law see PODGRECKI, supra note 29, at 24-25
("The aim is to reveal as fully as possible the conditions for the efficiency of the working of law
... ."); and HUNT, supra note 29, at 104 (noting Max Weber's sociology of law "focuses upon the way
in which legal materials in the form of substantive rules are developed and the way in which they are
applied in arriving at decisions."). It seems that the furthest that sociologists have gone is to identify
the principles by which particular societies determine the legitimacy of legal standards. In so using their
science, these sociologists have done more than describe how law operates, or fails to operate, to
accomplish certain tasks within the society studied. Advancing this more expansive role, see for
example, Philip Selznick, Sociology andNaturalLaw, 6 NAT'L L.F. 84 (1961), and Philip Selznick, The
Sociology of Law, in SOCIOLOGY TODAY 115, 116, 124 (Robert K. Merton et al. eds., 1959). For a
critical view of this approach, see Donald J. Black, Book Review, 78 AM. J. OF Soc. 709 (1972).
The statement in TIMASHEFF, supra note 29, at 19, that "the sociology of law ... aims to discover
'laws' of a scientific nature concerning society in its relation to law," should not be taken to mean that
laws flowing from the acts of socialization supply the basis for providing man-made law with binding
force. As Timasheff goes on to explain, the laws proceeding from acts of socialization are simply
statements or formulae describing recurring or uniform patterns of behavior, scientific laws based on
observation and experiment. Man-made law, however, is a human creation imposed with an eye toward
affecting the manner in which behavior is carried out. Id. Thus, while it is very likely that there may
exist some correlation between the sociological laws perceived through observation and man-made legal
roles, id. at 19 n.1, that only means the man-made rules affect the way in which humans behave. Id. If
one were to maintain, however, that sociological laws give force to man-made laws, it would seem that
the argument should be that the laws of behavior would dictate the character of the laws made by man,
and not that the laws of man dictate the character of the laws of behavior.
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obligates them to continue replicating long-standing practices. 43 Seemingly
recurrent behavior is regarded as behavior that must be repeated. When
repeated, the behavior gains additional force that affects the assessment of the
range of responses to future situations.44
Several difficulties present themselves when one carefully examines the
social instinct, rationality as a fact, sense of right, the biological postulate of
evolution, the physical principle of causality, and the socio-behavioral notion
that law is what is done. Essentially, the problems result from each of these
bases being nothing more than a way of describing law, a way of accounting
for officially sanctioned rules of behavior. In this respect they are all true to
the category that we have styled observable facts, for description or
accounting flows from observation. But this extreme fidelity causes them to
miss the point implicit in any attempt to disclose whether, and if so why, law
is capable of obligating those to whom it is directed. When endeavoring to
determine if there is a basis of legal obligation, it is not enough to just
describe how what is regarded as law comes to be, or how that which has
secured such regard comes to obtain the regard itself. Only by revealing what,
if anything, gives law the inherent force to bind is the real basis finally
pinned down. Nothing is made known by merely describing how law is
produced or how it gains the attribute of "lawness."
The first problem that prevents the bases catalogued under observable facts
from accomplishing the objective of identifying the force that gives law the
power to compel observance is the simple one of the less than invariable
nature of the facts involved. There seems no ironclad assurance that the facts
each basis assumes are perfectly unchangeable. With regard to the social
instinct, rationality, sense of right, and actual practice, the element of
unconstrained free will45 may deserve most of the responsibility for this.
Human beings and the institutions they oversee all too regularly manifest their
autonomy and independence, their freedom to make choices, through acts that
regrettably are either selfish, impulsive, without compunction, or in total
43. The socio-behavioral science of psychology has been used to ends similar to sociology. On its
use to explain opposed theories of law, see EHRENZWEIG, supra note 29, pt. 1 (reviewing traditional
natural law and positivist theories of law); and id., pt. 2 (attempting to reconcile and explain these
theories, and approaches on various substantive topics, through the psychoanalytic teachings of Freud
and Jung). On psychology's use in explaining the workings of judicial decision-making see FRANK,
supra note 29 (positing that psychoanalysis teaches that decisions are made, not from premise to
conclusion, but from conclusion to justification). On Frank's approach, see Golding, Jurisprudenceand
Legal Philosophy in 20th Century America: Major Themes and Developments, 36 J. LEGAL EDUc. 441,
459-60 (1986).
Anthropology also has been employed in the examination of law to ascertain whether disparate
cultures indeed have a system of law. See POSPIgIL, supra note 29. Pospigil observes that traditionally
there have been three approaches on this matter: 1) law is custom and, therefore, there is no "law" as
such; 2) law is a system of rules that does not include custom; 3) there is no universal notion of law,
and different cultures may have different ways of securing desired behavior. Id. at 12-18. Pospigil
departs from these approaches and attempts to look at law according to its "attributes, functions, and
processes." Id. at 341-43.
44. See A.S. DIAMOND, THE EVOLUTION OF LAW AND ORDER 54 (1951).
45. See infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text for discussion of "free will" as a basis of
obligation.
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disregard of established customs and norms. This suggests the vulnerability
of placing great stock in the significance of facts regarding certain characteristics or traits of mankind. As these facts are never immutable, the validity of
inferences we might be inclined to draw from them must rest on insecure
ground.
The principles of evolution and causality suffer the same plight, though not
nearly to the same degree, and for an entirely distinct reason. Being scientific
in character, they are not subject to the whimsical oscillations of the human
will. They are predictable and static. Impulse and caprice affect them not in
the least. Nevertheless, no matter how firmly rooted in the general understanding of the scientific nature of things, these two principles are not incontrovertible and eternal verities. Since the discoveries at the turn of the twentieth
century about the relativity of the generally considered absolutes of time
(duration), space (distance), and matter,4 6 and the additional discovery later
in the century that at the subatomic level events or effects often occur without
the existence of any certain and identifiable precipitative impetus,47 the longheld belief in causality as a universal natural principle has been under
siege. 8 For how else could it be that presumptive invariables like time and

46. Albert Einstein's theory of relativity provides that time (duration) and space (distance) interact
with each other so as to create a four-dimensional continuum in which the familiar length, height, and
breadth description of matter must also account for the additional component of time. See I RICHARD
P. FEYNMAN ET AL., THE FEYNMAN LECTURES ON PHYSICS ch. 15 (1963), for a complete description
of relativity. As a consequence of the interaction, observations of the same event by two separate
individuals in motion relative to each other will be described as having occurred at separate intervals.
Id. at ch. 15, p. 6. Also, an object in motion relative to a stationary observer will appear to experience
a shortening in length, and to an observer accompanying the object as witnessing a slowing down of
time. See JACOB BRONOWSKI, THE ASCENT OF MAN 248-52 (1973).
47. The principle of uncertainty was advanced by Werner Heisenberg in the late 1920's. See
BRONOWSKI, supra note 46, at 366. On the need to modify the principle of causality, presumably in
light of the uncertainty principle, see KELSEN, supra note 29, at 303. With regard to Einstein's theory
of relativity setting the stage for Heisenberg's principle of uncertainty, see RONALD W. CLARK,
EINSTEIN: TiE LIFE AND TIMES 338-46 (1971). See also 2 EDwARD M. BURNS & PHILIP L. RALPH,
WORLD CIVILZATIONS 688 n.l (4th ed. 1969) (arguing that Einstein apparently refused to accept the
notion implicit in Heisenberg's uncertainty principle and maintained that an explanation would
eventually be found); FEYNMAN ET AL., supra note 46, chs. 6-10 (illustrating Einstein's view of the
uncertainty principle). Perhaps Einstein's confidence that an explanation would be found stemmed from
a belief in the uniformity of physical laws throughout the universe. On the fact that we all grow up with
this belief, see CHARLES J. SINGER, A SHORT HISTORY OF SCIENTIFIC IDEAS TO 1900, at 50 (1969).
48. For the view that the relativity theory in fact overturned, and did not simply build upon, earlier
Newtonian physics, see KUHN, supra note 3, at 97-103. It should be noted that Einstein's relativity
principle is based upon the premise that the speed of light in a vacuum is the ultimate speed limit in
nature. An explosion occurring more than 170,000 years ago, as a result of the collapse of the star
named Sanduleak, a 12th magnitude blue supergiant located in the Large Magellanic Cloud, a dwarf
satellite galaxy of the Milky Way, was detected on February 23, 1987, by observers around the world.
Kenneth Brecher, FascinatingSupernova, PHYSICS TODAY, Jan. 1988, at S-7; Stan E. Woosley & Tom
Weaver, The Great Supernova of 1987, 261 SCl. AM. 32 (1989). Reports suggest that subatomic
particles known as neutrinos were detected on earth several hours before the light from the explosion
was observed. Eugene W. Beier, Neutrinos From Supernova SN1987A, PHYSICS TODAY, Jan. 1988, at
S-33. This, however, does not mean neutrinos travel faster than light and thus undermine Einstein's
basic premise. Neutrinos come from the stellar interior and are consequently emitted somewhat earlier
than the light, which comes from the exterior photosphere. Nevertheless, since the late 1960's theoretical
particle physicists have postulated the existence of particles tagged with the label tachyons, which are
thought to be able to travel at speeds in excess of the speed of light. Empirical efforts to actually
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space, or effect ergo cause, could admit of any departure? Likewise, in the
discipline of biology, recent theories of evolution challenge the standard

Darwinian approach of "gradualism" and its view of onward, upward,
progressive, yet incremental

development.49 Indeed, some have even

purported to advance the idea of dissolution as a natural opposite to evolution
itself." As a consequence, rather than witnessing constant refinement and
improvement, organisms become overspecialized and thus reach a point at
which further development is degenerative and may lead to extinction. Taken
together, these ideas concerning the principles of evolution and causality
suggest the factual weaknesses of both."

demonstrate the existence of tachyons, though, have not yet proved successful.
49. A chief counter-theory has been advanced by NILES ELDRIDGE & STEPHEN J. GOULD,
PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIA: AN ALTERNATIVE TO PHYLETiC GRADUALISM, in MODELS INPALEOBIOLOGY
82-115 (Thomas J.M. Schopf ed., 1972), and has come to be known as "punctuated equilibria." But see
James S. Trefil, Phenomena, Comment and Notes, 20 SMITHSONIAN 34 (1989) (suggesting recent
discoveries appear to support "gradualism").
50. See B.A.G. FULLER, Modern Philosophy, in HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 530 (1938).
51. Lest there be any doubt about the fact that the displacement of conventional wisdom concerning
causality and evolution are not aberrations, the history of science need merely be surveyed to see how
often once accepted explanations of phenomena have fallen to new and iconoclastic ideas. Three
prominent examples include the displacement of the geocentric theory of location of celestial bodies
with the heliocentric theory, the phlogiston theory of combustion with the oxygen theory, and the
corpuscular theory of light with the wave theory.
Regarding the geocentric theory, it is often dated from the second century A.D. and Ptolemy of
Alexandria (Claudius Ptolemaeus), not to be confused with the Ptolemies who ruled ancient Egypt.
Actually, the theory had its roots in Aristotle and his model of concentric spheres. See SINGER, supra
note 47, at 51-55, 89-91, 94-95. By the 15th century, Ptolemy's theory came under the attack of Nicholas
of Cusa. See BURNS & RALPH, supra note 47, at 555. The downfall of the theory came with the
publication in 1543 of De Revolutionibus by Nicolas Copernicus, who explained the universe as
basically heliocentric. See SINGER, supra note 47, at 212-15. It should be observed that the Copernican
theory had been advanced as early as the fifth century B.C. by the Pythagorean thinker Philolaus of
Tarentum, id. at 27, and was reiterated by Aristarchus of Samos in the third century B.C., id. at 65. The
17th century German, Johannes Kepler, improved the Copernican system by noting that the planets
travel around the earth in elliptical, rather than circular, orbits. ALAN G.R. SMITH, SCrENCE AND
SOCIETY INTHE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES 107-10 (1972). The movement away from
a heliocentric universe, towards a heliocentric solar system surrounded by innumerable other such
systems within our own galaxy, began with Giordano Bruno in the late 16th century. See SINGER, supra
note 47, at 218-19. This movement was continued during the 17th century by Robert Merton, Christiaan
Huygens, and Le Bovier de Fontenelle. See CARL SAGAN, COSMOS 146 (1980); SINGER, supra note 47,
at 291.
On the phlogiston theory, it held that when an object burned, phlogiston in the object was used up.
Thus, the process of combustion resulted in phlogiston being consumed, id. at 347, and the balance of
the object being left as ash. The idea was originally formulated by J. J. Becker in the latter half of the
17th century and was given authoritative formulation by Georg Stahl. Id. at 281, 338 n.l. The phlogiston
theory of combustion hampered the development of chemistry during the 17th and much of the 18th
centuries. By the last quarter of the 18th century, the great French chemist Antoine Lavoisier, sometimes
called the "Newton of Chemistry," a man who fell victim to the "Reign of Terror," see BURNS &
RALPH, supra note 47, at 54-55, proved that combustion involved taking oxygen from the air
surrounding the object burned, and not the taking of some mystical substance (phlogiston) from the
object burned. This dealt a fatal blow to the phlogiston theory. See SINGER, supra note 47, at 339-40.
See generally THE OVERTHROW OF THE PHLOGISTON THEORY (James B. Conant ed., 1950) (discussing
the procession from Joseph Priestley's support of the theory to Antoine Lavoisier's development of a
new conceptual scheme).
The corpuscular (also referred to as the particle, or emission) theory of light was cast in modem form
during the late 17th and early 18th centuries by Isaac Newton. It maintained that a luminous body
emitted streams of very small corpuscles. See SMrrH, supra, at 124-25. The wave theory, advanced by
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Even if the social instinct, rationality as a fact, sense of right, and all the
other bases listed under observable facts were to receive a stipulation
concerning the invariable nature of the facts they involve,52 the second
problem would remain: how can inescapable and predictably recurring
phenomena, constant and static features of human nature or the natural world,
share their binding, ineluctable attributes with the rules of law they happen
to produce? How can the law which is connected to one of these six possible
bases partake of the obligatory character of the basis and become itself
something able to command observance? By what process or device does the
law that humankind creates acquire the same puissance as the basis to which
it happens to be linked?
Clearly it is one thing to demonstrate or simply accept that everyone always
believes that it is right to observe the law, or that everyone always acts in the
kind of measured, temperate, and calculating way typical of rational behavior,
or that the principles of law governing day-to-day life result from the
hegemony of ideas superior in every respect to ideas that have been
subjugated due to their unacceptability given existing social and contextual
factors. Yet in such a demonstration or acceptance there is no reason to
believe that the laws which one observes, or the mind concocts, or the most
powerful social forces manage to put in place, happen to be laws that obligate
just because they evoke a sense of right, or are rational, or are the product of
social evolution. That law is somehow or other connected with an obligatory
factual basis is no more a reason to view law as binding than is the fact that
my tomatoes flourish in the brilliance of the daily sun a reason to conceive
of exposure to sunlight as the obligatory horticultural technique, thus
foreclosing the use of artificial lighting to simulate the natural. Though the
amount of time it spends in the sky each day may be affected by the seasons,
we can rest assured that the sun will make its daily appearance overhead. That
the product of this invariable phenomenon is the vigorous growth of exposed
plants does not mean we are compelled to use sunlight, rather than other
methods available as a result of technological genius, to nurture and care for
what our fancy has lead us to stick in the soil. Likewise with rules of law.

Christiaan Huygens in his Treatise on Light, published in 1690, argues that space is enveloped by a
mysterious substance known as ether, and that a luminous body propagates waves through that medium
just like water carries waves caused by the splash of a stone. See SINGER, supra note 47, at 367.
Through the work of Thomas Young, Auguste Fresnel, Leon Foucault, and Clerk Maxwell, the wave
theory emerged in the 19th century as the accepted position of most who studied the phenomenon of
light. Id. at 369-75. By the turn of the 20th century, experiments conducted on electromagnetic waves
by Heinrich Hertz, Henrick Lorentz, J. J. Thomson, and Philip Lenard raised points of incompatibility
with the wave theory. Then in 1900, Max Planck, at that time professor of theoretical physics at the
University of Berlin, advanced a theory of the workings of radiation that seemed incompatible with the
accepted wave theory of light. See CLARK, supra note 47, at 64-67. It was left to Einstein to explain,
in his 1905 paper On a Heuristic Viewpoint Concerning the Productionand Transformation of Light,
that light has both the wave and corpuscular properties. Id. at 68-70.
52. Actually, a stipulation of that sort may not be required for either causality or evolution. If the
ideas of relativity, uncertainty, and punctuated equilibria are viewed as merely qualifying the traditional
doctrines of causality and evolution, then these doctrines may be capable of demonstrating their own
merits.
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That they may be in one way or another connected with or the product of
some invariable observable fact does not mean that they are obligatory and
able to command our faithful observance. The mere fact that a thing is the
consequence, offspring, or relative of an inescapable phenomenon is not
enough by itself to give the thing the force of that which has produced it. For
law to be understood as fixing an obligation on those to whom it is directed,
it must locate its force in something other than a generative factual invariant.
The unchanging, unavoidable character of such an invariant is capable of
nothing more than revealing the natural attributes of the invariant itself.
The third and final problem with the assorted bases under observable facts
is closely related to that just discussed. It is distinct, though, because it goes
further and suggests that, even if law partakes of the nature of the invariable
facts which give rise to it, it is incorrect to speak of law as therefore
obligatory, because facts of nature, no matter how inescapable and certain,
can never give rise to obligation. 3 The quintessence of obligation is that it
reflects something which "should" be done, not merely in the precatory sense
of urging some particular course of action rather than mandating it, but rather
in the normative sense of indicating that it is the appropriate, ethical, or moral
thing to do. Unless reference is made to some "uncreated creator," 4 that
certain things exist as a matter of natural fact implies nothing in the
normative sense. In their existence, the facts of nature simply are. And as
such it would be erroneous to conclude that they evince an obligation that
they must be, let alone that the things, like law, to which they may give rise,
take on an obligatory character of their own. By their being, the facts of the
natural world merely exist. That we can observe and verify their presence
does not signify anything more than their presence alone. It would seem
gravely presumptuous for one to take the existence of such natural facts as
indicative of a normative standard that this is the way things were ethically
or morally meant to be.
B. Considerationsof Practicality
The second category of the possible bases of obligation could be referred
to as "considerations of practicality." The individual bases within this
category include expectation/reliance, self-interest, free will, and economic
efficiency. The principal attribute of each of these individual bases, the
attribute which serves to distinguish this entire group from the category
labeled "observable facts," has to do with the pragmatic reasons for honoring
legal rules, rather than with the need for observance flowing from invariable
facts of nature. These bases suggest simply that there are very down-to-earth
and practical reasons for considering law obligatory. Recourse to certain

53. See KELSEN, supra note 29, at 137-44, 17497; ROBSON, supra note 29, at 339.
54. It might be suggested that natural facts set in motion by a higher authority, a supreme being,
or divine entity, do implicate obligation in that they reflect the will of that authority, being, or entity.
On this matter and related arguments, see discussion infra part I.C.
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natural or apparent facts need not be had. And beyond that, there exists no
reason for having to draw inferences of obligation from such facts. What
gives law the power to command observance is that accepting it as nonobligatory could produce serious practical problems. Without a recognition
that law binds those to whom it is directed, lawlessness would overtake
civility in due course. The modicum of order and tranquility apparent in social
life would fall victim to individual impulse and desire.
The practical or pragmatic reasons giving law the force to bind can be
broken into several subcategories. One subcategory might cover the practical
considerations that center on those who are subject to legal rules, and examine
in depth the motivations that various parties have for supporting the idea that
law binds. The other subcategory might look separately at considerations that
stand apart from those which have to do with the parties involved and the
motivations they have for honoring law. As with the preceding category of
observable facts, however, no attempt at subcategorization is undertaken
herein with regard to considerations of practicality. 5 Yet even if it were, it
should be emphasized that both of the possible subcategories alluded to above
would still remain tied by a common theme. The practical reasons for viewing
law as able to command observance always apply, whether attention is
focused on the motivations of those subject to the law, or motivations that
have nothing to do with interests those subject to law happen to embrace. The
theme that would unite each and every product of any subcategorization effort
would still be one founded on the practical nature of the considerations
indicating that law binds.
Moving away from the linkage between potential subcategories, the notion
that legal obligation can be founded on the practical consideration of
expectation/reliance is essentially one which grows out of the significance of
consent itself. Originally, the requisite consent to the first societal obligation
may have been that given by a political superior, manifesting a desire that a
particular rule of law be followed. 6 Perhaps to distinguish law from mere
compulsion, however, consent on the part of those to whom the law applied
eventually took on greater importance. A political superior's evident
acceptance of a particular standard was not considered nearly as significant
as the acceptance of those under the standard's thumb. In that context, the
move was away from the consent given by the superior, and towards the
consent given by the subordinate. As a consequence of that shift, the
relevance of why consent gave rise to an obligation to do as one had
consented to do became increasingly pronounced. 7 One did what a superior

55. If an attempt were made to further refine the overall category, it should be noted that
expectation/reliance would be grouped with self-interest, see infra text accompanying notes 56-59, and
free will would be grouped with economic efficiency, see infra text accompanying notes 59-64.
56. This was certainly the focus of attention of John Austin, perhaps the foremost of the early
positivists. See CHtsTiE, supra note 27, at 472, 499.
57. For discussion of an early theory concerning what there is about consent that gives rise to an
obligation to do what one has consented to do, see the idea of self-limitation discussed infra notes 10408 and accompanying text.
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ordered out of deference to position alone. Nonetheless, that was entirely
inadequate to explain why an obligation existed to do as one had consented.
The idea that by consenting to a particular standard one produces an
expectation on the part of those to whom the consent is expressed, regarding
the fact that one's conduct will comport with what has been consented to,
suggests itself as a viable explanation. Consent to behave in the manner
prescribed by a specific rule of law induces those to whom the consent has
been voiced to rely on the rule being observed. Those people then change
their own positions and agree to conduct affairs according to the same rule.
Because of this reliance, legal rules must be seen as obligatory unless one is
willing to forego the possibility of mutual interrelation. Stated simply, keeping
one's word is essential if agreement is to be a realistic device in managing
affairs between independent entities.
A second and discrete basis of obligation, one also drawing on practical
considerations, might be found in self-interest. Self-interest as used here,
however, is not meant only in the traditional narrow sense of that term-the
limited individual interests of the parties directly involved in a transaction.
Self-interest is used here in the broader sense as well, specifically, individual
interests served indirectly through attentiveness to the larger interests of the
entire community. 8 The nub of the self-interest theory is that legal rules
have the force to obligate because they serve the interests of individuals,
either directly through setting forth standards that ensure, for instance, that
parties accomplish their desired objectives, or indirectly through contributing
to the creation of a sound and solid system that benefits all those who are
members of it. When two private persons agree to undertake the performance
of certain tasks, each seeks a desired objective, which they can obtain by
treating the agreement as obligatory. When the individual members of a
community treat adherence to the standards embodied in the legal rules which
that community has seen fit to adopt as something obligatory, each private
person within that community receives benefits that individual action could
not have produced. Thus, whether concern is with transactions between
individuals or the maintenance of society itself, every one of us can be said
to have an interest in the observance of law. When we honor our personal
promises we recognize that interest. When we honor our societal promises we
do the same.
In addition to expectation/reliance and self-interest, the practical consideration of individual free will59 might be said to provide the basis of legal

58. To some extent this rings of utilitarianism. For utilitarians, the objective of life is personal
pleasure. It is appreciated, however, that one will find it difficult to be happy in the midst of
unhappiness, for not only must the pursuit of happiness take into consideration the innate sympathy we
have for others, immediate or remote, but it must also account for the possibility that if we alone are
happy, others will be provoked into assaulting our own happiness. See GIORGIO DEL VECCHIO,
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 186-88 (Thomas 0. Martin trans., 1953) (presenting Jeremy Bentham's views).
59. On whether humans possess free will, compare St. Augustine of Hippo in BuRNS & RALPH,
supra note 47, at 382-84 (divine predestination and consequent absence of free will), and 5 THOMAS
HOBBES, The Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance, in THE ENGLISH WORKS OF
THOMAS HOBBES 1, 247-70, 344-57, 367-72 (Sir William Molesworth ed., 1840) (postulating that
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obligation. If free will is to be meaningfully respected, then the limitations on
it fashioned by rules of law must be viewed as obligatory. To accept the
notion that conduct is not determined, but rather the result of freedom of
choice, means that the freedom of all to choose as they so desire can be
respected only by recognizing that limitations designed to allow its exercise,
to the extent not incompatible with free choice by others, are limitations that
fix an obligation to do as they so prescribe. 0 Once the concept of free will
is accepted, the only way to assure that each person is allowed to experience
it to the greatest extent possible is by acknowledging that the limitations
imposed on free will by law are capable of establishing obligation. Free will
requires restrictions on the courses of action selected. Unless the restrictions
are perceived as binding, the idea of free will as an end grand enough to
unswervingly pursue would be seriously compromised. If legal standards are
considered optional, the free will of a few could rapidly extinguish the free
will of the others.
The last individual basis falling within the practical considerations category
is that of economic efficiency. Economic efficiency might serve as a basis for
legal obligation in one of two ways: by being considered the chief social
value, 6' economic efficiency could be said to produce obligation to obey all
economically efficient laws; by being considered an important social value,62

natural appetites determine conduct and thus there is no free will), with Immanuel Kant, S.E. FROST,
JR., BASIC TEACHINGS OF THE GREAT PHILOSOPHERS 146-48 (rev. ed. 1962) (free will present), and

ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. III, ch. 7, reprintedin ARISTOTLE, ON MAN INTHE UNIVERSE
83, 122-25 (Louise I Loomis ed., Classic Clubs 1971) (free will). See also IMMANUEL KANT,
FundamentalPrinciplesofthe Metaphysic ofMorals,in KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON AND

OTHER WORKS ON THE THEORY OF ETHICS 9, 67-83 (Thomas K. Abbott trans., 6th ed. 1909)
[hereinafter KANT, Metaphysic ofMorals]; IMMANUEL KANT, CriticalExamination ofPracticalReason,
in KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON AND OTHER WORKS ON THE THEORY OF ETHICS 101, 167-

91 (Thomas K. Abbott trans., 6th ed. 1909) [hereinafter KANT, PRACTICAL REASON] (addressing the idea
of free will and deterministic laws of the physical world, yet both concluding in favor of the existence
of the former).
60. Cf.KANT, Metaphysic ofMorals,supra note 59, at 47 (discussing Kant's alternative formulation
of his categorical imperative, the initial formulation of which appears id. at 31).
61. Though what has been said by the leading law and economics proponents is not entirely
explicit, language has been used which suggests that the idea of tracing law's force to economic
efficiency is somewhat acceptable. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism,Economics, and Legal
Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979) [hereinafter Posner, Utilitarianism].Judge Posner states:
While nowadays relatively few of the people in our society... consider wealth maximization
or some other version of efficiency the paramount social value, few judge it a trivial one. And,
... sometimes it is the only value at stake in a question.... But I am unwilling to let the
matter rest there, for it seems to me that economic analysis has some claim to being regarded
as a coherent and attractive basis for ethical judgments.
Id. at 110. Posner's position reappears in POSNER, JUSTICE, supra note 29, at 48-87; see also Richard
A. Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 4, 27 (1987)
[hereinafter Posner, The Constitution] (discussing economic efficiency as the best available instrument
for public policy decisions).
To a large extent, Posner's position is probably grounded in the belief that &conomic freedom and
individual freedom, which he undoubtedly values highly, see Sanford Levison, Some Reflections on the
PosnerianConstitution, 566 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 39,41-43 (1987) (criticizing Posner for the "egotistic"
rather than republican implications of his theory), are closely linked. For one of the chief economists
who promotes this view, see MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 7-36 (1962).
62. For theoreticians who argue for economics as one of a variety of factors law must consider, see
GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 24-27 (1970)
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economic efficiency could be said to outweigh other values in some cases and

thus indicate obligation to observe efficient laws. It is in this latter, weaker
sense that economic efficiency is used here.63 Every situation requires a
selection among various courses of action favoring differing social values. If
economic efficiency is considered such a value, it could, in some instances,
prove the most favored of the range of values involved.64 In the event a
situation suggests promoting economic efficiency, that objective is accomplished by understanding the laws best suited to that task as societal standards
that have the force to bind. Legal rules that advance an economically efficient
result have the force to compel observance whenever economic efficiency is
seen as more important than the other social values implicated by the situation
under consideration. Thus, as with expectation/reliance, self-interest, and free
will, a practical consideration-the simple promotion of economic efficiency-supports the obligatory nature of rules of law. If economic efficiency is
to be pursued, there needs to be a recognition that laws inuring to that end
have the force to obligate particular kinds of behavior.
Each of the separate bases of obligation discussed under the label of
practical considerations has a certain appeal. Yet it seems clear that they all

(providing that accident law involves the goals of "justice" and "cost reduction," with a choice made
between these two when they conflict). But see Guido Calabresi, About Law and Economics: A Letter
to Ronald Dworkin, 8 HoFsTRA L. REv. 553 (1980) (indicating that "justice" is a limitation, not a coequal balance weight, on "cost reduction"). See ACKERMAN, supra note 29, at xiii-xiv (suggesting that
perhaps the most important role performed by economic analysis is not in providing ready-made
decisions for normative questions, but rather in providing a structured and intelligent way of
understanding the distribution effects of various normative decisions). Ackerman elaborates on this
theme in BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAw 46-71 (1984) [hereinafter
ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING] (suggesting that law and economics has broadened the conception of
relevant contextual facts).
63. The argument using economic efficiency in the stronger sense is taken up infra notes 72-75 and
accompanying text.
64. Note that many economists have concluded that the question of why economics or wealth
maximization should govern societal decisions lies beyond the realm of their discipline. For the classic
articulation of this position, see LIONEL ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF

ECONOMIC SCIENCE 120-41 (1932). But see Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the
Behavioral Foundationsof Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317 (1977) (expressing need for
economists to examine philosophical and descriptive questions); Amartya K. Sen, Utilitarianismand
Welfarism, 76 J. PHIL. 463 (1979). Lawyers who have resorted to economic analysis, however, have
recognized the need to address this matter. See, e.g., POSNER, JUSTICE, supranote 29, at 48-115; Richard
A. Posner, The Value of Wealth: A Comment on Dworln and Kronman, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 243 (1980)
[hereinafter Posner, Wealth]. They have sought to explain how the common law reflects accepted
economic theory. Compare POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 29, at 23, 229-38, with Frank I.
Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1015 (1978);
George L. Priest, Selective Characteristicsof Litigation, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 399 (1980); Mario J. Rizzo,
The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 641 (1980); and Gary T. Schwartz, Economics, Wealth
Distribution, and Justice, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 799 (1979). They have also sought to explain why
economics should govern societal decisions. See ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING, supra note 62, at 78-93.
Their interest in this matter may be somewhat generated by the malaise in current ethical thought, which
seems to lean in the direction of decisionism, see Drucilla Cornell, Toward a Modern/Postmodern
Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 291, 300-01 (1985), or emotivism, see ALASDAIR C.
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 11-12 (2d ed. 1984). The effort may be to
counter the subjectivity of these approaches with a quantifiable basis for decisions. But see Michael S.
Moore, A NaturalLaw Theory of Interpretation,58 S. CAL. L. REv. 279 (1985) (arguing, inter alia, that
objective values exist and judgmental decisions should be based on them).
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suffer from two significant deficiencies. The first deficiency is the erroneous
nature of the premises upon which the various bases rest, and the second is
the inability of obligation to derive from practical considerations indicating
a need to observe law.
The claim that expectation/reliance, self-interest, free will, and economic
efficiency fail to provide a basis for legal obligation because each rests on a
false premise is indeed a serious one. Its validity, however, is evident. With
expectation/reliance, for example, the idea is that law is to be observed
because consent leads to reliance, and without reliance neither individuals nor
states would enter into agreements or continue to honor those entered into
once another contracting party has committed a violation.65 If one's word is
not kept, agreements would cease to be a viable instrument in the effort to
effectively regulate behavior. Yet reliance is not the essential factor in
bringing parties together in the first place, nor in keeping them together after
transgressions have been committed. The real explanation for these phenomena is every contracting party's hope to accomplish something which cannot
be accomplished unilaterally-the hope of controlling the exigencies of daily
life, exigencies that often seem beyond the control of singular action."
Likewise, although self-interest as a basis of obligation rests on the fact that
observance of law produces beneficial personal advantages, violations
occasionally occur when the violator believes they will be self-serving, go
undetected, and lead to nothing but indirect harmful consequences of a sort
which manifest themselves sufficiently far in the future to insulate the violator
from any real effect. 67 Observance of law is not imperative to the advancement of one's self-interest. In fact, there are many instances when the exact
opposite is quite true. Similarly, free will may be said to require the
observance of law, lest the will of the dominant be allowed to subjugate and
suppress the will of others. But even without viewing law as obligatory, the
freedom of all individuals to choose as they desire may be adequately
accommodated through interpersonal social norms that stand in the place of
"law." The need to limit free will, if there is to be anything resembling
limitation, does not require that law be seen as binding. Restrictions of equal
puissance lie well within the grasp of society. Economic efficiency, at least
in its weaker sense as a weighty social value, claims nothing more than that
efficiency needs to be viewed as obligatory in the event it is preferred over
other competing values. There is no need to be concerned with a false
premise. In the absence of a contention that law is automatically binding
whenever it is economically efficient, no connection is asserted between the
65. It might be thought that apart from the idea of expectation/reliance, obligation derives from
mere consent alone. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58, discussing the relationship between
consent and expectation/reliance. As set forth infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text, however, that
one has consented directly or through a representative to a particular standard of behavior does not, by
itself, fix an obligation to follow that standard.
66. Cf SOPER, supra note 2, at 69 (arguing that sanctions and not reliance are the key).
67. The likelihood ofan action being viewed as self-serving is surely amplified if one does not view
one's self as benefitting from the current societal arrangement. This would suggest that untoward activity
can be better deterred by a social structure that is more, rather than less, inclusive.
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practical consideration of economic efficiency and legal obligation itself. To
confine one's argument to the view that a law which promotes efficiency
needs to be treated as obligatory whenever efficiency is preferred over other
values is entirely distinct from insisting that whatever is economically
efficient is ipso facto obligatory. In the former case all that is asserted is that,
unless laws promoting efficiency are treated as binding, the value of
efficiency will not be secured.
Even if the premises underpinning expectation/reliance, self-interest, and
free will are accepted as unassailable, and even if the weaker sense of
economic efficiency falls short of connecting efficiency and obligation, there
still remains the second significant deficiency with the argument that legal
obligation rests on practical considerations. That deficiency concerns the
fallacy of thinking that simply because the observance of law is needed in
order to address or deal with each of these practical considerations, law
should therefore be conceived of as obligatory. The source of obligation of
legal rules cannot be that which required the rules themselves. The exercise
of free will by one person, for example, requires legal regulation if the
phenomenon of one individual's freedom to choose is to be reconciled with
the same phenomenon in other individuals. The fact of free will requires
viewing the law controlling it as having the force to obligate. The same is true
for expectation/reliance, self-interest, and economic efficiency. They all
suggest some need to view law deriving from them as binding. Nevertheless,
the need to regulate some practical consideration manifest in the human
situation cannot serve to supply the precepts formulated to meet that need
with what is essential to fix an obligation. That quality must spring from some
source outside of what suggested the necessity for regulation. If that were not
essential, every precept necessary to the accomplishment of some objective
or goal would acquire binding force and be capable of commanding obedience. But there is a vast difference between recognizing that observance of a
rule of law is necessary to the achievement of a particular end, and granting
that rule the appellation "obligatory." To say that something is necessary in
order for another thing to happen is merely to suggest that what is necessary
is an essential precondition. To say, on the other hand, that the something is
an obligation is to imply a responsibility, a duty on the part of one able to
cause that something to occur to undertake efforts to endeavor to assure its
occurrence. In the face of this alone, it is difficult to conclude that practical
considerations can supply the basis of legal obligation. When conjoined with
the matter of false premises, that conclusion would seem one impossible at
which to arrive.
C. ConstrainingExternalities
The third category of possible bases of obligation, here denominated
"constraining externalities," is comprised of theories which endeavor to
address the problem presented in the foregoing paragraphs. That is, the
theories in this category go beyond finding law to be binding because of
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certain practical considerations, since such considerations are simply incapable
of doing anything more than indicating that it is a good idea to view law as
obligatory. 8 Rather, these theories attempt to identify the notion that lies
beyond the bare need for viewing law as binding; this notion explains why
law has the force to command obedience. The individual bases subsumed
under the constraining externalities category include common will, economic
efficiency (in the sense that efficiency is the chief social value), divine will,
evolution, and the principle of causality. Each claims that law obligates
because of something exogenous to the observable facts apparent in the human
condition. Each seeks to locate what generates obligation in a source outside
of the practical need to obey the law.
Obviously these five theories might be subcategorized into two groupings,
with both common will and divine will as specific illustrations of a more
inclusive volitional or will theory, and with economic efficiency, evolution,
and causality as examples of a scientific theory. If such a subcategorization
were undertaken, a further distinction between "soft" and "hard" scientific
theories would seem advisable, with evolution and causality slotted into the
latter, and economic efficiency into the former. But putting aside the merits
of such a subcategorization, what follows proceeds on the basis of discussing
common will and economic efficiency first, and then taking up divine will,
evolution, and causality. It might be suggested that associating the various
theories in this fashion makes sense in view of the connection the common
will or economics shares with society, and the connection the divine will,
evolution, and causality share with obligation based on "higher authority."
However, since both consent-at least as concerns the notion of expectation/reliance-and the matter of economic efficiency received consideration
in the section just completed, continuity suggests itself as a more pragmatic
reason for following the course here laid out.
As we have seen, the expectation/reliance produced by consent fails to
explain obligation. This then raises the question of whether there is something
about consent itself, something about the very fact of agreement to be bound
by specific prescriptions, that serves to bind one to act in accordance with that
to which one has consented. Though it might be suggested that through
consent one binds one's self because of externally revealing internal
intentions, 69 unless we are prepared to acknowledge that commitments can

68. See discussion supra part I.B.
69. As best as I can determine, no commentator has actually advanced such a position. Nonetheless,
it is interesting to observe that Maine, in SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 268-77 (The
World's Classics ed. 1931) (1861), mentions an approach used in the Roman law of contracts that could
be understood as a variation on this theme. Maine describes Roman law as distinguishing between

conventions or pacts, on the one hand, and contracts on the other. The former involved only an
agreement, the latter an agreement plus obligation. Obligation was the thing that made contracts binding.
In the cases of what he styles verbal, literal, and real contracts, obligation arose from the existence of
a particular formality (for example, seal). But in the case of what he calls the consensual contract (that
involving agency, partnership, sale, or hire), "as soon as [the parties have assented], there is at once a
contract." Id. at 277 (emphasis in original). The suggestion, at least, is that in some situations the
Romans envisioned obligation as capable of arising from the simple fact of consent itself.
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be avoided whenever a new and inconsistent intention is externally revealed
(since, after all, obligation follows consent), the whole idea of the specialness
of the mere fact of consent itself must be dismissed.7" But how about the
fact that in consenting one fuses his will with the wills of others. The product
is the creation of a common will that is not only a collective force expressing
the promises of all those who have agreed to be bound, but is a super-will
which, by the very nature inherent in its character as more powerful than any
single will, is able to demand that it be obeyed. 7 This is essentially the
position implicit in the common will theory. The conjoining of the wills of
individuals or sovereign political states results in the creation of a superior
independent will that no longer retains the identity of each of the wills
comprising it. As a consequence, the separate expression of will evinced in
individually given consent may not be effectively recanted. The common will
fixes an obligation from which departure is not permitted.
The relationship between the common will theory and the expectation/reliance theory differs considerably from that between the part of the
economic efficiency theory which emphasizes efficiency as a social value, and
the part that emphasizes it as the chief social value. Thus, common will acts
to answer objections posed to expectation/reliance. Law binds not because one
anticipates that it will be followed, but because in agreeing to follow it one
helps produce a will superior to that of any individual will. Efficiency as the
chief social value, however, does not act to address similar problems with the
theory that economic efficiency is the basis of obligation because occasionally
efficiency is a value that may be preferred over others. The reason is that
efficiency as a value makes no claim to the primacy of efficiency itself.
Efficiency as the chief social value, on the other hand, makes precisely that
claim and, therefore, asserts the previously absent connection between
economics and obligation.72 Perhaps the notion that obligation should be
equated with whatever is economically efficient results from the malaise in
current ethical thought, which seems to lean in the direction of decisionism 73
or emotivism,74 both of which emphasize the subjectivity of value judgments.
By finding the source of obligation in what is economically efficient, theorists
inclined to this approach can rest comfortably in having identified a clean,
quantifiable basis for evaluating legal problems.
The third possible individual basis of obligation under the category styled
"constraining externalities" is that of divine will. In its modem form, this

70. See JAMES L. BRIERLY, THE BASIS OF OBLIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 11-12 (Sir Hersch

Lauterpacht & C.H.M. Waldock eds., 1958).
71. See HEINRICH TRIEPEL, VOLKERRECHT UND LANDESRECHT (1899); Heinrich Triepel, Rapports

Entre le Droit Interneet le DroitInternational,I Recueil des Cours 77 (1925). See also the discussion
of Triepel's views in BRIERLY, supra note 70, at 15-16.
72. See supra text accompanying note 69 for the absence of the connection. On intimations that
economic efficiency is the chief social value, see POSNER, JUSTICE, supra note 29.
73. See generally Comell, supra note 64, at 300-01 (1985) (defining decisionism and its relation
to moral relativism).
74. See generally MAcINTYRE, supra note 64, at 11-12 (explaining the theory of emotivism).
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classic theory travels under the guise of things like "practical reasonableness,"' s just "entitlements,"" or the "original position,"" all of which, in
the final analysis, seem to hinge on the existence of some sort of all powerful
moral presence.78 Roughly stated, the divine will theory might be taken to
contend that there is a coherent plan discoverable in the mere existence of the
universe. Since that plan is the product of an uncreated creator, immanent
normative essence, or timeless eternal power, it is something which must be
obeyed.79 Particular rules of human-made law consonant with the divine will
command the same degree of obedience as the divine will itself, while those
that are inconsistent lack the force to bind. 80 One might also argue that, of
necessity, the discoverable universal plan evinces a commitment to honesty,
integrity, and fidelity, since without such the plan itself could never reach
fruition. Consequently, the divine will can be said to establish a moral
obligation requiring that one's word (that is, consent, agreement, or promise)
be kept.8 By honoring commitments, conduct is aligned with the larger
blueprint of faithfulness that governs all existence. Especially pleasing about
this position is not only that it results in adherence to the obligations set by
the divine will, but that it also displays deserved respect for the will that is
honored by adherence itself. In tracing obligation to that from which all moral
or normative order derives, compliance with that order is heightened, and
condigned deference to its source is shown.
The divine will theory is clearly quite distinct from either the notion of the
common will or of efficiency as the chief social value. Plainly the idea of the
divine will implicates an obligational touchstone of an immensely different
sort. It also distinguishes itself, however, from the common will and economic
efficiency as the chief value by doing what neither of the other two attempt
to do. In maintaining that the true source of law's obligation resides in that
to which all of creation has been and will remain indebted and subordinate,
the theory depicts humankind as having no voice in the generation of what
actually causes law to bind. The common will theory finds the causal source

75. See FINNIS, supra note 2, at 100-27.

76. See ROBERT NozicK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 149-64 (1974).
77. See generally JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (suggesting a conception of justice
in which all persons begin in a position of equality).
78. See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract,86 COLUM. L. REv. 269, 275-76 (1986)

(using entitlement analysis to explain the consensual nature of contract law, reference is made to the
underlying moral force of the analysis); see also id. at 293 (discussing "shared intuitions"); FINNIs,
supra note 2, at 406-07 (viewing God as the ultimate basis of all obligation).
79. This suggestion is typical of natural law proponents. For discussion of the ideas of early
advocates of natural law, see supra note 28; see also PUFENDORF,supra note 28, ch. III, § 20.
80. See AQUINAS, supra note 28, pt. 1,2d pt, question 95, art. 2, answer ("[E]very human law has
just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in any point it deflects

from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law."). But see JEAN

DABN,

General

332-50, 41670 (Kurt Wilk trans., 1950) (contending that natural law and human law are of two separate spheres and
that, therefore, inconsistency between the two does not take away the force of either).
81. This approach would allow a proponent of the common will theory, for instance, to argue that
obligation follows a promise, no matter that the obligation fails to derive from the fusion of individual
Theory of Law, reprintedin THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES OF LASK,

wills.
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in the conjoining of individual wills. The economic efficiency theory finds it
in the aversion to subjectivity and the certainty which accompanies analysis
based on quantification. In doing so, both envision humankind as active
participants in the very making of that from which obligation springs, not as
uninfluential underlings imposed on from without. The divine will theory,
however, denies that obligation can arise from anything short of a source
completely distanced from man. It is only by understanding all the ramifications of the eternal normative order, an order in which our input is inherently
ineffectual, that one comes to have some appreciation for what really makes
law bind.
The biological principle of evolution, and the causality principle in physics,
can add a fourth and a fifth feasible basis of obligation here, just as they
added bases earlier under the category entitled "observable facts."82 It must
be mentioned, however, that evolution and causality looked at as constraining
externalities have a different twist than they did when looked at above. As
observable facts they were considered as maintaining one of two things: first,
that a historical, long-range view of law indicated evolution and causality at
work in the changing content of legal rules; or second, that law binds because
it is the creative product of a species subject to those biological or physical
principles, therefore possessing the same force as the principles themselves.
Only the latter approach received real attention. The notion that both the
evolutionary process and the concept of cause and effect are able to describe
what goes on with law over the long haul were said to provide no explanation
for why law binds. In short, when cast in terms of the former approach,
evolution and causality did not purport to represent, themselves as bases of
legal obligation. With regard to evolution and causality in the instant category
(i.e., constraining externalities), however, both principles are drawn upon in
yet a third distinct sense. They are considered here as going beyond the claim
that law binds because it is made by mankind-creatures admittedly subject
to these binding principles of the natural order. The essence of the claim is
not that the human species, as both biological creature and physical object, is
bound by principles whose force is imparted to the civil prescriptions the
species happens to adopt. Rather, the claim is the direct one that both
evolution and causality are much more than principles of biology and physics,
indeed that they are principles of the social world. 3
The claim that evolution operates in the social world refers to the fact that
the content of any particular legal rule reflects a struggle between disparate
and perhaps dramatically opposed concepts of what is essential to deal with
the problem the rule addresses. The result of this struggle embodies the
position considered most fit for the task. Given the inherent dominance or
superiority of the position the rule reflects, its emergence as the officially

82. See supra text accompanying notes 36-41.
83. I am unfamiliar with any commentator who has taken such a position, but it is quite conceivable
that since these principles have been called upon in the senses referred to above, see supra text
accompanying notes 36-41, they might also be looked to in the manner discussed herein.
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endorsed societal approach could not have been avoided. The essence of
evolution is the selection of that which is best suited to the issue at hand. As
the appropriate social organs adopted rules of law which had competed with
other proposals for that privileged status, the rules they adopted had to be
adopted simply because those rules were superior in all important respects. In
short, the law-making process was destined to turn out precisely the way it
did.
Similarly, with regard to causality, one could refer to any specific legal rule
as the consequence, effect, or result of certain identifiable, determinable,
antecedent events or conditions. To the extent that such reference is confined
to the view that every extant rule of law is the result of some traceable
precipitative circumstance, causality could be turned to as a source of
obligation. Like evolution, causality can admit to no other way for bringing
about law. Rules of law come into being not because they somehow magically
materialize out of thin air, but because some situation, thought, or condition
sets in motion the process that leads to their adoption. It is impossible to deny
that rules of law flowing from the setting in motion of such forces are the
result of those causes. And given that causality postulates the unavoidable fact
of some generative phenomenon, the rules of law give life to inescapable
products of such phenomena.
Perhaps some of these five possible bases of obligation have a certain
appeal. Nonetheless, they all suffer deficiencies which seem to raise legitimate
questions concerning their ability to explain law as obligatory. The deficiencies fall into two areas and are related to, yet quite distinct from, matters to
which I have already alluded. Speaking with greater specificity, those earlier
addressed matters dealt with the inability to explain obligation as derived from
observable facts. The idea was that even presumptively invariant facts of
nature do not reflect normative standards, 4 and the mere existence of
inescapable and predictably recurring phenomena says nothing about how it
is that law connected therewith shares in the same ineluctable attributes.8 5
The two problems with the various bases of obligation under the constraining externalities category are the foundational one that common will,
economic efficiency, divine will, evolution, and causality all rest on
unexamined assumptions about the force of that which supports those bases,
and the equally complex problem of whether any of the bases themselves
actually make the kind of normative claim to which they aspire. The
foundational problem and the criticism concerning invariant facts not
reflecting normative standards have parts in a continuum designed to argue
that law is obligatory. The problem of constraining externalities making
normative claims, and that of recurring observable facts not transmitting their
inescapable nature to the laws with which they are connected, share in the
incompleteness of arguments designed to demonstrate the force of law to bind.

84. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
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Focusing with greater precision on how a relationship exists between the
foundational problem faced by the five bases of obligation under the category
styled "constraining externalities" and the problem that observable facts of
nature do not establish normative standards, the connection to a continuum
which argues for the obligational force of law seems readily apparent. Even
if it is stipulated that law is the product of unchanging, inescapable, natural
facts like rationality, social interest, sense of right, or empirically verifiable
community practice, such facts of nature only reflect that it can be no other
way, not that legal rules which flow therefrom are binding. Rules of law gain
no force from the facts of nature, because facts of nature lack normative
content.86 In moving from "observable facts" to "constraining externalities"
to demonstrate that law is obligatory, the idea is to address the problem of
normativity through relying on things outside of, or exogenous to, mere facts
all of us can observe in our daily lives. In this respect, the bases listed under
the heading of constraining externalities build upon, or add to, the line of
argument aimed at proving that law has the force to bind. If the existence of
recurrent facts fails to demonstrate law binds, then perhaps law's binding
force can be shown by going a step further and pointing out the things
independent of those facts that may serve as the driving force behind the facts
themselves.
With regard to the problem of none of the bases in the constraining
externalities category making a normative claim, and observable facts not
transmitting their unavoidable, recurring nature to law, a more precise focus
is revealing here as well. As discussed earlier, not only does the repetitive
nature of facts like rationality, sense of right, or social instinct suggest
nothing other than things just happen to be the way they are, it does not speak
to whether the legal rules connected with such facts take on the same
inescapable, invariant quality. 87 Phenomena of the social or natural world
may be obligatory, in the sense that they will occur. Yet the mere fact that
rules of law are somehow connected with those phenomena does not mean
that the rules share the same obligational force. Therefore, arguments for legal
obligation resting on observable facts of the social or natural world necessarily come up short. Compensation for such incompleteness is not forthcoming
by a turn to the common will, economic efficiency in the strong sense (as the
chief value), evolution, or the other constraining externalities. These simply
share with observable facts an incompleteness of argument. Beyond the claim
that law is linked to a super-will, or a timeless eternal power, the bases of
obligation under the category of constraining externalities make no assertion
of normative force. The most they do is use external sources, sources other
than mere practical necessity or assuredly recurring facts, to anchor legal rules
and thereby support the arguments about law's ability to obligate.
Staying with the problem of the failure of the bases catalogued under
constraining externalities to make a normative claim, it is clear the problem

86. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
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cuts out the very heart of what was supposed to distinguish this entire
category from that of practical considerations. The whole idea behind looking
to sources external to the need to follow what law prescribes, lay in the
identification of something which gives law a link to normativity. To assert
that neither common will, nor economic efficiency in the strong sense, nor
divine will, causality, or evolution in the sense of a generative source, make
true normative claims, is to eviscerate constraining externalities as a basis of
obligation. Yet when each of the five theories subsumed under the label
attributed to that category is examined, the fact that they really make no such
claim clearly suggests itself.
Take the common will theory. It revolves around the notion of a collective
super-will. But to characterize a will as "super," and conclude from this that
the will makes a normative claim, is to miss the point about obligation. As
previously observed, obligation suggests that something "should" happen. 8
Not in the sense that it is being encouraged to happen, rather in the sense that
from an ethical or moral perspective it is the most appropriate thing that could
happen. The idea that the common will fixes obligation, however, understands

obligation to imply that something "must" happen. That seems to be the
essence of the super-will theory. Its very label rings of mandate, with
consequences associated with noncompliance. The feature that is central, the
feature of virtuousness, is left completely aside. So, too, when reliance is
placed on the biological principle of evolution or the physical principle of
causality. In such a case, it is not enough to argue that law reflects the
operation in the social world of these two principles. It is not enough to claim
that the law which exists is to be obeyed because it is the fittest product
available or the consequence of precipitative community forces. Though
arguments of this sort may invoke evolution and causality to explain why law
binds, in doing so they only indicate that the law which exists is the kind of
law these forces "will" produce once evolution and causality are put in play.
But if law is to be obligatory, if it is to command obedience, then it must go
further and indicate that what will be produced through evolution or causality
is also something that not only "will" be obeyed but "should" be obeyed.
The theories of divine will and economic efficiency in the strong sense, that
is, as the chief social value, are much more nettlesome as regards this matter
of a normative claim. By their very nature, both resonate with normativity in
that they clearly appear to entreat observance of the principles they embody.
Common will, evolution, and causality do not ring of an urging that they be
obeyed. They lack the "should" of normativity. Divine will and economic
efficiency as the chief social value, however, seem, almost by virtue of some
inherent quality, to make unmistakable normative claims. The moment one
considers the idea of a timeless eternal force, or the chief among all social
values, it is difficult to avoid the intrusion of overtones of morality. As we
all know, with morality comes the intonations of conscience associated with
what "should" be done.

88. See supra text accompanying note 54.
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It would be an oversimplification, though, to ignore the fact that both divine
will and efficiency in the strong sense can be referenced in two entirely
distinct ways. They can be said to give binding force to those laws which are
consonant with the divine will or present themselves as economically
efficient, since divine will and efficiency have a certain righteousness or
virtuousness about them. Or they can be said to give the force to bind because
the divine will, as the will of an omnipotent, almighty essence, is something
caution dictates be observed, and economic efficiency, as a concept permitting
the evaluation of law to be streamlined and quantified, is a standard that
merits utilization out of the sheer elegance of simplicity. Many times the
distinction between these two ways of thinking about the divine will and
economic efficiency as sources of legal obligation becomes blurred. Just with
regard to our moral lives alone, there are times when the admonitions in
sacred scriptures like the Bible, Talmud, Koran, Vedas, or Tao Te Ching are
thought about as warranting observance out of a sense that they represent the
word of a deity that is all powerful. Yet on other occasions we treat those
same admonitions as entitled to respect because of a sense that they state
positions capturing the truly ethical or genuinely noble.89 The same commingling is also evident in the phraseology we use to describe divine will and
economic efficiency as bases of legal obligation. With regard to the former,
we speak of "displays [of] deserved respect."9 As to the latter, our
descriptions are in terms of "a coherent and attractive basis for ethical
judgments."'" But respect can be displayed for the divine will, and the
coherency and attractiveness of efficiency can become apparent, without
necessarily acknowledging that their pull derives from virtue or righteousness.
That, however, is what lies at the heart of normativity. Both divine will and
economic efficiency can be perceived as satisfying the requirement of things
that "should" be observed. Such is the result of conceiving of the divine will
as a manifestation of a supreme and mighty being, or of efficiency as a way
to simplify and mechanize the process of making decisions. To fully capture
normativity, however, what is offered must make a claim to its own intrinsic
"value." When divine will and economic efficiency are thought about in the
sense that understands them as postulating moral or ethical positions, then,
and only then, do they meet that exacting test.
Leaving the problem of normativity and the bases of obligation under the
category of constraining externalities, and shifting to the foundational problem
associated with the bases listed under that same category, it is clear that even
when divine will and efficiency as the chief value are understood as making
claims to virtuousness, neither they nor the theories of common will,

89. It seems worth noting that there is at least a third possibility as well. Specifically, some may
yield to the teachings of authoritative religious works out of mere faith alone. The idea may be that
humans can never know all of time. Therefore, it is impossible to rationally assess the virtuousness of
any theological admonition. However, since such admonitions reflect the will of God, the One who
surpasses all understanding and was before time, they should be observed.
90. See supra text accompanying note 82.
91. See comments by Richard Posner, as discussed supra note 61.
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evolution, or causality prove able to supply obligational force to law. Stated
another way, even if every one of the theories comprising constraining
externalities were to be taken as making a normative claim, a claim to its own

intrinsic "value," the power of law to bind would remain absent. The
foundational problem responsible for this

circumstance concerns the

assumptions upon which common will, divine will, economic efficiency, the
physical principle of causality, and the biological principle of evolution
happen to be based.92 The culprit is the perennial one of infinite regress.93

Just as law cannot bind of itself, and an effort must be made to search for
something behind it if an explanation is to be offered for why it obligates, so
what is discovered in that search cannot of itself explain why law binds,
unless there is something about the thing discovered that gives it internally
generated obligational force.
In the context of divine will and economic efficiency, it would seem there
are problems with finding internally generated obligational force. While there
is reason to believe in an all powerful, uncreated creator,94 both knowledge
of and obedience to that essence's will are matters that cannot be taken as

given. As to knowing the will of some omnipotent force, the suggestion that
it is revealed through all we see about us in nature and our daily lives,95
ignores the possibility that what is seen is something other than the reflection
of a deliberative and intentional choice. 96 Yet without conscious choice

92. See supra text accompanying note 86.
93. On infinite regress in the context of international law, see Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, The
Foundations ofthe Authority ofInternationalLaw and the Problem of Enforcement, 19 MOD. L. REV.
1, 8-9 (1956).
94. With regard to the existence of a supreme force, it might be reasoned that everything in the
universe must have come into being as a consequence of something able to create the original matter
from which all that has ever been can be said to have descended. Things that we see today are the result
of mechanisms of creation that existed prior to today's things coming into being. Long before the
mechanisms of today's creation came into being, there existed still more antecedent and earlier
mechanisms, going ever backwards to the first of all creative mechanisms. Yet the very first creative
mechanism was itself created out of matter, and that matter, because there existed no earlier creative
mechanism in the universe to create it, had to have been created by something. Whatever created the
matter from which the first creative mechanism was created had to have been either itself the uncreated
creator, or created by something that was, or could trace its lineage back to, the uncreated creator. See
generally GERMAIN GRISEZ, BEYOND THE NEw THEISM: A PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION (1975) (referring
to the existence of an "uneaused cause").
95. See CICERO, supra note 28, at 225-27 (sensory perception and careful reflection). Several
variations of the divine will theory have existed. Cicero proposed that humans draw rational inferences
from what is known about humankind and the environment, and that justice is to be sought in what is
natural to man. Id.; see also SAMUEL CLARKE, A DISCOURSE CONCERNING THE UNCHANGEABLE
OBLIGATIONS OF NATURAL RELIGION, AND THE TRUTH AND CERTAINTY OF THE CHRISTIAN REVELATION
(7th ed. 1728), reprintedin BRITISH MORALISTS: 1650-1800 § 244 (D.D. Raphael ed., 1969) (the duties
of natural law "may ... be deduced from the nature of man."). Another variation holds that humans
must focus their reflection inward in order to obtain an awareness and deeper understanding of what
they already know. See AQUINAS, supra note 28, pt. 1, question 94, art 2, answer, at 1009.
96. If what exists about us is the result of a conscious rejection of all but the adopted plan, or at
the minimum a conscious choice from alternatives considered less attractive, deliberation may indeed
reveal one's will. But we can never be sure that such a process has been utilized. Even Aquinas
observed that "the will of God cannot be investigated by reason, except as regards those things which
God must will of necessity; and what He wills about creatures is not among these." AQUINAS, supra
note 28, pt. 1., question 42, art. 2, at 243 (emphasis added). To be sure, some have described creation
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nothing but the will to refrain from choosing is evinced. Similarly subject to
question is obedience to the will of the timeless force. This is certainly so
with regard to arguments for obedience that hinge on the force being the
creative wellspring of all that exists in time and space. While in such a case
one may think of adhering to the divine will out of a desire for friendship and
affinity, thereby displaying a certain element of gratitude for the gift of one's
existence,97 since raw creative power is not necessarily an indication of the
presence of intrinsic moral or ethical worth, obedience cannot be said to be
compelled on that basis alone. Economic efficiency as the chief value is no
less free from criticism. The basic difficulties it faces derive from both
wealth's inability to be the chief social value and, even more, its inability to

qualify as a value at all. Traditional mythic social narrative" depicts wealth
as vastly inferior to other things sought by members of the community. The
classic example of a value prized above wealth is that of love. 99 And, indeed,
thoughtful and careful philosophical commentators on the condition of the

world have ventured insights that, when developed, prove to undermine the
notion that efficient wealth accumulation can ever be anything more than an
in terms of a play or drama rather than in terms of a choice revealing an overall normative blueprint.
See 2 PLATO, THE LAWS OF PLATO: BOOKS VII-XII 803 b-c (1921) (man as God's plaything); FRrrOF
CAPRA, THE TAO OF PHYSICS 78 (Bantam Books, 2d ed. 1983) (1975) (Hinduism and creation seen as
a play).
97. See FINNIs, supra note 2, at 406-07 (1980).
98. On the role and impact of narrative in law see Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of
the Agon Between Legal Power and NarrativeMeaning, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2225 (1989).

99. Since childhood we have all been familiar with the myth of the king who lost his daughter to
the "golden touch." See, e.g., OVID, 2 METAMORPHOSES, bk. XI at 127-31 (Frank J. Miller trans., 1916)
(the original inspiration for the children's story). The same theme is expressed to adults in the painting
"Death of a Miser," which hangs in the National Gallery of Art, Washington, D.C., the work of the 15th
century artist Hieronymous Bosch. Bosch, whose real name was Jerome van Aken, was born about
1450, probably in the town of 's-Hertogenbosch, duchy of Brabant, Burgundy, in what is now the
Netherlands. See generally, Meisler, The World of Bosch, 18 SMITHSONIAN 40 (Mar. 1988) (describing
and interpreting Bosch's works, including "Death of a Miser"). For those who are not familiar with this
painting, it depicts a somewhat emaciated man who is afflicted with a presumably terminal malady.
Though he is being urged by an angel to fix his thoughts on a nearby crucifix, for entering through a
side door and portrayed in the style of a cloaked and hooded skeleton carrying an arrow about to be
thrust at him, the man seems preoccupied with a bag of coins being offered by a creature from "below."
Various interpretations may be given to this work by Bosch, but the one I have a personal prejudice for
is that which suggests the artist was attempting to teach us that many things, and especially life itself,
have greater value than wealth. When it is remembered that a frequent theme in Bosch's works was
condemnation of the worldly sins, the plausibility of my own prejudice does not seem quite so unlikely.
See DESIDERIUS ERAsMus, THE PRAISE OF FOLLY 224-25 (originally translated into English in 1549)
(Classics Club ed. 1942) for an example of a writer making the same point about an inferior position
accorded to wealth in comparison to wisdom. Taking a similar approach to Erasmus is Thoreau. He
observes:
Men rush to California and Australia as if the true gold were to be found in that direction; but
that is to go to the very opposite extreme to where it lies. They go prospecting farther and
farther away from the true lead, and are most unfortunate when they think themselves most
successful. Is not our native soil auriferous? Does not a stream from the golden mountains flow
through our native valley? [A]nd has not this for more geologic ages been bringing down the
shining particles and forming nuggets for us?
THOREAU, supra note 18, at 362-63 (emphasis in original).
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instrument for the requisition and nurturing of things having genuine

value."' 0 Given all of this, it is clear that foundational problems plague both
efficiency as well as divine will.

With regard to common will, evolution, and causality, the assumptions upon
which they rest are equally troublesome. The addition of one will to another

does not give rise to a will with super powers that fix obligation. The process
of several entities agreeing to shape their conduct around some specific
standard yields a product that depicts how widespread the commitment is to
address a particular problem in a particular fashion. It does not, however,
reflect a force beyond that of any one of the individual wills involved.''
Similarly, the basic assumption supporting evolution as a constraining
externality is flawed in that evolution cannot be said to make law bind by

virtue of social fitness. The mere fact that a certain standard regarding
conduct is promulgated by the authoritative decision-makers of a particular
community, because they had no option but to endorse the best alternative

then available, does not mean that what has been established as the rule of
society binds those to whom it is directed. It means only that what is
established has been established out of a natural rhythm dictating that the
fittest resolution of the particular social issue be endorsed. There is a world
of difference between the best solution always rising to the top, and the

ability of solutions of that sort to command obedience."0 2 Causality has no
easier a time with this distinction. To view the laws brought into being by the

setting in motion of inexorable social forces as therefore obligatory reveals
a myopia that blends the matters of what must "exist" and what must be

"obeyed." That the existence of something could not have been avoided is no
1 3
reason to think of that which exists as able to command obedience.

1

100. Using a rather convincing illustration involving a hypothesized machine able to supply one with
a life-time of one type of sensation, a distinguished scholar argues that humans value doing above
experiencing. See NozicK, supra note 76, at 42-45. This conclusion clearly admits of the view that
wealth itself is not a value. See also RONALD DwoRiN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 246-48 (1985)
(discussing wealth's lack of value). The mere instrumental nature of wealth is also the prime moral in
CHARLES DICKENS, A CHRISTMAS CAROL (Michael P. Hearn ed., 1976) (1843).
101. To insist that the common will binds, even though it is nothing but a conjunction of individual
wills and, therefore, is invested with no greater obligational force than any of the individual wills
comprising it, fails to consider the earlier referenced point, see supra text accompanying notes 69-71,
regarding the external revelation of internal intentions.
102. It is quite obvious that the fact that a certain solution is the best available does not guarantee
its adoption. But even if one assumes that the biological principle of evolution functions in the social
world to always produce the best option for the resolution of any particular problem, there can be no
doubt that this mere fact alone does not signify that the option thus produced binds those to whom it
is directed. Evolution may dictate that what is adopted by those with the power to establish legal
standards be nothing but what reflects the fittest alternative then extant. To concede this, however,
concedes nothing other than that those serving as society's authoritative decision-makers cannot escape
from adopting the standards they adopt. The task of demonstrating that law has the force to bind those
to whom it is directed, though, requires a showing that once adopted, there is something about law that
makes it bind.
103. The observation made supra note 102, could also be made, with appropriate changes, on the
matter of causality.
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D. Intellectual Constructs
The fourth and final category of bases of obligation can be fastened with
the appellation "intellectual constructs." The theories this label contains share
with constraining externalities a desire to locate and describe what lies outside
the law that explains the commonly held belief that law binds those to whom
it is addressed. The principal divergence between the basis styled intellectual
constructs and that of constraining externalities, however, resides in the latter
identifying the source of obligation as springing from one of the various
theories listed thereunder (for example, common will, divine will, efficiency).
The theories falling within the intellectual constructs category do not in and
of themselves serve to supply law with the force to obligate. Instead, they
simply identify a variety of arguments about how law acquires that force. In
other words, with constraining externalities law is said to be made obligatory
by externalities (for example, common will, etc.) that constrain obedience.
With intellectual constructs, however, what is advanced does not constrain
observance of law, but only calls attention to propositions about why law
binds.
But if this last category of bases of obligation only calls attention to
propositions about why law binds, how is it to be differentiated from the first
two bases-observable facts and practical considerations? Those bases also
identified arguments about how law acquires the force to bind and, thus,
would seem in no way distinct from intellectual constructs. Actually,
observable facts diverges in its focus on the tension which the failure to
recognize law as obligatory creates with presumably invariant characteristics
displayed by human beings and presented in the natural world. The practical
considerations category is similarly positioned in its view that untoward
societal consequences flow from the failure to see law as binding. Intellectual
constructs highlights propositions invested with validity only when law binds,
and in that sense it is tied neither to needs connected to certain natural or
apparent facts, nor to needs essential to the avoidance of unfortunate social
results. Any affiliation it has with needs-based analyses stems from its attempt
to demonstrate that if particular propositions about law and human beings are
utilized, then law must be understood as obligatory in order to confirm the
strength of those propositions.
The theories of obligation under the category entitled intellectual constructs
are basically three: self-limitation; hierarchy of rules; and rationality as an
end. These can be further broken down and placed in two subcategories, one
for simple and another for complex theories. The most obvious candidate for
the complex-theory subcategory is hierarchy of rules. Rationality as an end
can be slotted into the same category, largely because it argues by the same
kind of indirection to the position that law obligates those to whom it speaks.
Self-limitation is a simple-construct theory by virtue of its more direct
connection with the expressions of will that evidence themselves as law. As
with the previous bases of obligation, however, no effort is made to more
deeply explore this subcategorization. What is focused on is limited to an

1993]

WHETHER LAW BINDS

analysis of the important aspects of each of the three theories catalogued
under intellectual constructs, followed by a critique aimed at illuminating
deficiencies that impede utilization of the theories to explain why law binds.
The self-limitation theory is somewhat associated with both the common
will theory mentioned in the preceding section,"'s as well as the free will
theory discussed considerably earlier.'
Though the common will theory
argues that law derives its force from the fact of conjunction of several
individual wills, the self-limitation theory finds obligation in the significance
of each individual will being expressed. The idea is not that the revelation of
one's will to the larger community, or the fusion of one individual's will with
the will of another, acts as the catalyst giving law the force to bind. Instead,
the idea is that by freely imposing a limitation on how one agrees to conduct
one's own affairs, self-determination and personal autonomy are given play.
Since consent alone, whether expressed singly or in conjunction with others,
cannot create obligation, it must be said to arise from consensual expressions
that evidence operation of the free, autonomous nature of every promisor.
Beyond this, if unfettered self-determination is to be accepted as genuine, then
the capacity to choose to restrict the options from which future choices can
be made must be perceived as establishing obligation. Here, self-limitation
departs from the free will theory in that the latter argues that, because free
will exists, law must be viewed as obligatory. The essential component in the
self-limitation theory, however, is a limitation imposed by self on self.1" 6
Law is not binding because free choice indicates it needs to be viewed as
binding, but rather because choice, self-determination, and freedom have
validity only when law binds. External revelations of internal intentions, or
the marriage of several individual wills through agreement, simply act as the
occasion or the device that affords obligation the chance to arise. 1 7 Autonomy, self-determination, and free will function not as. practical considerations
that demonstrate the need to perceive law as obligatory, but rather as the
sources of argument about why law is to be understood as obligating those to
whom it is directed.
Rationality as an end shares with self-limitation the characteristic of
disclosing what it is that suggests law binds. It also shares with rationality as
a fact' 8 a certain emphasis on things reasoned and reasonable. Rationality
as an end, however, stands in contradistinction to self-limitation and
rationality as a fact. For example, it extends the chain of argument beyond
that used for self-limitation and focuses on the importance of making

104. See supra text accompanying note 71.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
106. For the classic statements on the self-limitation theory, see generally GEORG JELLINEK, DIE
REICHTLICHE NATUR DER STAATENVERTRAGE (1890); ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE (1900); GESETZ UND
VERORDNUNG (1895). For a discussion of Jellinek's views, see SIR HERsCH LAUTERPACHT, THE
FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 407-15 (1966).
107. The "will" theory is related to the self-limitation theory. See generally CHARLES FRIED,
CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981). For a review, see Anthony T. Kronman, A New Championfor the Will
Theory, 91 YALE L.. 404 (1981).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
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decisions or selections from the standpoint of the natural inclination of
decision-makers to act in a considered and temperate fashion. This is
distinctly evident from the fact that self-limitation postulates the obligational
force of law on the basis of the autonomy and independence of every
individual, while rationality as an end goes further to say that it is the fact
that decisions are made on the basis of a commitment to the inherent value
of things reasoned and reasonable which explains why selections by
autonomous individuals have the power to bind. In other words, the actual
pursuit of rational solutions to societal problems, and not the ability of
individuals to determine their own destiny, is what argues for law having
obligational force. The distinction between rationality as an end and as a fact
is even more pronounced. Specifically, rationality as an end stresses the
standards guiding decisions, while rationality as a fact concerns the thoughtful
and reflective processes that naturally typify evaluative judgments of

humankind.
The message about the inherent value of a commitment to rational decisions
fixing obligation captures the essence of rationality as an end. The idea is that
rationality or reason obligates one to do what it determines appropriate,

because in arriving at criteria of judgment, rationality identifies objective
principles rather than maxims of subjective volition (that is, interest and
desire), and thereby appears to the individual will as the kind of neutral,
external thing needed to command or necessitate observance through the
creation of the normative prescription referred to as the "ought.' ' 0 9 Judg-

109. Cf KANT, Melaphysic of Morals, supra note 59, at 38, 47 (noting that the ground of the
"categorical imperative" is that "rational nature exists as an end in itself"); see also 6 FREDERICK
COPLESTON, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 328 (Image Books 1985) (1960) (depicting this as a "postulate"
assumed by Kant).
Kantian philosophy is extremely tedious. With regard to the notion of the basis of obligation,
however, Kant appears to take the position that the mind can have as its object both the phenomenal
world, the world of experiences and reality, and the noumenal world, the world of pure thought. Man,
though, can never know of God, immortality, and freedom. They may or may not exist. Nevertheless,
the mind is so comprised that it is obliged to introduce these thoughts in an effort to attain a unity or
a totality with regard to what it experiences, knows, or is able to contemplate. See IMMANUEL KANT,
CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 271, 290-91, 304 (F. Max Muller trans., 2d ed., Anchor Books 1966)
(1781); 6 COPLESTON, supra, at 280, 283, 304 (noting that the mind is obliged because unification is
a natural disposition of the mind). To conceive of God, immortality, and freedom as more than
noumena, that is to say, to conceive of them as things in themselves, is to partake of illegitimate
"paralogisms" (logically false syllogisms). See 1d. at 284-86. They can never be experienced, proved,
or disproved. But even though they can only be the object of thought, man can act as if they exist and
thereby allow them to serve as transcendental ideas (regulative ideas) that aid the process of further
unification. The moral or natural law is not founded "on belief in God" but in pure reason. See id. at
313. Neither is "the basis of obligation... [to] be sought in human nature or in the circumstances of
the world in which he (man) is placed, but a priori simply in the concepts of pure reason." KANT,
Metaphysic ofMorals,supra note 59, at 4. From reason Kant formulates the categorical imperative, the
supreme principle of morality, which serves not as a premise from which rules of natural law can be
deduced, see 6 COPLESTON, supra, at 346, but rather as a criterion for judging maxims generating
specific acts of behavior. The imperative provides: "I am never to act otherwise than so that I can will
that my maxim should become a universal law." KANT, Metaphysic of Morals,supranote 59, at 18. As
an imperative, the categorical imperative commands that the will conform to something which is a good
in and of itself. Though Kant raises the issue of whether the imperative is binding, see id. at 43, he
answers that question affirmatively by postulating that man's "rational nature exists as an end in itself,"
id.at 47, and then by observing that objective principles of reason appear to the individual will as
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ments that are reasoned and reasonable obligate because rationality is a thing
sufficient in and of itself.
When one moves away from rationality as an end and towards the theory
of hierarchy of rules as the basis of obligation, a shift is made to an approach
which is completely aseptic. Unlike rationality's reliance on a notion familiar
to the probing thinker, hierarchy of rules employs an arcane and stilted
multilevel explanation for why law binds those to whom it is directed. The
suggestion is that at the level of daily life, rules of one kind set the limits
directly controlling community affairs. These rules comprise the body of law
with which the citizenry comes into everyday contact, rules that might be
styled first-order rules. At an entirely distinct level exist the rules by which
the validity of all first-order rules can be determined. These rules might be
styled second-order rules." ° A form of second-order rule might be that
legislative enactments in line with customary behavior by the public, or
consistent with the decreed desires of those who fashioned our governmental
system, should be honored."' In either case, beyond the explanatory
superstructure resides an appeal to some sort of postulate said to give law
(that is, first-order rules) force by virtue of validation. Rules of one order can
be stacked on or linked to rules of another order, but it is the hypothesis that
the rules of the loftiest order are to be followed which makes the theory more
than a sterile diagrammatic exercise and serves to support the argument that
law takes on an obligatory character.
The attractiveness of the three theories just outlined-self-limitation,
rationality as an end, and hierarchy of rules-is evident. Nevertheless, all
something external which commands or necessitates consonant behavior, thus creating the "ought" of
obligation. Id. at 30-31. On Kant's view that legal norms are politically superior to ethical or moral
norms, see EDWIN W. PATrERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW 385-86 (1953).
It is interesting to note that in addition to the postulate of reason as an end in itself, Kant's other
major postulates concern the transcendental ideas of God, immortality, and freedom. See 6 COPLESTON,
supra, at 328-31, 334-43. Also, with regard to the matter of the phenomenal and noumenal worlds, there
seems to be something in this of the split between the philosophical schools of "realism" and
"nominalism," with the former espousing that for everything experienced or known in the world there
exists an ideal but nonetheless real archetype outside the world, and the latter insisting that all that can
ever be known and all that exists is found in the experiences of the world. See C.WARREN HOLLISTER,
MEDIEVAL EUROPE: A SHORT HISTORY 272-73 (2d ed. 1968). Some of the earliest adherents to these

two schools of thought appear to have been Plato and the l1th century philosopher Roscelin
(Roscellinus), respectively. See 2 PLATO, TIMAEUS, reprinted in THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 3, 12-15

(B. Jowett trans., 3d ed., Random House 1937) (MacMillan 1892) (speaking of the creator (demiurgos)
who unites matter and ideas, material of the senses, and the unchangeable patterns of the cosmos to
make what man experiences and sees). For the views of Roscelin, canon of the cathedral at Loches, see
2 COPLESTON, supra, at 143-45.
110. For commentators advancing similar hierarchical rule systems, see DIONISIO ANZILOTrI, CORSO
Di DIRTrO INTERNAziONALE 43 (3d ed. 1928) ("a complex of norms which derive their obligatory
character from a fundamental norm"); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 77-96 (1961); HANS
KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (Anders Wedberg trans., 1945), reprintedin CHRISTIE,
supra note 27, at 621-23; and SIR JOHN W. SALMOND, SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE 137 (Glanville

Williams ed., 1 th ed. 1957) ("ultimate legal principles").
I 11. Kelsen certainly suggests this in the international realm. See HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF

LAW 214-17 (Max Knight trans., 1967). A similar approach is taken by Kelsen with regard to the
municipal or domestic realm. See KELSEN, supra note 110, at 625 ("[O]ne ought to behave as the
individual, or the individuals, who laid down the first constitution have ordained.").
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suffer from problems that erode their ability to stand as touchstones for the
binding force of law. Take self-limitation for instance. That theory is plagued
by the first of two very specific difficulties affecting each of the theories
under the label intellectual constructs. Specifically, since self-limitation finds
the basis of legal obligation in the limitations imposed by one's self on one's
self, it looks to a source that proves unsatisfactory and incapable of explaining
law as binding. This is amply demonstrated by the fact that the very creation
of an obligation under the theory depends upon manifestations of will to be
bound by some rule or rules of conduct. If such manifestations bind because
individuals possess the capacity to limit themselves, how can the obligation
to which the will is said to bind be described as legal in nature? After all, it
need hardly be mentioned that the very notion of legal obligation rings of
something designed to constrain the will of the one who is said to be
obligated. Constraint seems to imply the springing of an obligation from a
source outside of, or other than, the will of the one who is obligated. The
difference is between an obligation imposed from some source beyond the will
of the individual, and an obligation arising from a source within the will of
the individual." 2 A limitation imposed on self by self is a limitation only
so long as behavior is in conformance therewith, and can never rise beyond
the level of mere limitation to the level of legal obligation. The most that
self-limitation can achieve is to describe the mechanism used by individuals
to indicate that their actions shall be in accordance with a particular standard.
In no way can it serve as the source of legal obligation.
The unacceptability of the sources of obligation proffered for rationality as
an end and hierarchy of rules is equally as pronounced. The essential idea
with regard to the former is that of the sufficiency of choices guided by
reason. As long as reason produces the choices upon which one settles, then
those choices fix obligation. To think that reason, however, is the value which
imparts obligation to law is to ascribe not only to an extreme rationalism
resulting in the primacy of commitment or duty over good ends (because
obligation is always thought of as following from what reason identifies),"'
but also to a view that gives short shrift to other values that are ends-inthemselves. One could easily number in addition to reason the values of life,
knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, friendship, and perhaps even religious
belief and worship." 4 Irrespective of the inclination to alter this listing, it

112. See BRIERLY, supra note 27, at 14.
113. See 6 COPLESTON, supra note 109, at 347. For an illustration favoring duty over good ends, see
IMMANUEL KANT, ON A SUPPOSED RIGHT TO LIE FROM ALTRUISTIC MOTIVES (1797), reprinted in
IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON AND OTHER WRITINGS INMORAL PHILOSOPHY 346,
349-50 (L. Beck trans., 1949) (obligation to tell truth even though it may lead to death of another). The
idea of duty over ends is anti-consequentialist and is probably motivated by the same impetus that has
led to the doctrine of double effect (that is, one must not use an inappropriate means to produce a good
end). In opposition to consequentialism, see FINNIS, supra note 2, at 111-25 (1980). In support of
consequentialism, see JUDITH J. THOMSON, The Tolley Problem, in RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK 94116 (William Parent ed., 1986).
114. See AQUINAS, THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 28, pt. 1, 2d pt. question 10, art. lc and
question 94, art. 2d; FINNIS, supra note 2, at 85-92; WILLIAM K. FRANKENA, ETHICS 87-88 (2d ed.
1973); GERMAIN GRsEz & RUSSELL SHAW, BEYOND THE NEW MORALITY: THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF
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is abundantly clear that the moment more than reason alone is recognized as
an end-in-itself kind of value, the problematic character of selection arises.
Every instance which involves more than just reason presents the possibility
of values conflicting with each other. Acceptance of the primacy of reason
over a good outcome is not adequate to provide more than a capricious
resolution of such a tension. Adherence to a position simply preferring the
outcome produced by reason still leaves the stark reality of assessing the other
values involved, and then balancing and selecting among the many values that
are all ends in themselves." 5 While it might be agreed that with this as the
task, reason is always to be the value attributed preeminence, because it is
both an indispensable precondition to the occurrence of assessment as well as
the only thing able to engage in the exercise of weighing and choosing from
among the values concerned, one must not lose sight of the fact that the
weight accorded to particular basic values fluctuates in relation to the degree
to which a specific factual situation happens to involve one value more than
another. Thus, in a life-threatening situation, the value of life becomes
preeminent to, and indeed a precondition for, the value of reason." 6 True,
reason may be called upon in deciding the best action for extricating one's
self or another from such a situation. That, however, only illustrates that
reason can be participated in when preferring the value of life (or some other
value)." 7 It does not indicate that reason receives higher priority, for in the
absence of life itself reason is nothing. Indeed it is quite conceivable that
many others might feel that, without knowledge or friendship or aesthetic
experience, one either has none of the primal ingredients essential to permit
reason to be rational (since, for example, with what is reason to function if
one has no knowledge?), or none of the ingredients essential to permit one to
claim, and feel the claim is well-founded, that the fullness of the good life has
been experienced.
With regard to the unacceptability of the source put forward by the
hierarchy of rules theory, it need only be recalled that the second-order rules
which serve to validate the first-order rules are nothing but postulates.
Furthermore, like all postulates, these second-order rules are faithful to the
etymological Latin ancestor postulatum (that is, to assume) and state
propositions that are simply taken as given. Second-order rules make a claim
to normativity by exhorting adherence to legislative enactments that parallel

FREEDOM ch. 7 (1974); see also JOHAN HuIZiNGA, HOMO LUDENS: A STUDY OF THE PLAY-ELEMENT
iN CULTURE (1938) (discussing play as a basic value); John M. Finnis, "Reason and Passion": The
Constitutional Dialectic of Free Speech and Obscenity, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 222, 232-37 (1967)
(discussing aesthetic experience as a value); Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate, ques. 16, art. 1, reply 9
(discussing practical intelligence or reason as a basic value).
115. On the incommensurability of basic values, see FINNIS, supra note 2, at 92 (no objective
hierarchy among basic values). For disagreement with Finnis, see Donald H. Regan, What a Sensible
NaturalLawyer and a Sensible UtilitarianAgree About and DisagreeAbout: Comments on Finnis,36
L LEGAL EDUc. 496, 498-99 (1986).
116. Cf FINNIS, supra note 2, at 92-94.

117. See id. at 100 (discussing how reason or "practical reasonableness" is participated in when
shaping participation in other basic values).
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the desires of the Founding Fathers or what has customarily been done. They
speak in terms suggesting one "ought" to observe or "should" follow what the
rules decree. The basic shortcoming with the normative claim they make
concerns the failure to indicate that the rules themselves have a normative
quality. Clearly it is one thing to say that a proposition (first-order rule)
consonant with the desires of the Founding Fathers or customary behavior
"should" be followed, and something entirely different to say that the desires
of the Founding Fathers or the practices evident in custom (second-order
rules) "should" be followed. The former looks no further than the matter of
consistency between first- and second-order rules. The latter is directed at the
second-order rules alone and ascribes to them essential normative force. In
stipulating the propositions that comprise second-order rules, and in failing to
attach to those rules the admonition that they be observed," 8 the hierarchy
of rules theory shares with self-limitation and rationality as an end the
problem of an ineffectual source upon which to rest constructs advanced.
More than likely, the absence of an ascription of normativity to second-order
rules reflects a reluctance to face the problem of dealing with the question:
Why should custom or the desires of the architects of our system of
government be followed? Given that the chief proponents of the hierarchy of
rules theory happen to be positivists, it is not at all surprising to find this kind
of preference for a purely descriptive model of obligation.
The second major difficulty with the three theories catalogued under
intellectual constructs concerns non-neutrality. Whenever law is spoken of as
having a normative basis underpinning it, the implication is that the basis is
not only one that makes a "should" or "ought" claim, but also one that
suggests the existence of some internally generated obligational force. It
would seem that since any basis with such force is to reside outside those
which the law attempts to regulate, the force internally generated by the basis
is to be possessed of an impartial character, without affiliation with those to
whom law is directed. For want of a better description, this character might
be termed "neutrality." When self-limitation, rationality as an end, and
hierarchy of rules are considered, the entire category labeled intellectual
constructs seems woefully devoid of any sense of neutrality.
In providing that the force of law derives from the capacity of one to limit
one's own choice from available options, the self-limitation theory relies on
a construct that is patently non-neutral. By asking those whom law is designed
to regulate to supply the basis of legal obligation, the theory fashions an
argument which necessarily leaves law in the position of being subject to the
whim of the regulated. As earlier observed, the essence of an obligation that
is legal in nature is that of an external constraint, a constraint residing outside
the one to whom law speaks." 9 In locating the source that makes law bind

118. See HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 111 (1945) ("basic norm
presupposed as valid"); KELSEN, PuRE THEORY OF LAW, supra note I11, at 215-17; KELSEN, supra note
29, at 262 ("basic norm ... we presuppose as a hypothesis").
119. See supra text accompanying notes 112-13.
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in the ability of individuals to limit themselves, self-limitation supplies a basis
of obligation only so long as the actions of individuals are in conformance
with previously manifested limitations on will. Once a divergence occurs
between limitations assumed and actions undertaken, the obligation to
conform behavior with what had been assumed is removed, since nonconforming behavior presents the current dimensions of the limits on will.
Permitting those whom law regulates to slide in and out of obligation in
accordance with what they now desire to be the limits on self is palpably nonneutral.
This proposition is also true with regard to rationality as an end and
hierarchy of rules. As to rationality, it has already been indicated that there
are problems deriving from the existence of other values considered ends in
themselves. On the point of non-neutrality, rationality as an end is under the
shadow cast again by the involvement of the one to whom law speaks.
Specifically, the whole idea behind rationality as the basis of obligation
relates to the faculty of reason identifying criteria for judgment, which
obligates because rationality is a thing sufficient in and of itself. But the
neutrality or objectivity of reason is called into question when it moves to
apply the criteria for judgment it has identified to actions in which one has
a personal stake. Once reason has settled upon the principles for judgment, it
then translates them by considering their exact meanings and requirements in
the context of deciding how to react to specific factual situations involving the
person then engaged in the reflection. There are always two steps. The criteria
for judgment are identified by reason, seeking only reason as an end in itself.
Then the principles identified are converted by reason into actions directing
the volition of the one by whom they were identified. It is at this second stage
that the purity of impartial objectivity breaks down. When reflecting upon the
identification of the objective principles, detachment is always more complete
than when reflecting upon converting those principles into actions that affect
and direct one's desires. 2 °
As to hierarchy of rules, it would seem that the structured and formulaic
nature the approach it captures would depict a basis of obligation free from
the same kind of non-neutrality that undermines the acceptability of rationality
as an end. By maintaining that the source of legal obligation resides in an
intellectual construct designed to empower first-order rules consistent with
second-order or master rules, the theory advances a suggestion which seems
to supply generative force, for officially sanctioned standards of behavior,
through an objective and impartial touchstone. The fact of the matter,
however, is that hierarchy of rules is far from a neutral and uninvolved source
of obligation. The content of both first- and second-order rules is not selfapplying; the rules do not speak for themselves. In every case the meaning of
a first-order rule must be determined by some member of the society to which
the rule applies. That meaning must then be measured against the appropriate
second-order rule, which has also had its own meaning determined by the

120. See BERNARD A.O. WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMrns OF PHILOSOPHY 66-69 (1985).
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exact same person. Clearly, then, at every step along the way, there is direct
involvement by parties with an interest. Hierarchy of rules does not provide
us with a theory that assures neutrality. Given the essential need for
interpretation of any standard, there is always unavoidable participation by
those to whom the standard applies.
II. TOWARDS A THEORY OF LEGAL OBLIGATION
[Abgarus said to Artaban:] My son, it may be that the light of truth is in
this sign that has appeared in the skies, and then it will surely lead to the
Prince and the mighty brightness. Or it may be that it is only a shadow of
the light, as Tigranes has said, and then he who follows it will have only
a long pilgrimage and an empty search. But it is better to follow even the
shadow of the best than to remain content with the worst. And those who
would see wonderful things must often be ready to travel alone.
-Henry Van Dyke"'
Before subjecting my own curious views about legal obligation to the light
of public scrutiny, it need be recalled that the problem of whether law binds
those to whom it is directed led to this point. As was noted in the introduction, the importance of this question for the legal theoretician, public official,
judge, juror, or private citizen is strikingly obvious. Concerns regarding the
determinacy and objectivity of law, the interpretation of legal texts, the
meaning and force of precedent, the rendering of judgments out of line with
what is seemingly dictated, and the freedom to pursue actions which are
inconsistent with societally-established expectations all feel the impact of such
a query. From the analysis contained in Part I, there appears to be scant
support in any of the philosophical hypotheses one can imagine which can be
pointed to as providing incontrovertible evidence of law's inherent capacity
to obligate. Bases of obligation considered within the category "observable
facts" are plagued by the presence of factual divergences,' the distinction
between what leads to law and the conclusion that law therefore binds,'2 4
and the inability of naturally recurring facts to speak normatively.
Theories drawing on "considerations of practicality" have problems with the
significance of the need to take law as obligatory2 5 and the use of false
26
premises for developing the considerations driving the need itself.
"Constraining externalities" are equally troubled by the failure to couple a
claim that one should observe or honor law with the externality upon which
it relies,'27 and by the absence of something situated behind the externality

121. HENRY VAN DYKE, THE STORY OF THE OTHER WISE MAN 20 (Ballantine Books 1984) (1923).
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that compels the externality's observance. 128 "Intellectual constructs" suffer
129
from both ineffectual sources upon which to rest the constructs advanced,
3
as well as the absence of neutrality or impartiality.
A satisfactory theory of legal obligation must locate the "law" within the
total context of human experience. The law is part of life. It is not only a
formal articulation of the human species, but an articulation voiced with the

purpose of assisting the preservation and advancement of the species. As such,
law is of necessity both imbued with the life of its enunciator and designed

to affect the manner in which that very life unfolds. Thus, any complete
understanding of the law must acknowledge this reality. Having said this
much, I now proceed in Part II, with a great deal of reluctance born out of a
natural hesitancy to drop one's guard and reveal innermost thoughts, to set

forth what some may perceive as a rather heretical and seemingly nihilistic
view of law and obligation.
Like most trained in the law, I have long assumed, but never questioned, the

notion that law is binding. At present, however, it is my (undoubtedly illconsidered) opinion that there is nothing inherent in the nature of law that
gives it the force to obligate. The absence of law's obligatory force certainly
seems to have been the point of what has been reviewed in the many
preceding pages. Perhaps this iconoclasm results from the frustration that I,

like so many others, feel over instances in which society's hands seem to be
tied when it comes to dealing with the many acts of insensitivity, neglect, and
indiscriminate brutality suffered daily by innocent individuals. Or perhaps, it
is simply the result of a tendency to slip into intellectual lethargy that all
those who face middle age and continue to make contributions to disciplined

thinking must battle and successfully defeat. Then again, it is distinctly
possible that the iconoclasm shows an awareness for that stark reality of
realities we all sense, but because of an unnerving fear of anarchy, cannot
bring ourselves to admit. 3' Let me hasten to add, however, that I do not
12

128. See supra text accompanying notes 92-103.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 112-19.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 119-20.
131. It has always been my firm belief that knowing something about the person who is revealing
her thoughts-stated colloquially, what makes her tick-is at least as important as knowing the thoughts
themselves. Out of a sense of fidelity to this belief, the following revelations are offered. I am a happily
married father of two wonderful sons-ages three and nine-who regularly seem to test my parenting
skills. As the eldest of nine children, I was raised as a Catholic and Democrat in a somewhat close-knit
family. I now regularly attend an Episcopal church, consider myself to be nonpolitical, and am active
in feeding programs for local street people and have been active in reading programs for their children.
My father was a professional baseball player who spent the overwhelming portion of his working life
as a carpenter. My mother was the protective principal in charge of most of the child-rearing, a
condition that I suspect was very typical in the 1950's and 1960's. My father strongly desired that his
sons take athletics seriously; thus, I spent untold hours (some fondly remembered) under perfectionist
guidance at the baseball diamond. I still vividly recall one occasion, however, when as a young chap
my interest in selling school chocolate bars in the neighborhood, rather than in going to the ballpark-as
my father, in a conscientious and devoted way, thought I should-irritated him to the point that he
literally cut up and destroyed my baseball cleats. Knowing the many hours he lost at work by leaving
early to get me to the diamond for practice before sundown, having the perspective of a twenty-five-odd
year hiatus, and personally experiencing frustration as an involved father deeply committed to the goal
of helping his own sons succeed, I now look back with empathy. Indeed, the part in the movie FIELD
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32
believe that what stands for law need be nothing more than politics.

Indeed, I find the very thought of urging the politicization of law to be
nothing short of detestable. My current thinking is that law has two central
characteristics. The first is that the result it seeks to advance is one that is
sought to be justified, rationalized, and explained by reference to some
legitimating principle. The idea is not simply that a particular outcome is
desired, and the necessary manipulation, cajolery, or power has been
employed to assure that this outcome is preferred above the various alternatives. It is this characteristic of a legitimating principle, this feature of
something beyond mere ad hoc, unbridled discretion, which is chiefly
responsible for illustrating the distinction between law and politics. The
second central characteristic of law is that it acts as a mechanism for
permitting principles, referenced as legitimating principles that sanction a
desired outcome, to be considered, thought about, and reflected upon by those
officials who are instrumental in establishing the rules that set the boundaries
of acceptable societal behavior. In this capacity law accommodates the

potential for changing perceptions of the legitimating principles, changing
perceptions that seem to typify law's need to capture its essential character
as a device for dealing with difficulties facing reflective individuals
committed to associative existence. By virtue of such accommodation, the
essential ingredient for doctrinal alteration appears. Each of these issues will
now be examined in some detail.

A. Law and Obligation
To take the position that law does not obligate is not to deny that many, if
not most, people act in accordance with what law declares.'33 A large part
of this conformance between action and standard probably belies the fact that
OF DREAMS (Universal, 1989) where actor Kevin Costner, on first seeing the spirit of his estranged
father as a young man, remarked to his wife, "Look at him! He's got his whole life in front of him ....
[Life has not yet worn him down]," touched an incredibly responsive chord. Within a few months
thereafter, I telephoned my own parents, with whom I have a close relationship, and lachrymosely
expressed regret for the part I played in the life that wore them down. The importance of this episode,
at least for me, resides not in its suggestion that I somehow think apology might serve to insulate me
from abrasions with my own children, nor in its evidentiary value as revealing a perhaps overly sensitive
and maudlin personality type. For me the real importance is that the episode suggests a personal
perception about the unavoidably tragic nature of life. That is to say, a perception that it has always
been and will always be the child's way to unwittingly hurt those who love him most, and the parents'
way to inescapably receive the injury inherent in the child's action. In a condition of that sort, even the
moral directive to "honor thy father and thy mother" seems grossly inadequate to accomplish the real
objective of securing familial respect. If that is true for one born of another, how much more true it
would seem to be for mere legal injunctions designed to regulate relations between those associated by
nothing more than membership in the same species.
132. But see the writings of adherents to "critical legal studies" suggesting that law is nothing but
politics, for example, Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: An Introduction to its Origins and
Underpinnings, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 505, 506 (1986), and, presumably, can therefore never have any real
independent force.
133. With respect to this assertion, even in the controversial realm of international law, see HENKIN,
supra note 41, at 47 ("[A]Imost all nations observe almost all principles of international law ... almost
all of the time.").
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much of law is simply a formalization of norms of-conduct that would
otherwise be customarily followed. There is, to be sure, another part which
proceeds from an awareness and fear of the sanctions associated with conduct
at variance with the formalized norms, and most likely yet a third which
involves actions influenced by an internal assumption that what law
commands is always to be obeyed. In stating that law does not fix' an
obligation to do as it directs, however, what is meant is simply that, while it
may be obeyed out of a feeling that one is obliged, or out of a fear of
sanctions, or out of an identity between a specific standard and traditional
behavior, law contains nothing which, by its very nature, its endemic
character, is able to require its observance. Neither observable facts nor
practical considerations, constraining externalities nor intellectual constructs
give law what it needs to obligate.
If law does not obligate, why is it called "law"? Is not the very essence of
law the notion that what it commands is obligatory? Is it not incorrect to
denominate a societal standard "law" when that standard lacks the force to
compel behavior? I suspect that the overwhelming majority of people have
been taught, since they first indicated a sense of social awareness, that the law
is to be obeyed, and that the law describes what one must do and how one
must act. To the extent that this teaching is designed to emphasize law as an
imperative, with the idea being to either enhance the chances that the
proselytized will not engage in deviant behavior which exposes them to the
imposition of sanctions, or to inculcate an ethic of compliance with standards
accepted by the society in which one lives, the teaching seems relatively
immune from criticism. To the extent that the teaching is meant to capture the
nature of law, however, to depict its inherent ability to fix constraints on
one's freedom to pursue particular conduct or make certain choices, the
teaching seems somewhat wide of the mark. What stands for law may be
spoken of as binding, but there is nothing about its character that makes it so.
Everyday discussion about law may contain references motivated by interest
in stimulating compliance. Nonetheless, the discussion fails to disclose the
true essence of law as something with which compliance may be obtained
through fear or admonition, rather than through the ingredients that constitute
its basic nature. Although sound and logical reasons may exist for following
the law, there is nothing about it that gives law the inherent force to obligate
those to whom it is directed.
One might suspect that an extremely important reason why certain societal
standards are selected for description as "law" has to do with the consequence
known to proceed from using that description. If from early life we have been
taught that law is to be obeyed, then how better to generate substantial
interest in compliance with a societal standard than to attach to it the
appellation "law"? Doing so invests the standard with a puissance it would not
otherwise possess. There is nothing especially disturbing about appropriate
authorities capitalizing on the consequence of this phenomenon. The idea is
obviously to channel conduct into orderly and predictable patterns. In the
realm of relations between nation-states, I periodically get the impression that
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the reason some strongly insist upon calling international law "law," and that
others insist just as strongly that this description is inappropriate, has to do
with their particular perception regarding the desirability of the rules of
international law. Those who would view the rules as an attractive substitute
for max politik seem inveterately committed to the idea that the rules are part
of international "law." The hope is that because of the description the chances
of securing particular behavior will be enhanced. On the other hand, those
viewing the rules as inconsistent with objectives which the application of
power might secure stand by the position that the rules are not really "law"
at all, but simply a reflection of the way some would like to see affairs
conducted. For those wishing to operate without the constraint of principle,
the advantage of this view is all too apparent.
Where does this lead? It seems to me to lead to the following: the societal
standards called law are often obeyed, but for a variety of reasons, some of
which have nothing to do with law being considered obligatory; law is thought
of as binding because of the fact that part of human socialization involves the
teaching that it is to be obeyed; the idea of obedience to law is stressed in
order to move conduct in a desired direction; and standards characterized as
law are so designated because of an appreciation for the increased likelihood
that they will thus be respected. Yet to say that law is thought of as binding
because we are urged to believe it is so, and then to acknowledge that the
reality of this phenomenon is used to give certain societal standards greater
influence than others, is not to demonstrate that law is, in fact, able to
establish obligation. Obligation implies not only that certain behavior ought
to be engaged in, but, more unequivocally, that one has a responsibility to
engage in this behavior. Both of these forms of description suggest that
something lies behind them, something which indicates that what they
describe has a certain force.
By way of contrast, it makes no sense to speak of there being a responsibility to follow, for instance, patterned, replicative, and observable facts.
Adhering to something like natural scientific laws is not really observance at
all. Adherence is simply a fact which occurs, not because something lies
behind the natural laws to give them force, but because consonance with them
cannot, of necessity, be avoided.1 34 The societal laws which govern human
conduct are clearly distinct, in this respect, from the scientific laws of nature.
Laws regulating the affairs of mankind are not, in and of themselves,
necessarily observed. While this distinction might suggest that it is appropriate to speak of the term responsibility in the context of law, that would seem
so only if it could be demonstrated that something exists which makes law
binding. Yet, as has already been noted, even in the realm of the physical
world, questions have been raised about whether the so-called laws governing
it are anything more than subjective formulations depicting what one thinks

134. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55 and 86-88.
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one has seen.'35 Thus, what is left to give law force besides a series of

hypotheses (for example, that law binds because of a master norm or because
reason is an end in itself)? Perhaps these hypotheses are used to avoid the

problem of "infinite regress," the problem of tracing obligation back through
an unending array of still more antecedent and ever remote causes. Hypotheses, however, can never provide law's basis of obligation, for without
something more than a hypothesis, a presupposition, or an indemonstrable
truth, law can never be acknowledged as having the real force necessary to
compel specific behavior.' 36

B. Law and Politics
It is quite conceivable that one might conclude that if law is not obligatory,
if it lacks the force to compel behavior, then it represents nothing more than
the configuration of policy choices that are made by those in a position to
exert influence on the law-establishing organs of a particular social system.

Furthermore, since official policy choices made within the context of social
systems represent the essence of politics, one might conclude that law is

really politics. By clothing the political choices of society's most influential
groups with the description "law," a certain respectability, legitimacy, and
force to preferred courses of action is thereby obtained.
There is no doubt that a particular society's policy preferences, or the

preferences of a particular society at one historical juncture as compared with
135. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text; see also SIR ARTHUR EDDINGTON, THE NATURE
OF THE PHYSICAL WORLD 244 (1935); J.W.N. SULLIVAN, THE LIMITATIONS OF SCIENCE 228 (1933)
("Mathematical characteristics, it may be argued, are put into nature by us."); KUHN, supra note 3, at
170-71. On occasions when the subject of the limits of man's ability to comprehend objective reality
happens to arise, I always recall Dante's encounter with Beatrice in purgatory. When she, then a spirit
speaks to him, still a mortal guided among the wraiths of the underworld by the long-deceased and
much-admired Roman poet Virgil, in words he fails to understand, Dante inquires:
But tell me why it is, your longed-for words
Soar so far above my comprehension,
That, seeking aid, it needs it all the more?
Beatrice responds:
That you may know your chosen school,
And see how all its teaching parallels
The truths that I have uttered in my discourseAnd also, that the path which you now tread
Is just as distant from the way of God
As farthest heaven is remote from earth.
DANTE ALIGHIERI, Purgatorio canto 33, in THE DIvINE COMEDY 124-25 (Lawrence G. White trans.,
1948). While the fact that Dante has strayed towards worldliness is what prompts the journey through
the underworld, see DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE INFERNO 27 (John Ciardi trans., 1954), and, therefore, may
explain Beatrice's response, to what extent is she indicating that the ways of heaven are so different
from the ways of Earth that man can never fully comprehend the truth?
136. Presumably, if the existence of objective truth can be demonstrated, then it might be possible
to base law on more than a hypothesis, with the consequence being that law would fix an obligation to
act as it prescribes. For views on the matter of objective truth, compare, for example, PLATO, Phaedo,
in THE REPUBLIC AND OTHER WORKS 487 (B. Jowett trans., 1973) (theory of forms), and PLATO, The
Republic, in THE REPUBLIC AND OTHER WORKS, supra, at 7, with DAVID HUME, AN INQUIRY
CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (1949) (questioning objective truth).
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another, affects not only the ideological direction of the society but its
perception and understanding of the law as well. Were this not so, it would
be difficult to account for revolutionary developments that occur from time
to time in various legal doctrines. Privity of contract, "due process"
entitlements, and territorial acquisition by conquest and annexation are but

three such projects which readily come to mind in the private, public, and
international fields. 137 Yet the fact that changes in policies often produce

profound and significant changes in a society's understanding of the content
and meaning of the law is not evidence for the position that law and politics
are synonymous. Law and politics are two entirely distinct creatures. Both
share responsiveness to the policy choices made by a particular society, and
the objective or goal of being the production of a decision on some particular
issue of concern. Nevertheless, both seem typified by radically disparate
3
characteristics which indicate their differing natures. 1

The distinguishing characteristic of politics is that the decisions it produces
are decisions founded upon the outcome of the voting process. Politics
involves the effort to establish one's own preferences as those which will
direct the course of social affairs. The political process is content to
accomplish this objective on the basis of nothing more than the sheer force
of numbers. Politics aims at gaining the recognition that a particular policy
preference represents the position desired by the society concerned. This is
not to say that political representatives give no consideration to the essential
goodness of the proposition which they may be inclined to support. Indeed,
during the course of deliberation on a specific matter, representatives
frequently find themselves under intense pressure to see the merit of an
alternative approach and to defend that to which they subscribe. The basic

137. Every law student is familiar with the policy choices underpinning erosion of the doctrine of
privity of contract and the rejection of the classic "right vs. privilege" distinction in the area of
constitutional "due process." See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 11 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916) (on
privity of contract); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (on "due process"). What most may not
be familiar with is the fact that similar dramatic reversals have occurred in the law of international
affairs. The text refers to the idea that sovereignty to territory could, at one time, have been claimed by
virtue of military conquest and annexation. See J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 171-73 (Sir
Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963). The current view is that this method of acquisition is no longer
acceptable. See 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 241(a) (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952); G.A.
Res. 2253, U.N. GAOR, 5th Emergency Special Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/6798 (1967)
(urging Israel to rescind measures taken and to desist from future action in Jerusalem); S.C. Res. 252,
U.N. SCOR, 23d Sess., 1426th mtg., at 9-10, U.N. Doc. S/INF/23/Rev.1 (1968) (rejecting, by vote of
13 to zero, with two abstentions, Israel's effort to absorb Jerusalem after the 1967 war); G.A. Res. 3314,
U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142-43, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) (defining aggression).
Similar radical changes have occurred with regard to issues as diverse as the permissibility of war, see
2 OPPENHEIM, supra, § 52fe, the status of coastal waters beyond the territorial seas, see 2 GREEN H.
HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 197 (1941) (high seas); Ann L. Hollick, The Origins
of 200-Mile Off-Shore Zones, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 494 (1977) (coastal state zones), and the use of
national preferences in government procurement, see General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. III
8(a), GATT Document IV Basic Instruments and Selected Documents (1969) (permitting procurement
preferences); H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 74 (1979) (prohibiting preferences in
government procurement, though recognizing exceptions, as part of the Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations).
138. See generally Herbert Wechsler, TowardNeutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1959) (separating politics, which is seen as "manipulative," from law).
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point about the observation that politics' distinguishing characteristic is bound
up with the voting process and the effort to garner the largest number of
electoral commitments possible is that it is perfectly appropriate for a political
representative to vote a particular way simply because a majority of the
representative's constituents are seen as holding a view consistent with that
vote. No doubt there are innumerable instances where political careers have
been ended or imperiled as a result of voting one's conscience. That
phenomenon, however, is more a reflection on the problems inherent in
representative majoritarianism1 39 than of the principal distinction characterizing politics as unique and particularly different from law. Politics is a
numbers game, and no one would seriously view it as entirely illegitimate for
a representative of the people to voice the majority's will through a vote
registered with the intent of permitting that will to effectuate itself fully.
There may exist some sense that the vote should be able to stand on its own.

139. The basic problem with representative decision-making is that there are so many possible
positions on each substantive issue that it is very likely that even representatives selected by a true,
absolute majority of the constituents they represent will not vote in accordance with the view held by
a majority of those constituents on each and every matter. A more fundamental question is why the
principle of majority rule is to be utilized in the first place. The answer that it is the best device for
giving all views an equal chance seems unsatisfactory in light of the obvious fact that majority rule
guarantees that the majority's view will always be preferred while the minority's will always be rejected.
It is not enough to meet this observation with the response that majority rule suggests itself because it
stands as the substitute for what would otherwise be a war of every man against every other man, with
raw power being determinative. That observation may provide a practical explanation for why
majoritarianism is more acceptable than a pure state of nature, but in stressing the comparative
consequences of majority rule, it overlooks the fact that enlightened despotism, monarchy, or some other
form of political decision-making may also produce a better end result than decision-making through
brute force. In making this point, the real gravamen of the matter is touched. For when it is appreciated
that majority rule must be evaluated in the context of other alternatives, it becomes apparent that at
some point it must be directly defended by proof of its unique validity, its inherent necessity, and its
basic moral force. Majority rule may prove more acceptable than every other alternative, but what is it
about majority rule that gives it legitimate authority over those in the minority? What is it about
majority rule that suggests that it provides the ultimate yardstick by which the real justification for
governmental power is to be assessed? Though most have been taught from a very early age to accept
the idea of majoritarianism (indeed, some might even argue that its acceptance is more a reflection of
a natural psychological predisposition than of external proselytization), when confronted with the need
to directly defend the idea, we are frequently at a loss to develop any fool proof argument.
One argument that has been advanced is that, in the "original contract," unanimous consent was given
to the idea of majority rule. See, e.g., LOCKE, supra note 27, at 123-25. Separate and apart from the
problems with consent creating obligation, which have already been dealt with at length, see supra part
I.A., there is also the problem that the original contractors could just as easily have consented to
dictatorship, minority rule, or divine right of kings. Had that been so, would the mere fact of consent
have been enough to justify those forms of decision-making? Another argument in support of
majoritarianism is that electoral decisions really reflect a judgment on what voters think the "general
will" wants with regard to a particular matter. Thus, those on the losing side have not cast their votes
for what they want, but have simply miscalculated or erroneously guessed what the "general will," of
which their individual wills are a part, actually wants. See, e.g., JEAN J. ROUSSEAU, SOCIAL CONTRACr
AND DIscOuRsEs 102-41 (G.D.H. Cole trans., Everyman's Library ed. 1950) (1762). If we accept the
notion that the majority always knows what the "general will" wants, then perhaps this argument proves
more successfiil than the first. If we do not accept that hypothesis, then the "general will" theory would
seem unable to directly defend majoritarianism. Perhaps majoritarianism cannot be directly defended.
In the event that this is the case, then majority rule is probably best justified from the standpoint of
comparing its consequence with those of every other form of decision-making. Maybe all that can really
be said is that it is the worst form of decision-making, except for all the others.
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Nevertheless, it is perfectly appropriate for it to be explained by reference to
nothing more than its reflection of the will of the majority.
Law is entirely unlike politics in this latter respect. While it would be
appropriate for a political representative to explain a vote as the simple
manifestation of the will of the majority, a governmental official vested with
the authority to resolve matters through an adjudicative or nonlegislative
process would never be seen as able to justify a decision successfully on the
basis of reference to the will of the public. The fact that a majority of the
public wants a particular resolution undoubtedly exerts an effect on understandings of the content and meaning of law. As much as one may wish that
this were not so, it is a proposition impossible to deny. Simple reference to
the public's desires, though, could never serve as the explanation that justifies
an official nonlegislative decision. Law is characterized by something more;
law makes a claim to its own legitimacy. Decisions of law are justified by
rational explanation of why the principle, rule, or "law" they embody and use
produces results more appropriate than all of the alternative resolutions then
available. Officials rendering decisions of law may let their perceptions of the
public's preference weigh on how they decide, but they cannot appropriately
assert that the decision itself derives from what the public desires. It is
appropriate for a legal decision-maker to explain the decision made and the
law established on only the basis of a claim to the legitimacy of that which
results. Political decision-makers, on the other hand, act entirely within the
bounds of decorum when they explain their decisions by reference to
consonance with the will of the majority. No further explanation need be
advanced to justify a political decision. Yet with law, while the extent or
degree of public support for a particular approach is not meaningless, the
determinative consideration, the real desideratum, the only acceptable and
appropriate explanation in opting for one form of principle rather than
another, is the claim
that the approach selected is somehow the most correct
40
of those available. 1
This assessment seems accurate, as far as it goes. It fails, however, to take
account of the characteristics just mentioned which distinguish law from
politics, and proceeds instead on the premise that what is really law is
determined by what is called law or by what has the force of some sanction
associated with its contravention. Since decisions of the legislative process,
as well as decisions of the adjudicative or nonlegislative process, are called
law and have the force of sanction behind them, they, too, are considered law.
To my way of thinking, it may be convenient to lump decisions of the two
processes together. By doing so it becomes clear that both are to be equally
respected and that violations of either will not be countenanced. Whether law
flows from the workings of political maneuverings in the legislative process,
or from the deliberations and measured explanations of officials in the
adjudicative or nonlegislative process, it expresses the officially endorsed
view about the policies designed to guide social action. It seems, however,

140. See Smith, supra note 7, at 129-33.
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that by equating the two types of decisions, more than a little precision is lost
to convenience. It may simplify the complexities of political science to call
decisions of both the nonlegislative and legislative processes by the name
"law," but there would still seem to be no denying the fact that legislative
decisions can be justified by reference to the will of the majority, while it
would strike one as entirely inappropriate were such a justification offered in
explanation of a nonlegislative decision. In light of this, real "law" may be
seen as proceeding only from the nonlegislative process. Decisions of the
legislative process which are styled "law" are perhaps more accurately termed
political enactments.' 4'
C. Law and the Claim to Legitimacy
Keeping in mind the distinction between law established through the
legislative process, and law established through the adjudicative or nonlegislative process,' 42 the idea of law's claim to legitimacy should now be
examined in some detail. The best place to begin is with an unpacking of the
very words "claim to legitimacy." Their use connotes that the position
expressed by the government, through one of its officials making an
adjudicative or nonlegislative decision on the basis of a principle which is
established as law, is a position that is asserted, argued, and explained as the
most appropriate, just, and fair position from among those then considered
available. To "claim" that a nonlegislative decision that is made is the one
which should have been made is to recount, state, and articulate the essence
of the decision's underpinning or rationale and the steps producing it. To
make a claim to the "legitimacy" of the decision is to include in the
articulation of the decision's rationale some reference to or indication of an
underlying theme or value that suggests that the decision made is better than
any other which could have been made.
It is unlikely that the idea that adjudicative, nonlegislative decisions involve
a "claim" to legitimacy is terribly provocative. This is probably not the case
with respect to the idea that the claim be one to the "legitimacy" of the
decision produced by the adjudicative or nonlegislative process. To assert that

141. The fact that decisions of the legislative process are called "law," when they are perhaps best
seen as political enactments, is not meant to suggest that violations of such decisions should be any less
susceptible to sanctions than violations of real "law" coming from the nonlegislative or adjudicative
process. In both instances, the decisions establish the principles according to which the affairs of the
community are to be conducted. As a result, there is no reason why society should subject violators of
one type of decision to punishment, but not violators of the other. See infra notes 165-79 and
accompanying text.
142. In observing that law may be "established" through the adjudicative or nonlegislative process,
no view is meant to be offered on the question of whether the judiciary "makes" or "discovers" law.
On this matter one might see generally Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PrrT. L. REV. 1
(1983) (noting that to Langdell, judges "discover" the law); OLIVER NV. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW
(1881) (asserting that judges "make" the law); and Roscoe Pound, The Theory ofJudicialDecision, 36
HARV. L. REV. 940 (1923) (stating that judges both "discover" and "make" law). The point is that the
content and meaning of the law are enunciated by officials acting through the adjudicative or
nonlegislative process.
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there is a theme or value, or set of themes or values, indicating that a decision
which is handed down is more appropriate or fair than any other, raises the
matter of the various themes or values implicit in the other possible decisions,
themes, or values which some may see as certain and knowable truths. While
one might argue that many decisions turn on the principle of stare decisis and,
therefore, do not involve the matter of objective truth, this argument seems
to overlook the fact that stare decisis itself reflects the theme or value of
predictability 43 and claims its preeminence (at least in most cases) over all
others.'" Thus, the very idea of a decision, even one based on nothing more
than earlier precedent, which makes a claim to the legitimacy of the position
it reflects, pushes one up against the question of the very existence of certain,
objective truth.
Earlier, it was observed that in the field of "hard" sciences, what were
labeled scientific laws may have been nothing more than subjective formulations of what scientists thought they had seen. 45 The idea is that, even if
objective truth exists in the hard sciences, we can never presume to know
more than what the finite capacity of the human mind will permit us to
know. 14 6 This being the state of affairs in what is generally regarded as the
most empirical and certain of all human intellectual endeavors, it would be
quite understandable for one to conclude that, in the more intuitive and
uncertain field of ethics, all is but subjective speculation. Objective truth is
nowhere to be found.
Whether or not objective truth actually exists, however, is unimportant in
the description of law. It may be that if there is objective truth, then perhaps
natural law exists and is binding, and human laws which are inconsistent
therewith lack real moral force. The existence of objective truth can have no
effect on describing law as making a "claim to legitimacy," however, since
the description itself envisions nothing more than a rational explanation as to
why one theme is to be preferred over those implicit in other decisions. To
"claim" that a decision is legitimate does not require absolute proof that it is
objectively correct in the sense of measuring up to demonstrhble, knowable,
and external truth. All that is essential is that the decision coherently and
sensibly articulates why it decides as it does and not in a manner that gives
preference to some other value. Once that is done, the decision reflects the
law-the officially endorsed view of what values are to control.
If, on the other hand, the view that even science is not founded on objective
truth leads to the conclusion that surely such does not exist in non-scientific
disciplines, the point just made with respect to the existence of objective truth
would seem to apply with equal force. That law is described as making a
claim to legitimacy does not signify that it is making a claim to "correctness."
143. For the view that law seeks to maximize predictability, see HART, supra note 110, at 223-24.
144. For instances of departure from long-standing precedent, see supra note 137 and accompanying
text. Departures through the adjudicative or nonlegislative process occur when some theme other than
predictability is more highly valued.
145. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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All that is meant is that adjudicative or nonlegislative decisions establishing
law provide a suggestion as to why the decisions conclude that the themes or
values they prefer are better than those that would be promoted by the
alternative decisions available. Where objective truth does exist, the fact that
law is described as making a claim to legitimacy does not invalidate the
description, since all that the decision does is rationally contend, state, or
argue that it is better than other decisions which present themselves.
Laying to rest any fears raised by the matter of the existence (or nonexistence) of objective truth, there is still the problem of how one knows the
themes or values implicated by problems arising in specific factual contexts.
If objective truth exists, then from what source does it proceed? If it does not
exist, then what does one look to in order to identify the themes or values
presented by the matter in dispute? Here one might reference those grand
theories of the psyche which envision humanity's ability to be indelibly
marked by experiences of our ancestors, and then go further and suggest that
one possible source of knowledge of relevant themes or values is what can be
gleaned or deduced from a deeply felt sense of the themes or values
involved.'4 7 But surely experiences from the distant ancestral past are
extremely faint and provide influences of no more than an equivalent nature.
The most luminous and perhaps instrumental influences are probably those of
more immediate and contemporary origin.
Take politics, for instance. While it may not be synonymous with law, the
theoretical or ideological positions which make it a vibrant part of the cultural
experience have an effect on law, since those positions prefer certain themes
or values in which all have received some form of schooling, including
individuals who may eventually turn out to be legal decision-makers.
Nonlegislative decision-makers do not start with an entirely clean slate, a
tabula rasa, so to speak. In principle they may be free to pick and choose
from the entire spectrum of theoretical justifications. As a practical matter,
however, that kind of open-endedness is subconsciously limited through the
inculcation of a certain political tradition. The ideological premises of politics
leave their imprints on law by having shaped the very perceptions of those
who make law. There is, in other words, a certain given with which all
decision-makers start. This is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that the
political ideology prevalent in one society is not likely to be considered
readily available to a decision-maker establishing law in a society that
functions under diametrically opposed political principles. In establishing the
law, that one has been brought up in a particular political tradition may serve
subtly to restrict the latitude of what the law can be.
Beyond political ideology, however, there are also many other subconscious
influences that affect knowledge about the themes or values implicated by a

147. See, e.g. 14 SIGMUND FREUD, THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL
WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 285 (James Strachey & Anna Freud eds., 1979) (discussing the
imperishable mind reflecting all earlier human history); PLATO, Phaedo, in THE REPULIC AND OTHER
WORKS, supra note 136, at 505-11 (discussing the doctrine of recollection and immortality of the soul);
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dispute in a particular factual context. These influences can flow from
religion, education, family, and social environment, to name but a few of the
more familiar. Each of these structures of learning seeks to influence through
some sort of institutionalized teaching that aims at imparting to those in its
minion an appreciation and desire for things considered timeless and
important. It would seem inaccurate to think that influences from such
primary sources of socialization would not at least vie for a decision-maker's
attention. In the end, the influences may be ignored or overshadowed because
they seem somehow inconsistent with themes or values stressed by a political
ideology which may be regarded as of dominant prestige. It cannot be denied,
however, that such sources provide a wellspring for efforts to ascertain what
may be implicated by a specific dispute.'4 8 Indeed it might be that when
confronted with a dispute presenting questions not addressed by some other
officially controlling source, the religious, educational, familial, and social
influences are the initial sources which supply cognizance of the things that
really matter to the resolution. Political doctrine may in the end be used to
determine which themes or values will be accorded controlling weight, but it
is unlikely to serve as more than a secondary standard against which themes
or values coming from more basic, almost instinctive, sources are assessed.
Consider the roles of the family and social peers. Both teach important
lessons about the relationship between self and others, and thus communicate
the central underpinning of public life. On the level of the autonomous self,
the same is true about religion. Its message deals with how one is to live
one's life so as to remain in the grace of the Almighty. The fundamental
values which religion cherishes are evident in its catechism. The educational
experience rounds out the picture by stressing the values of thought, curiosity,
and exploration, and by nurturing an appreciation and taste for creative
endeavors. Ultimately it may be that the things these sources consider
important are "trumped" by what is viewed as of utmost importance by the
accepted political ideology. As true as that can be, one's initial awareness of
the values or themes presented by a particular dispute is likely to spring from
experiences with family, peers, religion, and education. These are more likely
than not the real touchstones of what every one believes to be of any
significance. Political theory may be the source for deciding whether the
themes or values deriving from these other sources can be officially endorsed,
but in our heart of hearts it is likely that few would admit to finding political
theory to be the first of sources to be consulted.
Having made the point that law from nonlegislative authorities makes a
claim to legitimacy, that this implies an assertion that a particular decision
can be explained on the basis of it being the best of the available alternatives
given the themes or values involved, and that the initial sources for these
themes or values are religion, education, family, and society, with accepted

148. See generally Winter, supra note 98 (noting how these sources are drawn on).
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political doctrine playing a secondary, though decisive, role, 49 there is
another matter which also deserves some consideration. That matter concerns
the fact that adjudicative or nonlegislative determinations based on a claim to
legitimacy are subject to criticism and even sanction when they happen to be
inconsistent with what the majority perceives as acceptable law.
On the domestic level, decisions announced through the adjudicative process
can be subjected to public ridicule. In instances where the belief motivating
the outcry is sufficiently strong, that can eventually lead to a legislative effort
to adopt a political enactment overturning decisions the legislature has the
power to reverse. 5 ' On the international level, the same type of scenario
might develop. Nonlegislative decisions taken by official government
representatives in one nation may be claimed as legitimate and in accordance
with law. The other nations of the world community may reject that
characterization as a self-serving rationalization advanced to justify purely
political actions. The acting state may then be rebuked for its "violation" of
accepted international standards. On occasions when claims by the acting
nation have aroused especial ire within the world community, sanctions may
be formally endorsed by appropriate international organs and imposed with the
hope of discouraging further acceptance of what is seen as a miscreant view.
In both the domestic and international instances, our normal understanding
of the concept of sanctions is turned on its head. Sanctions are not used to
enforce the decisions of the nonlegislative process, but to bring them down.
In a very graphic way this emphasizes the power that the majority possesses
in coloring perceptions of what is regarded or treated as law. As a consequence, just as the legislator who feels constrained to cast a vote on the basis
of conscience risks political suicide, a nonlegislative decision-maker who
develops finely crafted and tightly woven decisions based on a claim to
legitimacy risks sanction of another sort. What is of importance here is that
no claim to legitimacy, however well intentioned and rational, can ever
insulate those who advance it from the repercussions incident to the claim
being out of line with accepted understandings of what the law happens to be
with regard to a particular matter.'
A related matter exposed by the fact that nonlegislative, adjudicative
statements of law are subject to criticism and legislative reversal, takes us
back to the distinction between those statements of law coming from the
legislative process, styled "political enactments," and those coming from the
nonlegislative process, which comprise law in its truest sense. After all,
legislative reversal suggests legislative response to the wishes of political
constituents-the idea of majoritarianism-and this suggests that the

149. The initial thinking about values may be most immediately influenced by religion, education,
etc., but political ideology probably offers the determinative influence.

150. This is most likely to occur through proposed legislative or constitutional amendments reacting
to Supreme Court decisions. Lower courts also feel a compulsion to avoid decisions that appear too
radical in nature. It derives, however, from the check of higher court review rather than from prospects
of legislative or constitutional change.
151. See Joseph R. Grodin, Do Judges Make Law?, CAL. LAW., May 1989, at 61.
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constituents themselves support different values than those advanced by the
approach taken by nonlegislative authorities. In short, legislative reversal
indicates that, while at the level of authority where political enactments are
formulated and adopted (that is, the level of promulgation of statutes), law
may be justified by nothing more than reference to numbers. What precedes
legislative action is really very much like what is involved in nonlegislative,
adjudicative decision-making. Specifically, both involve value assessments.
Adjudicative, nonlegislative authorities identify, weigh, and balance values.
The voting public does the same. The difference is that the former uses its
value assessments to justify or legitimate the legal principles it develops,
while the latter does not. As far as the legislative process is concerned, value
assessments may lead to political representatives acting to promote the desires
of the majority of the voting public, but such representatives need not justify
their actions by anything more than numbers alone.
From this, two points are clear. The first is that it is correct to distinguish
between law and political enactments on the basis of law making a claim to
legitimacy. Nevertheless, that distinction should not lead one to believe that
values play no role in the political arena, even though the arena acts in a
purely representative manner.'52 To the extent that a political representative
acts as a conduit for the views of her constituents, value assessments are
indirectly reflected in all political enactments. The second, and perhaps more
important, point is that legislation indirectly reflects value assessments. This
suggests that the values promoted by political enactments may not always be
as well considered or thought out as those claimed as legitimating or
justifying adjudicative, nonlegislative statements of law. Presumably,
nonlegislative decisions are taken by government officials who attempt to use
a broader, more inclusive perspective than that likely to be evinced in the
individual assessments of members of the voting public. All too often, the
positions of citizens, whether discrete individuals in the domestic realm, or
the elected leaders of nations acting as citizens of the world community in the
international realm, are shaped by narrow, self-serving, parochial interests.' 53
D. Law as a Mechanismfor Thought on Claims to Legitimacy
The fact that adjudicative or nonlegislative decisions making a claim to
legitimacy can be subjected to sanctions, evincing the displeasure of the
majority, also tells us something more about law. Serious problems exist with

152. See Hutchinson & Morgan, supra note 8, at 1763. On the idea that legislatures should make
"value" choices, see Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29,
31 (1985), and Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudenceof Public Choice, 65 TEX. L.
REv. 873 (1987).
153. Decisions made by civil servants, on the other hand, though subject to criticisms on a variety
of other grounds, are more likely to turn on institutional considerations connected with stability. While
the general public is susceptible to the winds of emotion, the perspective of serving the interest of
institutions acts as a buffer resulting in the long-term view carrying great weight.
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the notion that law is obligatory, since nothing seems to lie behind it but
various hypotheses." 4 Furthermore, law's involvement in the making of
policy choices does not mean that it is like politics, for law makes a claim to
legitimacy while politics can be justified solely on the basis of majoritarianism"' Finally, attention has been called to the fact that law's claim to
legitimacy is not a claim to objective and certain "correctness," but only to
the rationality of its explanation for why certain themes or values have been
given preference.1 56 The fact that a claim to legitimacy does not protect
nonlegislative decisions from sanction adds another feature to our picture of
law. That feature is of law as a mechanism or process, not simply for dispute
resolution, but for fashioning and refashioning its own substantive character.
In other words, the second feature about law that deserves reference is that
it is a process for giving itself content; a process, one might say, for defining
57
itself substantively. 1
When we give attention to law as a mechanism, a process, a procedural
device or structure for thought, we normally think of law as the implement by
which humankind is able to avoid rather untoward ways of resolving disputes.
In the state of nature, the state of pre-legal existence, problems not susceptible to some sort of amicable resolution witnessed raw, unbridled power used
to effect a desired outcome. With the advent of law as an institution'58 and
the subjection of rulers to the power of the law,'59 disputes no longer had
to result in confrontations involving the use of force, since law provided a
device through which confrontations could be peacefully averted. But there
is another aspect of the law's mechanistic or procedural side, an aspect often
overlooked, though of inestimable importance in any effort to develop a more
complete conception of the law. Specifically, as a process or mechanism the
law not only allows claimants to avoid the resolution of disputes through
force, it also allows them to make claims about the substantive content of the
law concerned, claims that are part of a dialogue about what themes or values
are perceived by society as sufficiently important to warrant some form of
official endorsement. 60

154. See supra notes 122-30'and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 142-53 and accompanying text.
157. Any system that produces and reproduces itself through action between its own elements can
be described as an "autopoietic" system. See generally Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System, 83
Nw. U. L. REV. 136 (1989).
158. On theories concerning the origins of law, see JAMES J. ATKINSON, PRIMAL LAW (1903);
SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (James Strachey trans., 1961); SIGMUND FREUD,
TOTEM AND TABOO (A.A. Brill trans., 1918); JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE
ORIGINAL, EXTENT, AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (Oskar Priest ed., 1947) (6th ed. 1764); and
RoussEAU, supra note 139.
159. On customary law and the subservience of the ruler, see generally FRITZ KERN, KINGSHIP AND
LAW IN THE MIDDLE AGES 153-54 (1948); NORMAN ZACOUR, AN INTRODUCTION TO MEDIEVAL
INSTITTIONS 137 (1969).
160. Accord HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 345-97 (Garrett Barden & John
Cummings eds., The Seabury Press 1975) (1960) (developing a theory of interpretation for written
texts); see also id. at 261-63 (discussing how change in understandings of particular texts develops from
a dialogiceal process between interpreters and text). See generally DONALD DAVIDSON, INQUIRIES INTO
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Law can be thought about from both the perspective of what the rules of
law say, and from the perspective of the actual institutional workings that lead
to the rules being announced. With regard to what the rules of law say, it
must be observed that there is no effort here to call attention to some special
insight allowing one to cut through interpretive ambiguities and obtain a
clearer comprehension of what the rules mean. The concern with the meaning
of rules focuses on nothing more than the substantive side of the law. That is
to say, the law as a body of principles dealing with the affairs of society, a
body of principles that emerges from an adjudicative or nonlegislative process
characterized by a claim to the legitimacy of the themes or values the
principles prefer. There is nothing new in this beyond what has previously
been said. Not so, however, for the view of the law that examines the
institutional workings leading to the creation, enlargement, or alteration of
rules forming the law. Here there should be no confusion between the law as
a procedure, a device, a process, a structure, a mechanism for averting
unfortunate methods of dispute resolution, and the law as a process or device
for ongoing and unending conversation about the themes and values with
which society happens to be concerned. What has previously been said about
the law's procedural side as an alternative to the resolution of disputes
through force reveals nothing about law as a mechanism for society's dialogue
on how its affairs should be ordered.
With regard to the dialogue matter alone, it might be observed that there are
two official ways by which a society expresses its desires on important themes
or values. Reference has already been made to political enactments coming
from the use of the legislative process. These undoubtedly reflect at least the
preferences of the representatives of society who vote on such enactments,
and may indeed reflect the true wishes of society itself. The other way by
which these preferences are voiced, use of the adjudicative or nonlegislative
process, has also been mentioned. The focus, however, was on how law is
distinguished from politics. It is not that distinction which concerns us at this
juncture. Rather, what concerns us here is that it be made clear that the
adjudicative or nonlegislative process plays an important and instrumental role
in a society's official endorsement of important themes or values. Most would
recognize the political process as important in this respect. But law, too, has
an integral function to perform in giving authoritative and official approval
to matters and concepts held in high esteem. And both processes involve giveand-take, constant argument, assessment, decision, and pronouncement. Just
as the political enactments of one group of legislators must often give way to
those of another, so the legal doctrines of one nonlegislative body may, over
the years, give way to those of another. There is never any "established"
political enactment. Nor is there any "established" rule of law. Positions on
both fronts are under constant siege and subject to interminable reevaluation.
What is accepted political nostrum today is rejected tomorrow as chimerical

TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION (1984); NELSON GOODMAN, LANGUAGES
PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH, AND HISTORY (1981).

OF ART (1968); HILARY

19931

WHETHER LAW BINDS

panacea. What is said to be the law at any one time can just as easily be
swept away by changing conceptions of what is of paramount importance in
arranging the affairs of society's everyday life.
Recognizing that law is a dialogue or conversation, as well as a body of
rules making claims to legitimacy, facilitates a better understanding of law in
its totality. It has a substantive side and a procedural side comprised of a
means for both amicably resolving disputes and for allowing discussion to
take place about the themes or values society should officially endorse. To
describe the law in a manner that captures only its substantive component
would seem incomplete. Likewise, to give it a description that captures
substance and process, but confine the latter to dispute resolution alone, would
seem only slightly better. A more perfect picture of law reflects the
substantive side, and distinguishes that side from official pronouncements of
the political process regarding preferred themes or values. Going further, it
then acknowledges the position of dispute resolution on the procedural side,
but enlarges that side to incorporate the notion that law participates with the
political process in serving as an instrument of official discussion and
decision about the entire range of themes or values the mind identifies as
relevant. Any description of law that fails to depict the conversational role of
law would seem somewhat deficient. Such a description would leave out a
vital element. The reality is that law must be seen as a device for allowing
dialogue to proceed on important social concerns.
One reason why it is imperative that law be described with reference to its
conversational component has to do with the matter of expressions of
disapprobation toward law established by the adjudicative or nonlegislative
process. As was alluded to above, domestic as well as international legislative
bodies may adopt political enactments subjecting unp6pular official decisions
to some form of sanction.' 61 The legal basis underpinning an adjudicative
or nonlegislative decision may be changed by a representative governmental
organ. The legal justification advanced for a particular international action
may be rejected by an appropriate intergovernmental body responding with
punitive impositions. The possibility for such expressions suggests that law
must be described in a way which includes the conversational component. A
description without the conversational might be limited to depicting the law
as a vehicle for developing a justification for nonlegislative decisions, and
expressions of disapprobation as nothing more than rejections of the
justifications advanced. History, however, is replete with episodes of
legislatures going well beyond reproaching nonlegislative bodies, including
legislative reversal of nonlegislative decisions. Obviously, this would not
happen if nonlegislative decisions were nothing more than justificatory. 62
Without them being more than that, there would be no need for legislatures
to do more than remonstrate against proffered justifications. Yet because the
legislative process does more when it undertakes legislative reversal, the

161. See supra part II.C.
162. On the role of courts as justificatory, see SOPER, supra note 2, at 112-17.
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nonlegislative process itself must also be viewed as doing more. Because
legislative bodies occasionally act to displace the various bases which happen
to undergird those nonlegislative decisions which are seen as objectionable,
the very process that produces those decisions must be seen as going well
beyond providing mere justification for nonlegislative decisions. Indeed, they
must be seen as going so far as to providing official expression on the
prioritization of important social themes and values.
The most basic reason why it is imperative that law be described in a
fashion which includes a conversational component has to do with what we
know about the real characteristics of law as a result of extended consideration of it. Law is an instrument of social policy, a creation of humankind
designed to set forth the parameters of acceptable communal behavior. As
such, every dispute involving an existing principle of law focuses either on
how that dispute differs factually from previous situations that have drawn on
the principle, or on how the societal perceptions of the themes and values
underpinning the principle have changed and thus warrant a change in the
principle itself. To state it more succinctly, adjudicative or nonlegislative legal
disputes focus either on the facts or on the law. When the focus is the law,
the relevant decision-maker may entertain and consider divergent assessments
of pertinent foundational themes and values. Additionally, foundational themes
and values may be relevant in the context of arguments turning on factual
distinctions. For even in those cases, the pertinent themes and values have at
least been stipulated by silence. But clearly, whether by asseveration or
stipulation, the purpose of placing themes and values before the decisionmaker is to elicit response, generate cogitation, and produce measured
judgment reflected in a rational, well-articulated opinion.
The opinion or decision flowing from resolution of a dispute contains the
statement of the law as it is understood at that time by the decision-maker. In
relation to past resolutions of identical or analogous disputes, the decisionmaker's statement of the law is one chapter in an unfolding story, a
continuing dialogue regarding society's official view of various themes and
values. Just as one vested with the power to speak officially has to sort
through the divergent assessments of themes and values proffered by the
advocates of opposed positions, so too must she evaluate those assessments,
as well as her own conclusions, in light of what has gone before. The voice
of the past may be viewed as unpersuasive, or it may be thought to be as
perspicacious now as in bygone ages. In either case, the judgment of the
decisionmaker adds to the ongoing exchange. Officials of greater rank in the
hierarchy may set aside the decision and thus speak with more authority or
persuasiveness. 63 Time itself may reveal that the decision lacks the prescience to securely hold the more general and timeless elements of important
themes and values. 64 Be this as it may, each statement of the law simply

163. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
164. For the idea that place and time can even affect one's understanding of "justice," see D. Don
Welch, Big Pictures and Little Puzzles, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 463, 467 (1988) (book review).
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gives another perspective, and adds another angle to the discussion of the
themes and values implicated by social action. As with any conversation, new
conditions, demands, participants, and insights can radically alter the cogency
of conclusions once seen as unassailable in their wisdom. Law is as much a
discourse concerning the officially sanctioned arrangement of social priorities
as any exchange regarding that matter which occurs on a less authoritative
level. And as with any such exchange, law is never to be seen as definitive,
final, or fixed. Law never "is," it is always in the process of "becoming." And
as the word "becoming" implies, law is always changing, permutating, and
altering its appearance but never reaching any final state or condition.
E. Considerationsand Concerns
Perhaps what proves most troubling about the idea that law is not
obligatory, and that it is a continuous dialogue about social priorities with
whatever position is currently accepted being justified by a claim to
legitimacy, involves the fear that such a conception sets the stage for every
actor to define the law as she sees fit. If there is nothing about law which
dictates that it must be followed, will not everyone do as she chooses? If law
is nothing more than an unending conversation about how society's affairs are
to be organized, is not dissident behavior encouraged, if for no other reason
than the contribution it makes to the exchange? If law is characterized by the
fact that it makes a claim to the legitimacy of the themes or values it prefers,
cannot every person who explains an action with reference to its legitimacy
contend that the action happens to be in accord with the "correct" view of
law?
These are truly significant questions. Perhaps if law were viewed as
inherently obligatory they would not arise, or at least not in as pronounced a
fashion. But given the view of law expressed in this Article, the questions
exist and merit some sort of response. One place to begin might be by
observing that a prime focus of concern is with the affect of the idea of "no
obligation" on law observance in general. With regard to this matter, it is
important to say something about both the inclination of most humans to act
in a fashion which is socially acceptable, and the impact that apprehension of
sanctions has upon decisions regarding how one is to act. A second focus of
concern touches the matter of law observance indirectly, but is specifically
aimed at whether the idea of "no obligation" reflects a basic contempt for any
type of social standards and a desire to promote a free-wheeling, cavalier,
perhaps even devil-may-care approach to life. The important thing to say with
regard to the latter involves accountability and responsibility and their role in
developing a genuine sense of seriousness of purpose, conscientiousness about
actions, and sensitivity to the fact that everything we do, say, or think has
some consequence for either present or future inhabitants of this planet.
Now with respect to the idea of "no obligation" and its affect on law
observance, the first of the focuses referenced above, there would seem to be
little dispute that the inclination of most humans to do what is socially
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acceptable, 65 or to act in a way that averts the displeasure associated with
the imposition of sanctions, 166 serves to shape conduct and claims made to
justify such. Since we live in community with others and can seldom repair
to the tranquility of total isolation, the very realization of interconnectedness
tempers our thoughts about what we are at liberty to do. It is on this score
that official statements that "the law says" we must act in a particular fashion
have tremendous value, even though the statements may have no meaning on
the matter of obligation itself. By the simple fact of them having been made,
the statements draw attention to the established parameters of behavior, and
thereby stimulate the desire for moderation that derives from the sense of
community, whether that sense has its origin in our social nature, or purely
in selfish calculations suggesting that the greater good is also our own.
The apprehension of sanctions produces a similar effect. The knowledge that
certain kinds of behavior can result in the infliction of penalties has its own
impact. In many instances the desire to act in a socially acceptable manner
operates in conjunction with the fear of sanctions to produce the behavior we
see. To be sure, however, there are undoubtedly occasions in the process of
decision when individualism overshadows community. When that occurs,
sanctions operate independently of, an interest in social acceptability.
Nevertheless, on either occasion the sanctions are likely to take the more
familiar form of centrally imposed penalties, or be evinced through reciprocal
actions, whenever the harmed and the entity which has contravened some
established standard have cause to associate. But regardless of when or how
they might occur, sanctions loom constantly over any reflective form of
decision. Indeed it is unlikely that such decisions can ignore the weight
attributed to calculations concerning the reaction to behavior to be taken.
A complete picture of human nature must acknowledge that some decisions
are more reflexive than reflective. This may well be the case when important
personal beliefs or inveterate natural passions are involved. When the process
of decision is based on deep-seated, strongly held principles, or when it
capitulates to powerful, almost irresistible urges, the decision becomes either
more doctrinaire than contemplative, or more impulsive than rational.' 67 On
such occasions, social acceptability is completely lost in shaping conduct, and
sanctions are not likely to have much of an effect either. Curiously enough,
for those wedded to the idea of the obligatory nature of law, it is even
important to note the extreme improbability that exhorting an actor to see the
law as binding will have great impact on how one behaves when passion or
ideological doctrine is involved. One is going to act as one is going to act,
and neither social disapprobation nor sanctions, nor the fact of law violation

165. See DIAMOND, supra note 44, at 18, 51, 54-55 (making this statement in regard to even the most
primitive societies).
166. Id. at 51-52.
167. Impulsiveness can come from more than firm adherence to personal beliefs. On recent studies
concerning the workings of the brain and the possibility of physiological/neurological conditions or
processes that overcome what we think of as individual free-will, see RIcHARD M. REsTAK, THE MIND
275-314 (1988).
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is likely to change anything. 68 Actions based on principle or impulse are
motivated by such basic, elementary attributes that no amount of exhortation,
castigation, or punishment can be sure to produce success. When both the
interest in community and in rational, considered processes of decision are
subjugated to attributes of this sort, there is probably little that exogenous
forces can accomplish in directing conduct.
This brings us to the matter of whether the idea that law does not establish
obligation discloses a certain irreverence or contempt for boundaries or
parameters or restrictions on behavior. This second possible focus of concern
does draw attention to the fact that more than the simple external forces of
social acceptability and sanctions can be employed in law observance's
struggle against dogmatism and passion. Of essential importance, however, is
the attention that it draws to the topic of personal accountability, individual
responsibility for every action each of us takes as actors in the social arena.
True, accountability and responsibility can augment the outside influences that
affect the conduct of an actor. In doing so they contribute to the observance
of officially established legal standards. Where deep-seated principle or
natural impulse overshadows the sense of community or rational and reflective
processes of decision, the seriousness, conscientiousness, and sensitivity
resulting from the lessons of responsibility and accountability can take up
some slack. But the prime significance of these lessons is not found in their
role of benefactors of law. It is found in what they reveal about and can do
for the entire legal process. The importance of this point cannot be stressed
enough. From the making of law to the rendering of decision on facts in light
of that which is made, responsibility and accountability have a vital role to
play in the legal system. Furthermore, close attention to responsibility and
accountability suggest an alternative to reliance on "legalism" for improving
human behavior. That law may gain from personal accountability and
individual responsibility is laudable. Yet it is the relationship that accountability and responsibility have with both law and behavior that is of much greater
importance.
Consider for the moment accountability and the legal system. The prevalent
view in our society often appears to be that of complete and total faith in the
capacity of law to solve most problems. 69 If something has gone awry, call
on the legislature to adopt political enactments targeted at resolving the
matter. If the traditional approach of the common law made by the courts has
proved to be unsuccessful in addressing a societal ill, prevail on the judiciary
to do what is necessary to come up with a cure. 70 To the extent that the

168. Impulsive behavior would seem little affected by social disapprobation or characterization as
violative of law. Perhaps this is why some sanctions are so especially severe (for example, death), the

idea being to curb such behavior with extreme punishment. Obviously, though, impulse can often

overwhelm even fear of sanctions. In seeming recognition of this fact, the law admits impulse as a

mitigating factor.
169. See O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 467-68 (1897).
170. To the extent that either "conservatives" or "liberals" argue that a Court dominated by justices

of the other persuasion has created rules detrimental to social stability, and then go on to suggest that
a new Chief Executive should counter this trend by appointing individuals sharing with them a certain
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evolution of civilization is the story of humankind's progression from
individual self-help to greater reliance on community and organizational
structure, 17' the notion of "improvement through law" seems quite explicable. To be sure, movement away from self-help has been salutary. Without it
we may never have emerged from the dark ages. Nonetheless, both legislatures and courts do nothing more than express a judgment when establishing
some societal standard officially regarded as binding. And like all judgments,
those expressed by legislatures and courts are susceptible to influences that
may render them less than insightful and well considered.
The shortcomings of the legislature already have been alluded to.' 72 The
fact that adjudicative, nonlegislative entities make a claim to the legitimacy
of the standard they establish does not mean that we can remain comfortable
in the assumption that they are insulated from many of the same influences
which produce the legislature's shortcomings. 73 The best protection against
what some would view as ill-considered judicial judgment, and the best
insurance that legislators will resist pressures that constantly threaten to
undermine wisdom can be found in the lessons of personal accountability and
individual responsibility. 74 When all nonlegislative officials appreciate the
magnitude of what they do when expressing the government's judgment
concerning a matter before them, when every last legislator really takes to
heart the tremendous significance of the service performed by sifting through
the complex and often close arguments behind various pieces of legislation,
in short, when those who establish the social standards officially considered
to be binding and receiving the name "law" approach their task with a sense
of seriousness of purpose, genuine conscientiousness, and a sensitivity to the
fact that what they do has an impact on a scale of space and time far more
encompassing than they might imagine, then and only then will the faith in
law so pervasive in modem society even begin to seem realistic. Nearly all
legislative and nonlegislative lawmakers are decent, hard-working, ethical

ideological affinity, we again see a prime example of faith in law's ability to solve society's problems.
The same appears on a more simplistic level with regard to efforts to change the ideological persuasion
of the legislature through the election process and thereby affect the nature of statutes adopted by those
representative bodies.
171. One interesting example of how greater communal effort redounded to the overall benefit of
society concerns the growth of feudalism. With the decline of the Roman Empire in the West, and the
invasion of the Goths, Huns, and eventually the Vikings, the peoples of the European continent were
forced to take measures of collective self-preservation. Perhaps growing out of the institution of the
comitatus among the Germanic peoples (and the buicellarii,its ancient predecessor, among the Romans),
collectivism eventually displayed itself most fully in feudalism. See THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETr, A
CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 509-10 (5th ed. 1956). With growth of homage, fealty, knight

service, castles, lords, barrons, and kings came movement out of the dismal rubble of the early middle
ages, the rebirth of cities, and the conditions necessary for the development of nation-states.
172. See supra note 139.
173. Recall the idea that indeterminacy (or neutrality) surrounding nonlegislative, adjudicative

decisions is not without bounds. See supra text accompanying notes 147-53.
174. On restraint by adjudicative decision-makers, see United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1,79 (1936)
(Stone, J., dissenting) ('[T]he only check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense of selfrestraint .... ."), and LON L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 19 (1968) ("[AII that can be done safely
and effectively is to choose able and honest men as judges and to invest their office with a degree of
independence that will make them secure against outside influences.").
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people, but it is imperative that they be much, much more. They must have
the characteristics necessary to permit them to rise above partisanship,
personal ideology, parochialism, self-centeredness, and a dozen other
afflictions which inhibit humanity's ability to achieve what it is truly capable
of achieving. Law can never hope to match current public expectations until
such time as lawmakers fully meet the challenge of accountability and
responsibility.
Even if we were to hypothesize the ideal condition of a totally responsible
lawmaker, legislative or adjudicative, that would do nothing more than
provide an explanation for society's faith in law's ability to improve the
human condition. Explanations, however, occasionally have a way of being
deceptive illusions. They may tell us why one believes what one believes,
while all along unintentionally concealing that the belief itself is founded
upon an imperiling deficiency. This would appear to be the case even with
respect to law made under ideal conditions.
As shown by processes that conceived it and gave it birth, law made under
ideal conditions would surely warrant expressions of faith. But in light of the
fact that the extent of progress towards society's improvement is really
determined by the actual behavior of those to whom law applies, it would
seem that law can never claim entitlement to what most are prepared to freely
accord it. There can be no ignoring that whether law is entitled to the current
level of public confidence turns principally on what it is that is likely to affect
behavior most. As we have seen, law does have impact in this area.
Nonetheless, the single most important factor in shaping human conduct
would not seem to be law, but the sense of commitment to considerate
thoughtfulness, based on dedication to the notion we are all answerable for
how we conduct ourselves, that has been repeatedly trumpeted here as
personal responsibility and individual accountability. Accountability and
responsibility are not simply used here in the sense of getting people to
realize that they must be prepared to take the consequences of their actions,
but also in the sense of getting those who go far beyond this and take their
own lives ever so seriously to realize that by everything they do (or do not
do), say (or do not say), or think (or do not think) they impact others and thus
contribute to shaping every aspect of the world about them. Accountability
and responsibility as used here have a scope far broader than that envisioned
by those in our political culture who seem constantly to dwell on those
concepts.
Reference was made earlier to the fact that stressing responsibility and
accountability indirectly inures to the benefit of law observance. The thrust
of what has just been discussed is that, although responsibility and accountability can go further than that and enhance the very nature of law itself, it
is not the fact that there is law, nor that that which exists is better because of
the influence of responsibility and accountability, which really matters when
concern is with improving human behavior and generally elevating the human
condition. Instead, what really matters is that raising the overall levels of
responsibility and accountability, in their broadest sense, can alone do more
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to improve the human condition than any body of law, whether established by
lawmakers who are conscientious or who are just plain capricious. Stressing
responsibility and accountability may move a large portion of society's
members to observe the law. Observing law, however, is not necessarily
synonymous with improving the human condition, for surely it might be said
that there are laws which protect things antithetical to elevating the level of
the society generally. And even if that position were rejected and law
observance were thought of as synonymous with societal advancement,
observance alone could never lay claim to being the best facilitator available,
for the rate and extent of improvement of the human condition would thus be
linked to the existence of official pronouncements of social standards, rather
than left free to proceed at the pace and distance set by the more ambitious
program of inculcating everyone, from the earliest stage of moral cognition,
with a genuine sense of conscientiousness, considerateness, and commitment.
No doubt ambition may outstrip results. The effort to raise the level of
personal responsibility may fall short of full success. But even in such a case,
at least the law will benefit-chances are that it will be observed more often.
When such a harmless risk of failure is never untaken, however, the chance
of ineffably vast societal advancement is delayed or, perhaps lamentably,
forever lost.
Two points emerge from the emphasis on responsibility and accountability.
The first is that the notion of law as incapable of fixing obligation has hardly
any significance. It matters very little that law is not inherently obligatory if
one of the outgrowths of stressing responsibility is an increase in law
observance on those occasions when emotion or principle might otherwise
prevail. 7 Whether it is said to proceed from law's obligatory character or
from a sense of personal responsibility, for those concerned with consonance
between law and action, the only real interest should be basically in the
bottom-line matter of observance. The second point is that there is no merit
to the claim that, because law is said to lack what is necessary for it to
obligate, an irreverence towards restrictions, boundaries, or standards is at
least implicitly evinced. To the contrary, it might be suggested that, if the
main justification for restrictions or boundaries lies in the overall advancement of society, then the plea for responsibility and accountability reveals an
even stronger commitment to control than is revealed by faith in law. As
already stated, if law is looked to for improvement of society, then assuming
that the ideal social condition has not yet been achieved, there will be a
continuous need for more or different laws to be brought into being, lest
stagnation makes its stifling entrance and thus obstructs future progress. On
the other hand, if emphasis on responsibility is looked to, if responsibility is
perceived as being in the nature of a substitute for law, which is, after all,
non-obligatory, then the extent and speed of improvement in the human
condition is not tied to whether, and how, lawmakers decide to act. In
stressing responsibility, it thus seems one can claim to be even more

175. See supra text accompanying notes 167-71.
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committed to restrictions, standards, and boundaries than would be the case
when confidence is reposed in that massive edifice of social norms carrying
the cognomen law.
The most significant of the problems confronting a shift from emphasis on
law to emphasis on responsibility and accountability is that of the loss of an
external measure for evaluating appropriateness. With law one can always
exhort actors to stay within the bounds of some identifiable, established,
definite, often publicly articulated rule. With responsibility, the best that can
be done is exhortation encouraging reflective, measured, ideologically
skeptical, open and receptive, considerate action that recognizes the real
impact of the action on others. But abuse is born of losses like that of the
external measure of appropriateness. One may be unwittingly beguiled into
thinking that she has acted in a personally responsible fashion, a fashion
which signifies an awareness of accountability. The ambiguity of the
unfamiliar, less certain, indeterminate ideas of responsibility and accountability can result in occurrences of precisely this sort. There will never be total
clarity, absolute illumination about which decisions are the truly responsible
ones. Room always will be available for one to claim that her actions were,
if not consonant with the "letter" of responsibility, at least consistent with its
"spirit." Yet as significant as this problem confronting a shift from emphasis
on law to emphasis on responsibility and accountability happens to be, it is
a problem that those who appreciate the limitations of law's capacity to
address effectively the inveterate ills of today's world must always endeavor
to minimize.
Could it perhaps be that minimization of the problem of abuse incident in
a move from law to responsibility and accountability is best addressed by
highlighting that these two admirable traits are expressed by nothing short of
a sincerely earnest, conscience rending, heartfelt, anguishing attempt to
discover the most prudent course of action? Surely decisions emerging from
less intense, exacting, and agonizing processes would seem to run the risk of
deceiving one into believing that judgment has been exercised appropriately.
Against such self-deception we must always remain vigilant.
But then again it must not be supposed that, simply because judgment may
have been exercised appropriately, there is some guarantee, an assurance if
you will, that the "best" of an entire range of decisions available will be
settled upon. Pains may be taken to guard the decisional process from
subconscious perversion. Yet that alone cannot provide a warrant of
superiority for the decision which is ultimately made. The fallibility of
humankind is far too great to permit the feeling of complete confidence.
Struggle and confusion would seem to be mankind's lot for as long as the
successors of our race trod upon earth's firmament. Keeping this in mind, one
must not lose sight of the fact that a shift in the direction of responsibility and
accountability holds out promise for society far beyond that which emphasis
on law is able to offer. Perhaps on the basis of this and this alone we should
hold our heads high, set our course, and venture into the unknown and
bewildering frustrations that cumulatively comprise daily life.
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A final thought is suggested before proceeding to draw on the ideas related
in this Part of the Article in order to offer some observations on theoretical
scholarship's concern with the likes of determinacy and interpretivism,
judicial precedent's attention to plain language, and the citizen's, official's,
or juror's interest in legal obligation. Matters of this sort, after all, supply the
reason for this diversion examining my own views on law and obligation.
Moreover, they are also what we are compelled to return to if the circle I
have been sketching in such a faint and unclear hand is to be closed. The final
thought I have in mind has to do with professing and believing; that is,
professing that law establishes obligation, even while believing that it does
not.
For some, it may seem as though the call for a reinvigoration of the
concepts of responsibility and accountability carries with it another side, a
side indicating a call equally as strong for law to be portrayed as it really
is-a non-obligatory articulation of how society wishes its affairs to be
ordered. Such an inference may be logical and axiomatic, but nothing could
be further from capturing the course I think perhaps most prudently taken by
those who have devoted their lives to divining the mysteries of law and legal
process, though such mysteries may never submit to comprehension. To my
way of thinking at this juncture in my life and career, it is one thing to
believe and recognize that there is nothing inherently obligatory about law,
and something entirely different to advocate the tempering of behavior
through the inculcation of a sense of conscientiousness, considerateness, and
commitment. No doubt the latter may be needed because of the former, but
it is just as clear that even if law were able to obligate, any effort to foster
and husband responsibility and accountability would have independent
justification due alone to the benefit it would produce for law observance. It
would therefore seem that responsibility and accountability are capable of
standing on their own. Nothing requires that they be tied to the matter of
whether law is obligatory. From this emerges the idea that advocating the
virtues of responsibility and accountability does not necessarily mean that an
equally active effort to educate people about law's inability to obligate is an
essential correlative. The advantages and benefits of responsibility and
accountability can be extolled, and' labor expended to help them flourish,
without a concomitant campaign to rivet public attention on law's nonobligatory character. To call for a reinvigoration of responsibility and
accountability does not mean one also calls for open professions about law
lacking the inherent force to bind.
As was alluded to previously,'76 law is often obeyed because we are
trained or taught to believe that it must be obeyed. Implicit in this is the idea
that there is something about law which makes it obligatory. From a very
early stage we come to think and feel that we are obligated to observe the
law. It may be wise to capitalize on these psychic sensations and take
advantage of the order and control resulting from the general perception of

176. See supra part II.A.
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law by continuing to refer to it as obligatory, while simultaneously endeavoring to use existing social institutions to heighten the basic level of individual
responsibility and personal accountability.
Candidly, there is an element of duplicity in this approach. Dissimulation
must be undertaken. Those who see law as lacking the power to command
obedience must maintain in communication with others that no such
deficiency exists, all along knowing what the real case happens to be.
However, the gain resulting from an approach of this sort allows retention of
what is positive about the belief regarding law's nature and permits a move
from one plane of behavioral control stratagem to another without the kind of
backsliding likely to be experienced were law simply to be exposed for what
it is and responsibility and accountability emphasized instead. For those
involved with the law to go forth and profess to the masses that they are not,
and should not feel, obligated to do what the law provides would have
untoward consequences of the most unseemly sort. Fear of sanctions would
surely deter many from engaging in activity violative of the law's standards.
For those who follow the law primarily out of a sense of obligation, perhaps
violations may become more frequent in instances where sanctions are seen
as insufficiently severe and self-interest as especially strong. In view of this,
caution would dictate that the course be one of maintaining the appearance of
obligation while working to shift the real point of decisional reference from
what is provided by law to what is provided by matters of a much more
fundamental nature.
The great attraction of seeing law in the way I have suggested is that it puts
it in its proper place in the entire social context, thus reminding us that all
law grew out of the need to order affairs so as to allow the promotion of
values thought sufficiently important to be desired, while stressing that law
is to be understood as only one of the many devices by which an ordering of
affairs can be accomplished. When viewed in this light, the real question that
must be confronted in every instance of an action having some legal
implication is not the question we as lawyers might be most inclined to ask,
the technical legal question of whether the conduct involved is within the
parameters of some legal rule. The real question is whether the conduct itself
is consistent with the ordering of affairs essential to allow values which
advance the human condition to be pursued. No doubt, if a potential actor
asks and answers this question in a fashion different from a nonlegislative
decision-maker, sanctions can follow and should be accepted if the actor
claims to honor accountability. Nonlegislative decision-makers, however,
would seem able to take a decision endorsing the action in the event they
believe it to be in line with important values promoting social advancement
and consistent with the ordering of affairs necessary to attain that objective.
Nonetheless, higher authority (for example, an appellate body, a legislature,
a constitutional referendum) is able to overturn what is viewed as unacceptable. Ideally this would only happen when an equally fair and honest, yet
divergent, assessment is arrived at. The ideal, though, is not always to be
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expected. Notwithstanding the discouragement and disappointment incident to
such failures, the struggle for the ideal should continue unabated.
Whether the focus is on potential actors or nonlegislative, adjudicative
decision-makers, when a thoughtful judgment to act or decide in a particular
way is arrived at, any move away from rules and in the direction of discretion
raises once again the potential for abuse, or even well-intentioned mistake.' 77 It seems far simpler to have decision-makers or actors controlled by
straightforward, articulated standards, than left free to exercise their own
judgment on how best to evaluate a particular situation. Does it not seem
equally as clear that standards help to eliminate abuse or mistake, while
discretion, even though couched in terms of responsibility and accountability,
tends in the opposite direction? Is it not true that the perennial tension
between "the rule of law" and "the rule of man" is one which should always
be resolved in favor of the former? Any lawyer who favors ambiguity and
discretion over certainty and limits has missed out on a teaching that is basic
to all who have successfully completed the novitiate year of their professional
education, and is surely one whose views are not just naive and misinformed,
but downright heretical and subversive.
The presence, definiteness, and accessibility of the rules of law have never
been, nor will they ever be, sufficient to insulate us from innocent prejudices,
well-intentioned errors, deficiencies resulting from structural inadequacies in
the legal process, let alone those hopefully rare occasions of outright
incompetence, bias, and abuse. Rules are far from being deliverers of
salvation. 7 8 Nevertheless, in that they spell out what is acceptable they
would seem to minimize, at least somewhat, or lessen the chances of mistake,
abuse, or wrong thinking by setting forth parameters which unsuspectingly
tether the influence of idiosyncracies accompanying personal discretion, and
by providing a measure against which decisions that are taken can themselves
be subjected to the moderating pressure associated with public evaluation. But
perhaps more importantly, through the establishment of rules and, concomitantly, the central part played by thought and discussion about the applicability, meaning, and scope of the rules, the phenomenon of process becomes
institutionalized. Rules lead to the system of legal decision-making taking on
a life of its own. This institutionalization of process strengthens order by
moving us away from self-help. To turn a phrase, the process is the message.
In light of the benefits of the institutionalization of process, no matter how
strong my commitment to the idea of promoting responsibility and accountability, I feel compelled to register the view that I do not favor a complete,
total, and final break from rules of law. Rules must be blended with

177. You will recall that this Article raised this same concern earlier in regard to decisions to act
taken by those whom the law is aimed at regulating. See supra text accompanying note 176.
178. For an interesting example of skepticism regarding classic approaches to the use of law to solve
social problems, see DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987) (see especially part III, "Divining

A Nation's Salvation," which seems to advocate a view and use of law that emphasizes the development
in society of matters that are so basic they cut across all lines and improve the condition of society
generally).
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responsibility and accountability, with the latter given significantly greater
emphasis than they have received in the past and, in time, than that given to
law. In combination, responsibility and accountability on the one hand, and
law on the other, can provide for stability with creativity, order with
inventiveness, structure with real and beneficial change. Those deciding to act,
as well as those evaluating the lawfulness of the action taken by others, can
then be free to see that law is the servant of society rather then its master. In
this, perhaps law's original role can be recaptured and society's faith in its
capacity to improve the human condition justified.
Beyond the rules versus discretion tension, however, the fact that potential
actors make decisions which are evaluated by nonlegislative authorities, who
themselves have their evaluations subjected to evaluation, moves us to perhaps
one of the most essential points herein. Decisions taken in full exercise of
personal responsibility and individual accountability can lead to varying
assessments regarding whether the values they promote order society's affairs
so as to advance the human condition. Higher authority may view the situation
entirely differently from nonlegislative decision-makers involved in the initial
assessment of the appropriateness of a specific actor's behavior. Indeed, there
is the distinct possibility that even two potential actors may see things in a
different light. The fact that differing assessments can be advanced indicates
the centrality of values in determining whether one's own or another's action
or judgment of action reflects a decision that is truly responsible and
accountable. The only way of getting close to knowing if a decision captures
personal responsibility and individual accountability, the measure by which,
I maintain, all conduct and thought should be judged, is to look at the values
it seeks and then endeavor to ascertain whether those values are consistent
with the progress of humankind. That law is not binding leaves one free to
pursue what is determined to be in the best interest of humanity. Yet true
responsibility and accountability, by their very nature, require not only that
determinations genuinely reflect a conscience-rending attempt to openly
consider all available approaches, avoiding arbitrary exclusion or discounting
of any, but also that those who make them own up to sanctions flowing from
decisions of official bodies who may simply rely on "the law," or actually see
the matter differently after in-depth consideration of the values involved.
CONCLUSION
The opening pages of this Article suggested that edifying exchanges on
several important and controversial topics of law and jurisprudence have
appeared in the literature serving the legal profession.'" Exchanges regarded
as theoretical scholarship have surveyed jurisdiction to invalidate legal
directives, the determinacy of law, the process of legal reasoning, and the
subject of interpretivism generally1 80 Those exemplified by judicial

179. See supra INTRODUCTION.
180. See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
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precedent have focused on departure from the plain language of private
contractual commitments, common law principles, statutory provisions, or
constitutional texts.""' Exchanges on practical concerns have resulted in the
articulation of positions on civil disobedience, the contravention of law by
governmental officials, lawyer-to-client advice on the morality of law
violation, judicial departure from well-settled standards, and jury nullifications.'8 2 In each case, however, discussion has invariably proceeded from
the perspective that law binds. Elaborate and ingenious arguments have been
advanced to persuade one of the wisdom of the writer's view, all the while
leaving aside the more fundamental question of the status of law and legal
standards.
On this point, it was suggested in Part I of this Article that neither
observable facts nor practical considerations, constraining externalities nor,
intellectual constructs, possess what is essential in order to give law the force
to bind. To be sure, those who contravene law's dictates are subject to
whatever sanctions the body overseeing the law may deem appropriate. But
the question of whether the law, apart from the likelihood of sanctions, has
the inherent capacity to require observance must be answered in the negative.
Theories of obligation based on observable facts, practical considerations,
constraining externalities, and intellectual constructs fail to supply a
persuasive explanation for why law should be regarded as binding.
Law is nevertheless a vehicle for ordering the affairs of society. In this
respect, whether made by legislative or nonlegislative officials, law evidences
the value preferences of the community. To contend that law lacks the force
to bind does not mean that a disordered and valueless society is either
preferred or unavoidable. As Part II pointed out, order and values can be
preserved by commitment to unremitting and serious emphasis on developing
in all people, from the very moment they acquire moral awareness, a sense of
individual responsibility and personal accountability. Responsibility and
accountability not just in acting, thinking, and talking in a fashion that reflects
an almost brooding sensitivity to the need to be conscientious, open to all
suggestions, skeptical about each, and caring toward every inhabitant of our
world. Nor just responsibility and the accountability in resignation to
punishment that might follow some form of irresponsibility found in
submission to whim, a closed mind, ideological self-assuredness, or egocentrism. The kind of responsibility and accountability to which attention has
been directed was conceived broadly, to appreciate that each of us contributes
by our action or inaction, not simply to our own discrete condition, but to the
very nature of all that we see around us. In a real and concrete sense, we all
share in responsibility for every aspect of the society in which we live.
Emphasizing responsibility and accountability places the focus on the values
which actions that are said to be responsible happen to promote. Since the
objective of law is to order society's affairs so as to allow the pursuit of

181. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
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values deemed sufficiently important to be desired, the task confronted when
seeking to determine whether an action is to be designated "lawful" is not one
that revolves around consistency of the action with the words of the rule, but
around consistency with the values society holds dear.
Now there can be no denying that the possibility exists of different actors
or decision-makers arriving at differing conclusions with regard to the matter
of lawfulness. A conclusion can be affected by inflexible commitment to the
plain language of the rule, or simply by a different vision concerning the
values implicated in the situation at hand. You may assess a situation
differently from me, John Paul Stevens differently from Sandra Day
O'Connor, and clearly, Mother Theresa differently from Muammar Khadafi.
True responsibility, however, acknowledges the very real likelihood of
divergent assessments. But it also goes much further. True responsibility
involves a willing acceptance of the consequences (that is, sanctions) of a
determination by the community that action taken on a decision was unlawful.
The very fact of divergent assessments of the values involved seems to be an
unavoidable reality. In all the uncertainty of a social system designed to focus
on the allocation and assessment of values, nevertheless, there lies the seed
of genuine legal creativity. When responsibility and accountability augment
the order wrought by law, while at the same time directing attention to what
really matters, that is, all that resides within the veneer which legal rules
encapsulate, the opportunities for improving the human condition are vastly
enhanced and the chances of society's faith in law having some degree of
validity are made increasingly meritorious.
I would be remiss not to acknowledge that the notion of responsibility and
accountability so ardently advocated herein may well lack the force to suggest
even itself as obligatory. Obviously the point has not been explored. However,
if there is nothing about law which gives it the force to bind, there may be
nothing about responsibility and accountability which indicate they must be
honored. A reason for this paper advancing these two virtues has more to do
with defending against suggestions that if law does not obligate then chaos
must be preferred. Yet taking that explanation as given, it seems perfectly
sensible to inquire whether responsibility and accountability are themselves
obligatory. While admittedly they may be useful in producing an orderly
society, is there anything about them or their usefulness which indicates one
must not choose to act irresponsibly and with a sense of impunity?
Beyond this concern, there is yet a second which I must disclose. No
exegesis which draws attention to the fact that officially endorsed societal
standards called law are designed to facilitate the pursuit of values seen as
important would be complete without an exploration of the identity, attributes,
and comparability of values generally. Without some feel for what should be
considered values, the character and aspects of each, and the weight and
relationship they bare to each other, it would seem impossible for an adherent
to the position that law does not obligate, but rather arranges the affairs of
society so as to allow the promotion of desired values, to arrive at an
informed conclusion regarding the lawfulness of particular conduct. Obvious-
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ly, if facilitating the pursuit of desired values is the quintessential objective
of law, then whether specific conduct is lawful turns on the degree of
consistency between the values desired and those advanced by the conduct in
question. Just as obviously, for the degree of consistency to be determined
between these two, it is absolutely imperative that one be fully sensitive to
and knowledgeable about value analysis. This would appear to be the case
even in the event, as mentioned before, that there is no such thing as objective
truth. After all, one particular conclusion may present itself more appropriately than another, out of consonance with what is desired, rather than out of
some natural hierarchical ordering which leaves no other acceptable
conclusion. Yet the kind of exploration of values envisioned is not to be
found in the foregoing, as it would undoubtedly take at least as many pages
as have already been filled to begin to scratch the surface of that extraordinarily complex matter. To this extent, what has been offered so far sadly fails
for incompleteness.
Notwithstanding this failure, a failure with which in some respects I am
sure most thoughtful people can empathize, it is clear that what has been said
permits an intelligent reaction to matters like determinacy, legal reasoning,
and interpretivism, all raised by theoretical scholarship. It also permits a
reaction to judicial precedent on the meaning and application of terms in
private contractual commitments, and the resolution of conflicts involving
behavior inconsistent with constitutional or legislative text or common law
principles, as well as a reaction to practical concerns like civil disobedience,
advice to clients on the morality of contemplated conduct, and jury nullification. Those were the matters proffered at the outset of this paper as suggesting
the relevancy and importance of inquiring into the question of whether law
binds.
The cerebral challenges of theoretical scholarship are substantial, and the
inventive genius of those up to the task is frequently quite astounding. It
seems, however, that the non-obligatory nature of law suggests that much
energy has been mischanneled. Rather than weaving a complex and intricate
tapestry on something like whether law has an established meaning, or legal
reasoning is arbitrary and non-justifiable, talents could be better used if
applied to the task of husbanding in citizens a sense that we all must own up
to the way we conduct ourselves. Stratagems equal in creative brilliance to
those concocted to prove one's position on such things as determinacy or legal
reasoning can be employed. Refocusing theoretical scholarship in this way
would allow for integration of lessons about temperance and tolerance, to
those inclined to believe in the existence of identifiable, immutable truths, and
about restraint and reflection, to those inclined to believe that nothing is
certain and that truth is an illusion nowhere to be found. Irrespective of the
side of the issue on which one happens to find oneself, by approaching any
of the concerns of theoretical scholarship from the perspective that law's lack
of obligatoriness is to be coupled with a heightened emphasis on civic
conscience, the thrust of such scholarship will be away from the development
of ever more abstruse defenses of one's view, and toward a common effort to
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elevate humankind well above the level of mere sentient creature. Such a
reorientation will not only demonstrate the real-world value of theoretical
scholarship, but will also enlist some of the most deft minds in fashioning a
social curriculum for enhancing the quality of individual behavior.
A shift away from approaching law as binding, and towards an emphasis on
developing a greater sense of the serious obligations attendant to individuality
in society, can prove similarly beneficial to the architects of judicial
precedent. They no doubt labor agonizingly with cases which pit decisions
suggesting themselves as appropriate against what the language of a
constitutional or statutory provision, earlier judicial opinion, or private
contractual commitment would appear to allow. Proceeding from the
proposition that the prime task is to aid the growth and development of the
twin virtues of responsibility and accountability, judicial officials can assuage
their troubled consciences and pen decisions reflecting an incorporation of
that task into the one of giving effect to public or private legal standards.
Departure from the words of any legal pronouncement need not be as it might
seem to appear. As normative law does not exist apart from society, so it
cannot be understood apart from that in which it exists. Therefore, in
rendering decisions which are designed to promote sensitivity to the important
obligation that we all have to be conscientious, considerate, and committed to
ourselves as well as to the community in which we live, a judge performs
exactly as is to be expected, and in a manner that captures every aspect of
what is truly involved in the law.
The practical concerns, like civil disobedience, jury nullification, and
conduct of government officials, can also prove less wrenching when viewed
from the perspective of law lacking the inherent ability to command
observance. By a recalibration that focuses on the fact that the real obligation
of every person to whom the law speaks is one of thoughtful conscientiousness based on a selfless sense of autonomy, the decisions associated with each
of these practical concerns become easier. Certainly they are no easier if one
considers the level of genuine and searching deliberation involved. The very
essence of accountability and responsibility demands attentiveness to this
matter. But on the score of decisions incongruous with what the law seems to
direct, those faced with taking such decisions can do so with a certain calm
appreciation for how their actions comport with law's objective of ordering
and enhancing social intercourse.
By rejecting the conventional wisdom regarding law's binding force, those
who, confronting any of the complexities mentioned above, repose confidence
in responsibility and accountability trust in tried and faithful lights of societal
advancement. The role of legal rules is accorded a position befitting the extent
to which rules are able to guarantee the successful conclusion of that quest.
Those interacting with law continue to speak publicly of it as a set of
obligatory social norms. However, at the same time they appreciate its real
import. While concerned with proceeding in a measured and cautious
fashion-considering all options and discounting none-and prepared to
accept the consequences incident to a rejection of the propriety of the course
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pursued, those involved regard the existence of a legal rule as but a very
weighty factor in deciding what conduct is to be undertaken. The weight of
the rules derives from what they appear to say about how society regards the
matter at hand, as well as from the mere fact that when seemingly shown
disregard, values like predictability and consistency are called into question.
Thus having such weight, actions which typify the quintessence of responsibility and accountability must move with the greatest of reluctance to contravene
established standards of law. Yet for all the hesitancy which that reluctance
engenders, it is nonetheless appreciated as vastly different from a perception
of law as sacred and inviolable dogma.
If I may be permitted a concluding observation, perhaps much of the
turmoil in modem legal scholarship is nothing more than a microcosmic
reflection of a problem that, on the larger level of society itself, has dogged
humankind since the beginning of the species-specifically, the desire for
certainty, definitiveness, closure, a final answer about what is correct or right.
Here exists an unremitting pang that nothing seems able to satiate. This
longing for certainty pervades every aspect of our existence. In the law it
manifests itself in both the search for the meaning of legal rules and efforts
to formulate persuasive explanations of legal obligation. Yet as irrepressive
as the desire may be, it is at least possible that it exerts a control that diverts
us from the terribly unsettling reality that if we are truly to make a contribution to societal advancement, indeed if we are to experience what life is all
about, we must first let go and content ourselves with complete and total
uncertainty.' 83 Some may say no more foolhardy prescription could be
offered for the guidance of the legal system. The very notion of law rings of
order, clarity, and explicitness. But perhaps it is of just such things that selfrighteousness, inflexibility, cupidity, and insensitivity are born. Perhaps it is
just such afflictions that not only prevent us from coming to grips with what
must really be done to create a harmonious society, but what must also be
done for each one of us as individuals to know an analogous sense of inner
peace.

183. I am reminded of a couple of interesting observations that have relevance at this juncture. In
Justice Holmes' 1897 dedication address at the new hall of the Boston University School of Law, he
suggested that the legal system seems to reflect the logical form of reasoning. Nonetheless, his long
years of experience and perspicuous mind led him to believe that "certainty generally is illusion, and
repose is not the destiny of man." See Holmes, supranote 169, at 466. Similarly, the writings of HansGeorg Gadamer, the German hermeneutics philosopher, suggest a theme o learning to live with
uncertainty and absence of objectivity. Gadamer argues in TRUTH AND METHOD that interpretation of
any text is a reflection of the community and tradition in which the interpreter exists. GADAMER, supra
note 160. And "[t]radition is not simply a precondition into which we come, but we produce it
ourselves, inasmuch as we understand, participate in the evolution of tradition, and hence further
determine it ourselves." Id. at 261 (emphasis added). The intimation is that the meaning of any given
text is never static, but always changing. Appropriate understanding requires recognition and acceptance
of this reality. From the Christian religious tradition derives a comparable admonition to embrace
uncertainty. The epistle of James 1:17-27 entreats its readers to look not to the formal law as a guide
to conduct, but to "the perfect law, the law ofliberty." In complete liberty exists uncertainty. Yet in that,
more than in the crystal clear formulations of articulated law, is to be found the soul's salvation.

